

EAST EUROPE

A Monthly Review of East European Affairs

EAST-WEST CULTURAL EXCHANGE
HUNGARY'S REVOLT RECONSIDERED

WINTER JOURNAL *by Martin Armstrong*

PHILOSOPHY IN POLAND

Man in the News: Hungary
Khrushchev after the Summit
Profile of a Friend
Moscow on Tito

JULY 1960

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EAST EUROPE

Formerly NEWS FROM BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

CONTENTS

THE MONTH IN REVIEW	1
CRACKS IN THE CURTAIN	3
THE REVOLT RECONSIDERED, BY WILLIAM GRIFFITH	12
WINTER JOURNAL, BY MARIA DABROWSKA	21
HUNGARY'S NEW ENVOY, BY GENERAL BELA KIRALY	26
PHILOSOPHY IN POLAND	29
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS	36
PROFILE OF A FRIEND	48
TEXTS AND DOCUMENTS: ON REVISIONISM	49

EAST EUROPE is a monthly review of political, economic, social and intellectual trends and events in the Soviet orbit. Information contained in this magazine is based on a thorough analysis by specialists from East European countries of all major Communist publications as well as the monitoring of Communist broadcasts.

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THE MONTH IN REVIEW

DISUNITY

IN THE PRESS DISPATCHES which the world reads over its breakfast table, the countries of the Western bloc often sound like a family that is fighting about an inheritance—in contrast to the rhythmic chants which emanate from the East. The truth, as the events of the past six weeks have shown, is that both blocs contain diverse elements which are held together only by strenuous efforts on the part of the men who lead them. President Eisenhower was turned away from Tokyo last month because the Kishi government was unable to quell the demonstrators by measures available to it under the democratic constitution of Japan. If Premier Khrushchev escaped worse embarrassment from his Chinese ally, it was only because the Communist oligarchs are free to conduct their international relations without consulting public opinion.



The Peiping-Moscow differences probably escaped the notice of all but a handful of China's 650 million people; to discern them, indeed, required the services of men skilled in the exegesis of Marxist-Leninist texts. Both Parties quoted Lenin by the paragraph; both affirmed their belief in the possibility of coexistence with "capitalist imperialism"; both asserted that Communism would some day win the whole world. The differences lay mainly in tone and emphasis, and in Peiping's iteration that the Communists must not flag in their "struggle against the imperialist policies of aggression and plunder." But the implied criticism of Khrushchev's summiteering was plain enough in Moscow.

ON THE "LEFT"

P*ravda* GOT AROUND TO REPLY on June 12, with an article commenting on Lenin's book, "Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder." Said *Pravda*: "The left-sectarian sentiments and tendencies against which Lenin's book was directed find their expression in some places even in our time. Some persons mistakenly consider the course of the achievement of peaceful coexistence of countries with different political systems, the struggle to halt the arms race and to strengthen peace and friendship among peoples, and the talks between leaders of Socialist and capitalist countries, as some kind of deviation from the positions of Marxism-Leninism."

This leaden pronouncement was enough to show Peiping and the rest of the world that Premier Khrushchev was still in control of policy-making in the Kremlin, although outsiders could not be sure what concessions the Premier may have made to his opponents at home. The center was holding. But in Eastern Europe, where the Communists are much more sensitive to public opinion than elsewhere, it was necessary to make a quite different defense of Khrushchev's actions in Paris and to assure the people that there had been no change in the policy of negotiation with the West.

ON THE "RIGHT"

IF THE CHINESE DEVIATION is "left-sectarianism," the danger in Eastern Europe comes from the opposite extreme of "revisionism." The symbol of this heresy, of course, is Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia who has kept his country stubbornly independent of Moscow ever since his break with Stalin in 1948. Although Tito has supported Moscow

in most aspects of its foreign policy, he has often criticized the existence of two world blocs and Moscow's presumption to dictate policies for all Communist countries. During the Paris proceedings he divulged to the world his own view of the U-2 incident, expressing the hope that it would not be used (by Moscow) as an excuse for tearing down the framework of negotiation so painfully built. On May 28, in a speech at Subotica, he compounded his offence by taking a neutralist position in the East-West struggle. While characterizing the US as "the main culprit" in the collapse of the summit talks, he implied that the USSR was also at fault. He said that the Yugoslavs must cooperate with the African and Asian countries and "with all peace-loving forces in the world in the struggle to preserve the peace. You can see for yourselves that the great powers are not exactly those in whom one might have full confidence. . . ."

ANTI-TITO

THE NOTION THAT THE USSR cannot be relied upon to defend the interests of the small nations, and that Khrushchev is not whole-hearted in his quest for peace, are hardly the ideas that Moscow wants to circulate in Eastern Europe. That they do circulate is not entirely the fault of Tito. An East German newspaper, *Freie Erde*, reported on May 31 that a certain collective farmer had said: "Khrushchev should not have been so pigheaded. Then the summit conference would have taken place." Opinions like these creep into the controlled press only as texts for editorials written to refute them, but they are probably on the lips or in the minds of millions of ordinary people.

Moscow lost no time in moving against the public figure who embodies these views. On May 23, *Kommunist* published a thoroughgoing attack on Tito's domestic and international policies which was equivalent in substance and argument to the attacks made upon him by the Chinese Communists. (See Texts and Documents.) "J. Tito," it said, "rests all hopes for the consolidation of peace and the security of nations not in the comity of the Socialist countries . . . but merely in the 'countries which have not joined blocs.' Tito tries to come out again in the role of an arbiter standing 'above the blocs' and thereby denies the correctness of the policy of the States of the worldwide Socialist system on the most important international issue."

IN BUCHAREST

FOR ALL OF PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S agility in the political arena, his position as the spokesman for his allies and dependents is much less secure than that of the American President, and his ability to carry on meaningful negotiations with the opposite side is probably no greater. As much as any Western statesman he must defend the accepted verities and denounce the ideological enemies of his camp. His performance in Bucharest on June 21 showed how hard he must work to satisfy all of his retainers. Speaking to the Third Congress of the Romanian Workers' (Communist) Party, he thundered against "the imperialist policy of the United States" as the chief cause of world tension. He charged once more that the Eisenhower administration was incapable of negotiating with the Communist bloc. At the same time he stressed that the USSR would adhere to its policy of peaceful coexistence. Alluding to the doctrinal dispute with China, he said that "one cannot mechanically repeat now what Vladimir Ilich Lenin said many decades ago on imperialism and go on asserting that imperialist wars are inevitable until Socialism triumphs throughout the world."

The delegates who turned up in Bucharest included all but one of the First Secretaries of the East European dependencies, an indication that some important political discussions were probably underway. A *New York Times* dispatch from Warsaw on June 20 reported that the East Europeans were solidly in support of Khrushchev against his opponents in Peiping and Moscow, and that they regarded further negotiations with the West as of the utmost importance. The net result of the Bucharest proceedings was to shore up the Soviet Premier's platform as well as was possible for such an edifice of contradictions, leaving him free to assume the posture of a world statesman for his next venture into the West.



Stanislaw Skrowaczewski, a young Polish conductor who is now under contract with the Minneapolis Orchestra.
POLAND (Warsaw), No. 2, 1959

Cracks in the Curtain

The peoples of Eastern Europe are not quite as isolated from the West as they were in Stalin's day, and contacts seem likely to continue despite the failure of the summit conference.

MAN IS A RESTLESS, inquisitive animal, constantly beating paths into strange places. Against his mobile energies, the barriers of nature, language and government can only partially prevail. Probably the most elaborate attempt to divide the human race was that of Stalin and his cultural commissar Zhdanov in the years after 1943, when they tried to seal off the peoples of the Soviet bloc from all contact with other cultures of the world. The effort was a massive and ingenious one, ranging from barbed wire and border guards to radio jamming stations and the censorship of mail; and from internal controls over popular culture to the regimentation of scientific research. This apparatus functioned in a framework of political purges, policemen and jails, and was successful so long as Stalin was alive to maintain his system of terror. Stalin's successors have abandoned his most outrageous instruments of control and chosen instead to operate on the assumption that "Socialism" has a culture of its own which can triumph in a competitive race with other cultures.

The result has been a startling increase in East-West contacts on all levels, and the peoples of the Communist countries have begun to turn their faces again to the West. It is a development which the Communists have not been able to view with equanimity, much less with enthusiasm, particularly in Eastern Europe where the culture of the West sometimes threatens to nullify the influence of the Soviet Union. The chairman of the Hungarian Writers' Union recently warned of the "illusions" that tend to arise in an era of peaceful coexistence, particularly the illusion that "peaceful coexistence also includes ideological peace."

"This is by no means true: a policy of peaceful coexistence does not mean . . . the reconciliation of two different ideologies. But we [must] reckon with the revival of such illusions. Namely, international contacts are becoming broader, the channels in which the two cultures meet will grow in number; hence, it is evident . . . that cultural and intellectual elements which are not our own will arrive regularly, and we have to be well-prepared to fend them off."¹

Who Gains? Who Loses?

Similar fears of the insidious West have often been expressed by other cultural functionaries in Eastern Europe. The invasion of their theaters by plays straight from Broadway, the popularity of American jazz and Western fashions in clothing, the hunger of intellectuals for the Western science and art which form their true cultural heritage—these constitute a formidable challenge to the notion that Socialism *à la russe* is a way of life superior to that of the decadent, bourgeois West. Short of a return to the cruel methods of Stalin, there is not much the Communists can do to shut the West out. They still jam radio broadcasts from abroad (except in Poland), and monopolize the channels of public communication, but it is not possible to suppress the desire of their intelligentsia to know what is being thought and written in other countries, or to prevent young people from playing Western music.

But there is another side to the coin. By elevating contact with foreign countries to the status of a deliberate policy, the Communist governments have been able to picture themselves as favoring mutual understanding among nations. It is no longer the Communists—so the argument runs—who seek to raise barriers against world intercourse but rather the West, which is afraid of what it may find in the lands of "Socialism." A Polish literary weekly expressed this idea last year in an article entitled "Optimistic Reflections." During the years of Stalinism, it said, "the 'West' bewailed the lack of contact with people from the 'East,' considered this lack as representative of 'Eastern' weakness and fear of the 'West,' and saw the restoration of contacts as a tool in its own anti-Communist agitation. Contact was established. Hosts of tourists from the Socialist countries began visiting the capitalist world and vice versa. Scientific, cultural and literary exchange was revived. The results, however, are completely opposite to those expected in the West. . . . Fear of Communism's 'internal terror' and its economic and military power is now more and more giving way to fear of its cultural influence and the force of its examples and achievements."²

While this is to overstate the attractiveness of Communism to Western eyes, some visitors from the West are no doubt impressed by the appearance of things. The symptoms of Communist tyranny—of which they have heard so much—are largely invisible to the eye. What they see primarily are buildings and people, and the results of ten or fifteen years of heavy investment in the material equipment of society. To quote the article previously cited, "Let us try to think along the lines of a farmer from Mogila, near Cracow, who returns to find Nowa Huta [a giant iron and steel town] in place of his village. Let us try to follow the reasoning of a western intellectual who, for years on end, was told about the 'iron curtain,' and who today sees behind the windows and counters of numerous stores in Warsaw or Cracow various Western books and publications, many of which are by no means famous for their sympathy to the Communist cause. . . . He expected to encounter hatred for the 'system'; the most he will notice—if he is an anti-Communist—will be wary skepticism and critical humor together with an acceptance of the direction of the development, with criticism—at times—reserved only for the method, tempo and costs."

OPENING THE WINDOWS

IN PLACE OF THE OLD prohibitions, the Communists have tried to control the kind and quantity of contacts with the West by carefully screening the artists, students and other personnel who are sent abroad, and by limiting cultural imports to works that may be considered, in a Marxist sense, "progressive." In some cases, moreover, the approach to "coexistence" seems to be largely verbal—a propaganda device to exaggerate the most guarded contacts so that they seem like large concessions. The tendency to praise the performances of Western musicians making guest appearances in Eastern Europe for the first time in years, or to publicize the enthusiastic reception given to



Maine's Senator Muskie (center) bids farewell to US Embassy staff and Poles during a recent visit to Poland, where his family originated.
NACZA OJCZYNA (Warsaw), January 1960



Artur Rubinstein, a jury member at Warsaw's International Chopin Contest, congratulates the young Mexican contestant, Michel Blok.
RUCH MUZYCZNY (Warsaw), April 1-15, 1960

East European dancers and singers on Western tours, all too often conceals a lack of contact in other important fields.

Poland Takes the Lead

The magnitude of this exchange varies among the East European countries. It developed first and most extensively in Poland, where traditional ties with the West have tended to re-establish themselves under the relatively liberal Gomulka regime. By the end of 1957 Poland's Minister of Culture was moved to complain: "Books and films from the USSR or other People's Democracies have become as rare [in Poland] as Western books and films were several years ago. Such a state of affairs is, of course, abnormal."³ While the authorities have since taken steps to insure a better "balance," contemporary Western literature and films are becoming a normal part of Polish existence.* Poland has also permitted the growth of mutual contacts in such fields as music and sport—where ideological difficulties are least—and sent closely supervised teams and troupes abroad. Today the trend is toward the expansion of contacts between individuals, particularly in the scientific and technical spheres. Polish specialists, students, artists and writers regularly attend various international congresses and meetings, and are also allowed to accept invitations from the West for extended visits.

In the period 1957-1959, Poland sent 3,500 scientists abroad for international seminars, study and research—a majority of them to the United States, Great Britain, France, Scandinavia and the Soviet Union—and about 2,188 foreign scientists came to Poland (as compared with

658 in the years 1952-1956).⁴ Figures like these are quite frequently cited by the Polish press and radio, although they carefully refrain from breaking them down on a country-by-country basis. Thus it has been announced that this year a total of 5,000 students will go abroad to Great Britain, Austria, Denmark, France, The Netherlands and the Soviet bloc countries.⁵ The student association at Warsaw University has signed exchange agreements with student associations in London, Paris, Berlin, Stockholm, Belgrade and Moscow.⁶ (Other examples of Polish cultural contacts are given on page 8.)

Czechoslovakia: Slow and Careful

The other Satellite countries have been more reluctant to open windows to the West. Czechoslovakia, which is closest to the West both in geography and industrial development, has lagged far behind Poland in its cultural contacts. In the last year the press has reported many instances of cultural cooperation (music, films, etc.) as well as exchange trips to and from Western Europe by agricultural experts, professors and, in particular, scientists. (According to one paper, between January 1 and October 31, 1959, a total of 165 scientists from capitalist countries attended 30 scientific conferences arranged by the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences.)⁷ But the regime of Novotny and Siroky, orthodox to the core, has shown considerable and no doubt justified concern at the political consequences that may ensue from some of this commerce. The Party newspaper *Rude Pravo* last year published a long article dealing with certain unfortunate "liberalist tendencies" which arise when "a relaxation of international tension takes place."

"The struggle against bourgeois ideologies which come to us from the capitalist countries is a more complicated prob-

* According to recent statements in the Polish press, 117 American literary works were published in Poland in 1955-58, totalling 3 million copies.



Dancers of the Polish Slask Folk Ballet, which recently toured the United States.

POLAND (Warsaw), No. 2, 1959

lem than it would appear. . . . [For instance] in Italy, a progressive artistic trend sprang up after the Second World War which was called neorealism. . . . Some of our film workers began to take over the 'non-evaluating' aspect of this technique, transferring it mechanically to our reality. . . . They did not sufficiently realize the basic differences between our realism and Italian realism, the differences between the Socialist and the capitalist systems. A situation emerged in which the Party was forced to criticize these incorrect trends. . . .

"The fact that not all foreign theatrical plays, films and books displayed and sold in our country . . . are consistently Socialist productions—although in their own countries they are considered progressive creations—demands a good deal of explanatory work. Sometimes explanations are necessary even when the work speaks to the viewer in a . . . distinctly progressive manner. Many spectators, on leaving the theater after seeing the West German film 'Die Wunderkinder' asked themselves how it was possible for such a film to be produced in Adenauer's Germany. A number of people do not know that for the most part only the most valuable Western productions reach our countries and that these are exceptions, that the majority are mainly worthless and ideologically hostile productions."⁸

Kadar Seeks Respectability

In the case of Hungary, obstacles have been erected not only by the Communists but also by Western governments which have been reluctant to show friendliness toward a regime that was born in the bloody suppression of the October 1956 Revolt. In the period following the Revolt, Hungary lived almost isolated from the West, but in 1958 Kadar began to encourage cultural and scientific exchange, partly, no doubt, with the aim of winning international acceptance for his regime. At the Brussels World's Fair in the summer of 1958, Hungary staged an exhibit that was calculated to give the most favorable possible impression of the country's internal state. The Hungarian Academy of Sciences made considerable efforts to increase foreign contacts, and the press began to emphasize the benefits to be derived by Hungary from a better knowledge of Western technology. One newspaper article expatiated on the "patriotic" reasons for encouraging exchange of technical personnel:

"Today, the more modest possibilities of our economic situation still limit the collective travel of engineers, the more extensive exchange of experience. . . . But travel will multiply with the consolidation of our economic life. Foreign travel not only eats up money, it also brings it in. The knowledge of engineers is increasing—the products of our industry have become more modern and better. . . . This is how closer knowledge of the growing technical science of the world becomes a material good and a stimulating force for a better life."⁹

While acknowledging that much can be learned from the West, the Kadar regime has been exceedingly cautious about the kind and extent of foreign contacts. It has sharply limited scholarship and student exchange programs (undoubtedly remembering the role of youth in the 1956 Revolt), and has subjected those sent abroad to intensive screening. It is known, for instance, that of the 55 members of the Folk Singers Ensemble who remained after the Revolt, only 26 were granted visas by the Ministry of the Interior to perform in Munich and Paris in September 1959. Nor have the people sent abroad always been acceptable to the West. In 1959, for political reasons, the French government refused to grant entry visas to one Hungarian writer, several Party journalists and the head of the Hungarian Peace Council—an action which provoked the Hungarian regime to complain that its own attitude was far more "tolerant."¹⁰ Another instance of Western hostility occurred in 1958, when the Italian authorities refused to validate the passports of Italian winners of a Hungarian radio and TV contest, who had been awarded the prize of a ten-day trip to Hungary.

Hungarian cultural exchange with the West has increased over the past few years, and the Hungarian press tends to accord high praise to foreign performers—i.e., to the Bertheau theatrical troupe which, in 1959, was the first French theatrical company to perform in Hungary for nearly two decades. But the results of the effort are not very impressive, and the only substantial accomplishment has been the signing of a Hungarian-Finnish cultural exchange agreement. Because it strongly fears the impact

of Western influence, Hungary's program for cultural exchange has placed main stress on the non-verbal arts, and music now constitutes Hungary's chief "cultural export." In 1959, for example, a Kodaly exhibit was organized in Paris, to be followed by a Bartok exhibit in 1960. Hungarian painters are now encouraged to show their work in various European capitals, particularly Paris. In 1959, for the first time in 17 years, Hungarian films were shown at the Venice Film Festival. In 1960, the Hungarian radio boasted of Hungary's radio contacts, claiming that it had agreements with 50 foreign countries for exchange of programs:¹¹

"Relations with the large West European radios are more lively [than with others]. Paris and Brussels often beam our chamber music, which is particularly liked. London is glad to borrow Hungarian dance music, and Monte Carlo, Hungarian light music. The Paris radio has sent us popular educational conferences of its most eminent scientists and is beaming, in exchange, similar Hungarian broadcasts. Among American States, relations with the Canadian radio are very active. This radio recently asked for eight radio plays."

The Isolated Balkans

Bulgaria and Romania have never been as closely linked to the West as the other satellites, and their Communist leaders have not been forward in seeking new contacts or in renewing old ones. The Bulgarian press has recently made much of the triumphs of Bulgarian musicians abroad (e.g., the successes of Dimitur Uzinov, who sang in Italy and at the Metropolitan Opera in New York) with-

out, however, calling for more intimate contacts. Aside from musical exchanges (which seem to be most extensive with France and Italy), the government sought international markets for its film production and, according to the official press, Bulgarian movies reached countries "where the name of Bulgaria had not been heard for a long time."¹² Plans for 1960 reflected a continuation of the 1959 program and did not seem to envisage any radical relaxation in Party supervision of cultural emissaries. In preparation were a London exhibit entitled "15 years of the People's Republic of Bulgaria," an exhibit in Sofia of English scientific books, and a Bulgarian book exhibit in Stockholm. In addition, according to a newspaper account:¹²

"Many of our performers will go abroad this year—a folk dance ensemble to the US, a Pioneer Symphony Orchestra to France. . . . For the first time we will participate in the Edinburgh film festival. . . . A number of interesting exhibits . . . by foreign masters will be opened in our country . . . and our painters will display their works in many exhibits throughout the world. Exhibits will be organized in Sofia and other cities . . . of Austrian and Brazilian art . . . of the American painter Rockwell Kent, of a group of Italian painters. . . . Our exhibit '2,500

* The source, *Rabotnichesko Delo*, April 23, 1960, declared that in 1959, Bulgarian motion pictures were accepted for foreign distribution "60 times, 17 times in the capitalist countries; popular scientific, documentary, animated cartoon films were accepted 104 times, 53 times in the capitalist countries." The article, indicated, however, that Bulgarian films still left much to be desired and had not attained an acceptable form for the international market—especially in regard to length.



A recent Prague exhibit of modern Italian painting and sculpture attracted large crowds, including the bearded gentleman above.

CZECHOSLOVAK LIFE (Prague), October 1959



Prague's Mayor Alois Svoboda (right) presents a gift to the Lord Provost of Edinburgh on a 3-day official visit to the Czech capital.

CZECHOSLOVAK LIFE (Prague), August 1959



years of art in Bulgaria,' presently in Italy, will be organized in France and the German Federal Republic. Exhibitions of Bulgarian painters will be opened in England, France, the USA, Iraq and India."

Fear of opening wide the doors to Western influence has also dominated Romania's activity in the field of contacts, despite official assertions that visits of artists and scientists are in the "spirit of peaceful coexistence" and contribute to the cause of "progress, civilization and peace." Since 1957, however, the Party has advanced considerably from its state of Stalinist hostility to all Western productions; a major advance was made in 1959 with the signing of a limited cultural agreement with France. Negotiations between the two countries had begun two years previously, but founded mainly because of the Romanian government's refusal to reopen the French Library, French Institute and French Schools in Bucharest, closed in the postwar period in the Party's drive to liquidate organizations outside its control, or to permit French publications to enter the country uncensored. Last year, with these issues still unsettled, Romania and France decided to allow the exchange of lecturers, scholarship students, professors and books, and appointed a mixed cultural commission to draw up and supervise yearly exchange programs. Early in 1960, similar negotiations were started between Romania and Italy and, if the present trend continues, traffic between Romania and the West is bound to expand in the coming year.

EXCHANGE WITH THE UNITED STATES

IT IS DIFFICULT to measure the size of the present traffic between East and West, involving as it does broad-jumpers and mathematicians, politicians and symphony orchestras. The United States Government has compiled statistics on its formal exchanges with the Soviet bloc,* which give an idea of the general magnitude and of the relative participation of each country.

The intercourse with Poland far exceeds that with any of the other East European Satellites. Exchanges got under way in 1957; the American projects were mainly in the fields of culture, entertainment and sport, while the Poles laid stress on scientific, academic and technical activities. In 1958, exchange was stepped up considerably, and a number of promising young Poles were invited to the US for long-term advanced study. The Ford Foundation gave grants to about 60 Polish students and teachers in arts, languages, economics, sociology and philosophy; the Rockefeller Foundation initiated projects involving about 30 Polish specialists in medicine and agriculture; and the

* The US has signed two exchange agreements with the USSR (one for 1958-59 and another for 1960-61) specifying the type and number of exchange delegations in industry, agriculture, education, science, medicine, and the performing arts, and also covering exchanges in films, sports and exhibitions. With Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania, exchange has been based on *ad hoc* arrangements; these involve intergovernmental negotiations as well as negotiations between the Communist governments and private American citizens and organizations. The figures do not include tourists, commercial travellers and diplomats.

EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH THE UNITED STATES

Direction of Travel	Number of Projects* 1958-59	Number of Visitors** 1958-59
USSR to US	136	1867
US to USSR	141	2144
Poland to US	99	680
US to Poland	57	484
Czechoslovakia to US	36	58
US to Czechoslovakia	13	46
Romania to US	8	17
US to Romania	10	46
Hungary to US	10	43
US to Hungary	9	32

SOURCE: US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, REPORT ON THE EAST-WEST EXCHANGE PROGRAM, PROJECTS STARTED OR CARRIED OUT AFTER JUNE 30, 1959. The US does not maintain diplomatic relations with East Germany and Albania and hence there are no exchange projects with them. Relations with Bulgaria were restored late in 1959.

* A project is defined as an activity within the scope of the East-West contacts program involving a visit either way or both ways by individuals, groups, delegations, etc., not including tourists, commercial visitors and diplomats.

** The figures do not include trips primarily of a diplomatic, tourist, family, journalistic or commercial nature.

Brethren Service Commission brought over 20 young Polish agriculturalists to live with American families. There were, in addition, about 40 Polish students and technicians working in other fields. (Only about 15 Americans went to Poland under comparable projects, and the majority were professors travelling under Ford Foundation grants.)*

The number of "cultural" exchange projects also increased in 1958. The visit of the American pianist Artur Schnabel was one of the most publicized Polish musical events of the year. An agreement was reached allowing exporters of American films, books and periodicals to sign sales contracts with Polish authorities. It was reported that well over 100,000 Poles had viewed American films loaned by the US Embassy. Poland agreed to let the US distribute 30,000 copies of a Polish-language monthly called *Ameryka*, to be published by the US Information Agency. (The first issue went on sale in Poland on February 2, 1959, and was quickly sold out.)

Recent Polish Visitors

Exchange in 1959 proceeded along similar lines. US statistics give the following information on Polish visitors in the first half of that year:

- 28 Poles attended scientific and technical meetings in the US;

* In 1957, 182 Americans went to Poland and 95 Poles came to the US on the basis of Polish-American projects; in 1958, 228 Americans went to Poland and 250 Poles came to the US. If visits by tourists and commercial travellers were included in these statistics, the number of Americans visiting Poland would be much higher.



The Czech Trio, now on a 7-month tour of Greece, Lebanon, Iran, India, Ceylon, the Philippines, Japan, the US and Latin America.

CZECHOSLOVAK LIFE (Prague), April 1960

- 60 Poles arrived in connection with cultural-entertainment projects (this included a tour by the Polish Comédie Theater Group and a visit by the Polish soccer team);

- 101 Poles were in the US for academic purposes.

Bare statistics do not convey the human significance of this passage of people. Nor does the statement in a gray government report that, in the second half of 1959, 14 Polish visitors attended scientific and technical meetings in the US (the Second World Conference on Medical Education in Chicago, the International Oceanographic Congress in New York, the Radiation Preservation of Food Conference in Boston, etc.).¹⁴ The list can be extended. In the period between September 1959 and June 1960, about 27 Polish professors were lecturing or doing research



Bulgaria's Pioneer Orchestra has become a major cultural export. Last year the group won success in Austria, Italy and West Germany.

BULGARIA TODAY (Sofia), No. 1, 1960

at US universities.* In the second half of 1959, US audiences were entertained by the colorful Polish Slask Folk Ballet which toured 21 American cities under the management of Sol Hurok. The young Polish conductor Stanislaw Skrowaczewski also attracted wide attention, and his US successes won him a contract as the new conductor of the Minneapolis Orchestra. A "Miss Poland" took part in the "Miss Universe" Beauty Contest in California. On the other side of the exchange, Leonard Bernstein conducted the New York Philharmonic in Warsaw, and the Jerome Robbins Ballet showed Polish audiences some of the current trends in American dance. Two well-known American writers—Saul Bellow and Mary McCarthy—went to Poland on International Education Exchange Service grants.

The Others

Compared to that with Poland, US exchange with the other East European countries has been small. The Czechoslovak regime has adopted a restrictive attitude toward exchange, and although the tempo of East-West contacts picked up in 1959, they were still very limited in the cultural and academic fields. Emphasis, for the most part, was on science and sport. In the first half of 1959, about 16 Czechoslovak visitors attended scientific meetings in the US and 2 visitors arrived to participate in the world figure

VISITORS UNDER US-SOVIET BLOC EXCHANGE PROGRAMS IN 1958

From US	USSR	Czecho- Poland	Ro- lovakia	ma- nia	Hungary
<i>Academic</i>	206	16	1	5	1
<i>Scientific-Technical</i>	392	16	2	0	0
<i>Culture-Entertainment- Sport</i>	355	196	15	30	77
To US					
<i>Academic</i>	39	161	3	3	1
<i>Scientific-Technical</i>	247	38	6	4	4
<i>Culture-Entertainment- Sport</i>	230	51	5	0	21

SOURCE: COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, UNITED STATES EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, ROMANIA AND HUNGARY. These figures are approximate, and do not include tourists, commercial travelers and diplomats. It is estimated that about 5,000 American tourists visited the Soviet Union in 1958; 66 Soviet tourists visited the United States, the first since World War II.

*In connection with other academic projects for the second half of 1959, the Ford Foundation issued 25 grants to Poles and the Rockefeller Foundation 40; 18 Poles arrived under the Agricultural Exchange Program; 3 Poles came to the US for the International Atomic Energy Agency Training Program in nuclear physics; 6 Polish doctors interned at American hospitals; and 13 other Poles worked in various fields. Only about 12 Americans went to Poland for academic activity.

CZECHOSLOVAK CONTACTS WITH THE WEST

Some of the comings and goings between
Czechoslovakia and the West in 1959:

January

The Czech film "Grandfather Automobile" was shown in London. America's Dean Dixon led the Brno Philharmonic State Orchestra.

A Czech scientist went to study for one year at the French National Research Center for Atomic Energy, near Paris.

February

C. H. Waddington, the English biologist, lectured in Czechoslovakia.

An exhibition called "1100 Years of Czechoslovak Architecture" opened in Vienna.

Arthur Miller's "A View from the Bridge" was performed in Prague and Bratislava.

Czechoslovak theatrical groups also staged plays by O'Neill and Langston Hughes.

Prague's Charles University awarded an honorary degree to Pablo Casals.

Czechoslovak rheumatologists visited Belgium.

Three Czechoslovak doctors were granted WHO scholarships for study in London.

March

The Scotch poet Hugh MacDiarmid visited Prague.

The government announced that Czechoslovakia would enter three films at the Cannes Film Festival.

April

In April and May, the French Julien Bertheau Theater toured Czechoslovakia.

skating championships; in exchange, about 11 US citizens went to Czechoslovakia in connection with scientific and technical projects, and 21 Americans (3 in the field of music and 18 for figure skating and ice hockey) were involved in cultural projects. In the second half of the year, no American visited Czechoslovakia under the exchange program, but 11 Czechs came to the US for scientific conferences, the well-known Smetana Quartet gave concerts in 17 US cities, and, for the first time in the postwar period, 6 Czechoslovak specialists arrived on study grants.

US-Hungarian exchange has been equally limited. In the first half of 1959, 5 Hungarians attended scientific conferences in the US, and 4 Americans went to Hungary, 2 of them musicians on privately arranged tours. In the second half of the year, about 6 Hungarians came to the US for scientific and technical purposes, 8 Hungarians arrived for the Modern Pentathlon Championship in Pennsylvania, and the Hungarian conductor Janos Ferencsik gave several concerts at the Hollywood Bowl. Only two Americans went to Hungary in this period, for scientific meetings.

The pattern was similar with Romania. In the first half of 1959, 8 Romanians attended the World Petroleum Congress and, in the academic field, Professor Ionescu Tulcea

A seven-member delegation of Icelandic musicians visited Prague.

It was announced that three groups of Czechoslovak architects would visit the West in the summer and fall—20 would go to Italy and 30 to France and Austria.

The regime stated that it would soon publish *Robinson Crusoe* in the original version.

Czechoslovak short films were shown at the industrial film festival in England.

Dr. Thomas H. Stewart of the Smithsonian Institution was in Prague in connection with celebrations commemorating the 90th anniversary of the Czech anthropologist Alex Hrdlicka.

May

Dr. Albert Sabin consulted with the Czechoslovak Health Ministry on his polio vaccine. (Dr. Sabin also went to the USSR.)

Representatives of French agricultural organizations visited Czechoslovakia on a study trip.

Two books by the Czech author Jan Otcenasek were published in France.

The Swedish poet, E. Blomberg, arrived in Prague at the invitation of the Communist Writers' Union.

Arthur Miller's "Death of a Salesman" was performed at the Prague National Theater.

The Liberec ballet performed Gershwin's "Rhapsody in Blue" and "An American in Paris."

June

Sir H. Melville, British specialist in macromolecular chemistry, arrived in Prague at the invitation of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. According to the press, he was the 12th member of top British scientific institutions to visit Prague during the year.

July

Czechoslovak writers participated in the PEN Club Congress in West Germany.

A number of philologists from Sweden, France and England participated in the summer school of Slavonic Studies.

August

14 American gynecologists visited Prague hospitals during a study tour of Europe.

September

The American Chemical Society awarded the Fritzsche Prize to Academician Frantisek Sorm, who left for the US to accept the prize and lecture in New York, Detroit and Boston.

October

An Austrian book exhibit was opened in Prague.

Violoncellist Milos Sadlos went to Indiana State University for 2½ months of lecturing and teaching.

The Smetana Quartet left for a nine-week tour of the US and the German Federal Republic.

November

A delegation of Czechoslovak professors left for a three-week study tour of British universities.

December

The Finnish National Opera and the Prague National Theater signed an agreement on exchange of soloists in 1960.

An exhibition of Czechoslovak children's books opened in Bologna, Italy, and was slated to tour other Italian cities.

An exhibition entitled "The Little World of Jiri Trnka" (famous painter and producer of animated films) was opened in Paris.

participated in a special mathematical analysis program at Yale. A pianist—Julius Katchen—was the only American to go to Romania under the exchange program in this time. In the second half of the year, 2 Romanians attended the Annual National Conference of the American Association of Textile Chemists and Colorers, in Washington, D. C., and 3 Romanians—2 agricultural technicians and 1 participant in the IAEA Training Program in nuclear physics—came to the US for academic purposes. A total of 8 Americans went to Romania.

PROSPECTS

THE FAILURE OF THE summit conference in May does not seem to have affected the East-West cultural exchange programs. In a Moscow press conference on June 3, Premier Khrushchev declared that the Soviet Union was not imposing restrictions and that for the time being "all the scheduled visits of scientists and artists are being made." In May and June there were numerous artistic exchanges with the Satellite area. To mention only a few, Hungary's famous composer Zoltan Kodaly visited England, the British conductor Sir John Barbirolli was hailed in Prague and Budapest, the violinist Isaac Stern played in Czecho-

slovakia, and such movies as "The 400 Blows" and "Room at the Top" were presented to Hungarian audiences.

Though the East-West exchange is still small by the standards of civilized intercourse, it is supported by significant elements of the public on both sides of the international barrier. Short of some major catastrophe, it seems unlikely that Khrushchev's public table-pounding will stem the hopeful flow of people and ideas.

SOURCES FOR THIS ARTICLE

¹ ELET ES IRODALOM (Budapest), January 15, 1960

² ZYCIE LITERACKIE (Cracow), July 5, 1959

³ TRYBUNA LUDU (Warsaw), December 17, 1957

⁴ Radio Warsaw, March 28, 1960

⁵ TRYBUNA LUDU (Warsaw), January 3, 1960

⁶ Polish Press Agency, January 12, 1960

⁷ SVOBODNE SLOVO (Prague), November 17, 1959

⁸ RUDE PRAVO (Prague), April 19, 1959

⁹ MAGYAR NEMZET (Budapest), January 25, 1958

¹⁰ NEPSZAVA (Budapest), June 13, 1959

¹¹ Radio Budapest, March 22, 1960

¹² RABOTNICHESKO DELO (Sofia), February 2, 1960

¹³ US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "United States Exchange Programs with the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Hungary," August 20, 1959

¹⁴ US State Department, "Report on the East-West Exchange Program, Projects Started or Carried Out After June 30, 1959"

Book Review

The Revolt Reconsidered

WILLIAM GRIFFITH

Tamas Aczel and Tibor Meray, THE REVOLT OF THE MIND. A CASE HISTORY OF INTELLECTUAL RESISTANCE BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN. New York: Praeger, 1959.

Istvan Meszaros, LA RIVOLTA DEGLI INTELLETTUALI IN UNGHERIA. DAI DIBATTITI SU LUKACS E SU TIBOR DERY AL CIRCOLO PETOFI. Turin: Einaudi, 1957.

Tibor Meray, THIRTEEN DAYS THAT SHOOK THE KREMLIN. New York: Praeger, 1959.

Miklos Molnar and Laszlo Nagy, IMRE NAGY, RÉFORMATEUR OU RÉVOLUTIONNAIRE? Geneva: Droz and Paris: Minard, 1959.

THE TRUTH ABOUT THE NAGY AFFAIR. London: Secker & Warburg and New York: Praeger, 1959.

THE REVIEW. Brussels: Imre Nagy Institute. Quarterly, June 1959 to date.

François Fejtő, UNGHERIA 1945-1957. Turin: Einaudi, 1957.

BOOKS ON THE Hungarian thaw and Revolt continue to appear; like the American Civil War, Hungarian events from the death of Stalin in 1953 to the crushing of the Revolt by the Red Army in late 1956 seem to encourage attempts at total recall on the part of their participants. No full-scale scholarly work has yet been published, either on Hungarian events themselves or in the framework of a comparative study of, say, Polish and Hungarian developments.¹ It therefore seems worthwhile to attempt a

cursory survey of recent publications, evaluate the material and viewpoints expressed, and, finally, make some tentative suggestions as to lines of inquiry which might profitably be further pursued.

Of all the "memoir" literature yet published on the 1953-1956 period in Hungary, Aczel and Meray's *Revolt of the Mind* and Meray's *Thirteen Days That Shook the Kremlin* are the most detailed and among the most interesting. Tamas Aczel and Tibor Meray were, in the 1949-1953 period, young, fanatical Stalinists; Aczel received the Stalin Prize for a novel, and Meray won the Kossuth Prize for his dispatches about American bacteriological warfare in Korea. By 1954 they were among the leaders in the Hungarian intellectual revolt;² they both fled to the West after the 1956 Revolution. *Revolt of the Mind* is an account of the pre-Revolution intellectual thaw, journalistic and episodic in style, and often sacrificing continuity and perspective to dramatic effect. It is admittedly one-sided, concerned only with Communist writers and journalists, and at times almost too journalistic: it suffers frequently from suspiciously "total" recall—the 1949-1956 conversations quoted probably reproduce the spirit but hardly the letter of what was said. Nevertheless, it is the most detailed first-hand description yet published of intellectual ferment in any Communist country; as such it is an invaluable case study, whose significance extends far beyond Hungarian developments. Perhaps its

greatest virtue is the extremely detailed information it provides on shifting factional loyalties in Hungarian Party and literary circles; any reconstruction of these developments must rely heavily on this pioneering memoir.

Revolt of the Mind is more detailed but less systematic than the earlier *La rivolta degli intellettuali in Ungheria* by Istvan Meszaros, a former assistant of the great Hungarian Marxist philosopher Gyorgy Lukacs. Meszaros' book is not, like *Revolt of the Mind*, confined primarily to Party and literary developments; it also treats developments in philosophical, ideological and other intellectual sectors, and it attempts a systematic, scholarly account beginning with the Lukacs and Dery affairs in 1949 and 1951 and concluding with the Petöfi Circle in 1956. Whether because Meszaros did not have available to him the wealth of detail concerning Party and literary factionalism which *Revolt of the Mind* provides, or whether he omitted it for purposes of compression and schematization, this reviewer has the impression that Meszaros' schematic presentation tends to understate the complexity of the developments and the constantly shifting factional allegiances of their Party and literary participants.

One is struck, reading Meszaros' book as well as the other literature on the subject, by the relative paucity of ideological innovation in the Hungarian thaw and Revolt, particularly as compared to contemporary developments in Poland, where Kolakowski³ and others made substantial although not always original contributions to contemporary revisionist thought. Lu-

Mr. Griffith, long a student of East European affairs, is currently at the Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

kacs himself played a curiously withdrawn and relatively inactive ideological and personal role in Hungarian events; his influence in East Germany was much greater than in Budapest. Nor do any of these books cover economic developments during the Hungarian thaw, either in theory, organization or operation; however, Professor Balassa's recently published work on this subject⁵ serves excellently to fill this gap, while the work of the Columbia University Project on East European National Income will provide, when published, a beginning on the recalculation of Hungarian statistics, without which, since official statistics are distorted and unreliable, only the most general quantitative trends can be ascertained.⁶

Meray's *Thirteen Days That Shook the Kremlin*, after an introduction treating the political (rather than literary) course of the Hungarian thaw, gives a day-by-day account of the Revolt, October 23 to November 4, 1956. It is a political history of the uprising as experienced by Hungarian revisionists, who, having liberated themselves from the dead world of Communism, were powerless to lead, direct, or even decisively to influence either Nagy, their reluctant leader, or the Hungarian masses, whose national, democratic revolution lasted only a few days before it was engulfed by the Red Army.

On Imre Nagy

Imre Nagy, Réformateur ou Révolutionnaire? is the first biography of the 1953-1955 and October-November 1956 Hungarian Premier, written by Miklos Molnar, one of the editors during the thaw period of the Hungarian literary journal *Irodalmi Ujsag*, and Laszlo Nagy, a Hungarian emigre journalist. This biography is an indispensable source of material on Nagy; its account of his early life breaks entirely new ground for the Western reader, and its analysis of the changing political positions of Nagy and his associates during his 1955-1956 forced retirement is of major interest for the study of Nagy's general political development. Furthermore, in spite of the authors' obvious sympathy with Nagy and his

general position, the biography is more than simply a memoir; the authors do not hesitate to criticize Nagy's shortcomings, and the picture they reveal is far from an entirely flattering one. Even so, one finishes the book with the feeling that a certain amount of filial hagiography still remains; the biography, a valuable pioneering effort and a major source of historical evidence, in this respect leaves something to be desired. It includes a valuable bibliography of available sources on Nagy and his period.

The Truth about the Nagy Affair is a detailed refutation of the Budapest regime's charges, prepared in Paris by an anonymous group of post-1956 Hungarian emigres. In the course of this, it provides some valuable facts on Nagy's career, particularly on the developments during the Revolt, plus brief biographies of some of Nagy's associates.

The Imre Nagy Institute in Brussels, a group of Nagy's former associates headed by Gyorgy Heltai, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Revolt, and Balazs Nagy, one of the leaders of the Petofi Circle, began publishing last year *The Review* (Brussels), a quarterly issued in English, French and Hungarian and devoted primarily to the study of Hungarian developments during the 1953-1956 period. *The Review* may perhaps be characterized as "revisionism recollected in tranquillity"; its editors are obviously not only still enthusiastic revisionists and supporters—even worshippers—of Imre Nagy,⁷ but also believe (probably more so than most of their associates who remained in Hungary) in the possibility of some kind of a revitalized, humane, patriotic Communism in Hungary. They are also influenced by current revisionism in France,⁸ to which they devote considerable attention. Of the articles which have so far appeared, one might single out as especially worthy of notice Peter Kende's "Reflections on Hungarian History" (No. 1, June 1959), an interesting attempt at a revisionist reinterpretation, two articles on Hungarian workers' councils by Janos Bak (No. 2, Oct. 1959) and Ferenc Töki (No. 3, Jan. 1960),⁹ and one by George Gömöri on "Polish Echoes of the Hungarian Revolution,"

a valuable contribution to Polish studies. *The Review* also publishes occasional articles on developments in other East European countries. One of them, Heinz Brandt's "The East German Popular Uprising," by a former leading East German Communist official, is a significant first-hand contribution to history, the first account from high Communist circles of the Party background to the June 17, 1953 risings in Eastern Germany; it is a major addition to previous published studies¹⁰ on this subject.

Of all the general accounts of this period by far the best is Fejtő's *Ungheria 1945-1957*, a much expanded and more penetrating Italian version of his *La tragédie hongroise*,¹¹ in spite of what this reviewer considers its bias in favor of revisionism. The depth of its analysis and the extent of its sweep deserve high praise. *Ungheria* is a systematic study of Hungarian developments since the Second World War. The author, a left-wing Socialist with revisionist and syndicalist sympathies, is a journalist and historian of Hungarian origin now living in France. An associate of Laszlo Rajk before the War, one of the editors (with the great poet Attila Jozsef and the essayist Paul Ignatus) of the prewar journal *Szep Szó*, he emigrated to France before the war broke out, and, after



During the Revolt this Budapest shop bore the popular inscription, "Russians go home." EAST EUROPE photo

postwar service as Press Attache in the Hungarian Legation in Paris, resigned when Rajk was tried in 1949. Fejtő is the author of a standard work on postwar Eastern Europe, *Histoire des démocraties populaires* (Paris: du Seuil, 1952), the editor of the most complete documentary collection on the Hungarian literary thaw,¹² and has written numerous articles on Hungarian and other East European problems.¹³

This reviewer was particularly impressed by *Ungheria's* breadth of sociological analysis and of historical perspective. Fejtő's treatment of post-1953 Hungarian developments, in spite of his revisionist sympathies, is far from uncritical; his analysis of Nagy exposes mercilessly the latter's indecision, hesitations, and organizational amateurism. The treatment of Kadar as an individual and as a representative of one group in the Party leadership is the best, indeed almost the only one available; Fejtő sees clearly that Kadar and his associates were coalescing as a group in late 1955 and that by 1956 they were a clear third alternative (as opposed to Rakosi and Gero on the one side and Nagy on the other) which was available to the Soviets when the Revolt broke out. Where this reviewer would differ with Fejtő is in his conclusions as to the significance of the Revolt. Fejtő seems to feel that it presented a genuine and viable Marxist alternative both to orthodox (or Khrushchev's) Leninism and to Western parliamentary democracy: a multi-party system relying more on work-

ers' councils than on parliamentary institutions. Sympathy for—indeed, uncritical acceptance of—the central role of workers' councils is one of the major characteristics of current revisionist thinking, a point of view which is shared by all the books here reviewed. This seems to me an illusion: as Mr. H. A. Clegg has written recently,

“... working-class self-government has been no more than a fleeting vision during revolutions, a promise rather than even a momentary reality, a form of government starting to decay before it has come into being. If it does not fall victim to its opponents, or to its own theories, then it falls victim to the necessities of the situation in which it finds itself, to the technical and organizational requirements of running an industrialized society...”¹⁴

The Weakest Party

Aczel, Meray, Meszaros, Molnar and Heltai were all Communists in Hungary, first Stalinists and then revisionists, and remain, to a greater or lesser degree, revisionists in emigration,¹⁵ as does Fejtő. The political complexion of these authors reflects quite accurately the trend of the overwhelming majority of serious works so far written by Hungarians on this period. Such studies have the great advantage of profiting from the personal experience and knowledge of members of that group which was mainly instrumental in starting the ferment in post-1953 Hungary: the dissident, revisionist members of the Hungarian

Communist Party, particularly writers, journalists and other intellectuals. They have the disadvantage, particularly for non-specialist Western readers, of being written from a specific, strongly left-wing and, for Hungary, an unrepresentative position. One of the important aspects of postwar Hungary was the weakness, smallness, and atypicality of the Hungarian Communist Party. Far less than in Czechoslovakia, less than in Poland, less perhaps than in any other East European country except Romania, did the Hungarian Party have any mass base or genuine popular support. Neither in politics, in literature, nor in the economic life of the country was Communism ever a major native element in recent Hungarian history; it was imposed from outside by the Russians. When in 1953 the Russians ordered it to reform, it split, and during the Revolt it disintegrated completely, only again to be artificially created by the Soviets.

The most striking thing about the Hungarian Revolt was the instantaneous, almost elemental resurgence of the forces of Hungarian history, tradition and patriotism. Had the uprising won, and had the authors of these books remained in Hungary, they would most probably have been relegated to political isolation and impotence, while the main democratic forces of post-1945 Hungary, the peasant parties, the Social Democrats, and the Catholics, would have dominated the scene. This would not have been an exceptional development; revisionists within the Sino-Soviet Bloc, those

¹ Perhaps the most penetrating brief study, which addresses itself also to comparative problems, is Raymond Aron's "Une révolution totalitaire," preface to *La révolution hongroise* (Paris: Plon, 1957) and supplement to *Preuves*, No. 82 (Dec. 1957).

² For their loss of faith as Stalinists and their conversion to revisionism, see *Revolt of the Mind*, pp. 244-269, and Aczel's "The Honest Sinners" and Meray's "The Crisis of the New Class," *The Review*, No. 1 (June 1959), pp. 70-86 and 87-101, respectively.

³ Leszek Kolakowski, "Intellectuals and the Communist Movement," *Nowe Drogi*, Sept. 1956; "What Is Socialism?" (written for but not published in *Po Prostu*, 1956; tr.: Edmund Stillman, ed., *Bitter Harvest* (N. Y.: Praeger, 1959), pp. 47-50); "Re-

sponsibility and History," *Nowa Kultura*, Sept. 1-22, 1957 (tr. excerpts *East Europe*, Dec. 1957, Feb., March, May 1958), and most recently, "Karl Marx and the Classical Definition of Truth," *Studia Filozoficzne*, 1959, No. 2 (tr. excerpts: *Soviet Survey*, No. 32, Apr.-June 1960, pp. 74-79) and "The Priest and the Jester," *Tworczosc*, Oct. 1959 (brief tr. excerpts: *East Europe*, Feb. 1960, p. 12); vd. Leopold Labedz, "Leszek Kolakowski: or, Ethics and Communism," *Soviet Survey*, No. 23 (Jan.-Mar. 1958), pp. 71-78.

⁴ Vd. Morris Watnick, "Georg Lukacs: An Intellectual Biography," *Soviet Survey*, No. 23 (Jan.-Mar. 1958), pp. 60-66, No. 23 (Apr.-June 1958), pp. 51-57 and No. 25 (July-Sept. 1958), pp. 61-68; Peter Demetz, *Marx, Engels und die Dichter* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt,

1959), pp. 262-285; Aczel and Meray, *Revolt of the Mind*, pp. 57-68; Meszaros, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-37; L. Stern, "Georg Lukacs: An Intellectual Portrait," *Dissent*, V, 2 (Spring 1958), pp. 162-173; George Steiner, "Georg Lukacs and his Devil's Pact," *Kenyon Review*, XXII, 1 (Winter 1960), pp. 1-18 and Gyula Borbandi, "Lukacs György és A Kommunista Part" (Georg Lukacs and the Communist Party), *Latohatar* (Munich), V, 1954, p. 103.

⁵ Bela Balassa, *The Hungarian Experience in Economic Planning* (New Haven: Yale, 1959).

⁶ A fact which lessens the usefulness of Nicolas Spulber's *The Economics of Eastern Europe* (Cambridge, Mass. and N. Y.: Technology and Wiley, 1957), a study based only on official statistics.

who consciously attempt to revitalize Leninism on the basis of humanism and national independence by means of revising some or all of its fundamental ideological and organizational concepts, seem normally to end as Social Democrats, whether or not their cause is crushed by the *force majeure* of actual or threatened regime (or Soviet) intervention. Like the fuse in the dynamite, revisionism is consumed by its own explosion.¹⁶

But without the fuse the dynamite does not explode. The first essential for understanding of what went on in Hungary after Stalin's death, therefore, is understanding how the fuse was ignited: how the Hungarian ferment in the Party, among the writers and journalists, and then among the youth, got under way, developed, spread, established what Marxist-Leninists so superciliously call "links with the masses," and rushed on to explosion. For this understanding the material in the books reviewed is essential. They are not all-inclusive; the three major documentary collections, *Les Temps Modernes*' "Révolte de la Hongrie" for the writers' revolt, Melvin J. Lasky's *The Hungarian Revolution* for the October 23-November 4 period and Free Europe Press's documentary "The Revolt in Hungary" still remain the starting point in published material for any close study of this period. Of unpublished material, by far the most comprehensive is the collection of detailed interviews with participants in these developments conducted in 1957 by the Columbia University Research Project on Hun-

gary (CURPH).¹⁷ The recently published brief summary of results by Professor Zinner,¹⁸ in this reviewer's opinion the best short analytical study of the Hungarian thaw and Revolution which has appeared to date, makes one's anticipation of his forthcoming book on this subject even greater. Even so, some of those interviewed did not tell all they knew; Aczel and Meray's *Revolt of the Mind*, for example, includes much material not available in the CURPH material.

Third Road

The books reviewed here, then, are only part of the story. The present is always rooted in and profoundly influenced by the past; and of few historical events is this more true, and yet more difficult to grasp, than the Hungarian Revolt. The outward events, beginning with the recital of Petöfi's poem during the demonstration on the afternoon of October 23 and ending with the crushing intervention of the Russians and the execution of Nagy and his associates (so reminiscent of the intervention more than a hundred years before of Tsar Nicholas I) were themselves characterized by an uncomplicated, passionate, often naive, and always transparently honest patriotism and revolutionary fervor that cynical twentieth century observers had thought long since relegated to history.

Nor were the Hungarian thaw and Revolt accompanied by any serious revival of the chauvinistic, obscurantist, authoritarian and—at the end—

Fascist aspects of the pre-1945 Hungary of Admiral Horthy and the Arrow Cross. A free post-Revolutionary Hungary, unless all signs deceive, would have turned to a "Third Road" of agrarian, non-Marxist Socialism (continued nationalization of industry but private ownership in agriculture), political parliamentary democracy and Austrian-style neutrality in foreign policy. It is on this aspect of the Revolt that the books reviewed, and indeed most writing to date on Hungarian history or contemporary affairs, are most notably inadequate.

In general, these books¹⁹ express, or, more accurately, assume a Marxist view of Hungarian history, in which Horthyist and then Arrow-Crossist Hungary become the logical end-product of the ownership of the overwhelming part of Hungary's agricultural land by the great landed aristocracy, the control of economic life by a few wealthy industrialists, the rule of an increasingly Fascist bureaucracy, and the alliance with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany for the purpose of reestablishing Hungarian predominance over the subject Slav and Romanian nationalities in a re-created "Great Hungary" such as existed before 1918. To the authors of these books Hungarian Fascism is so extensive a concept as to include, and indeed be typified by, the Horthy regime. This is bad history, just as is the similar view that Hitler's Nazism was the "end product" of, or was conducted in almost co-equal alliance with, German capitalism.²⁰ The great Hungarian landowners, Admiral Hor-

⁷ Vd. e.g., the anonymous review of Meray's *Thirteen Days That Shook the Kremlin*, in No. 3 (Jan. 1960), pp. 89-98.

⁸ On which now vd. Jean DuVignaud, "Neo-Marxism in France," *Soviet Survey*, No. 32 (Apr.-June 1960), pp. 40-45.

⁹ But cf. "Workers and the State. II: Destruction of the Hungarian Workers' Councils," *East Europe*, VIII, 3 (Mar. 1959), pp. 19-28 and Miklos Sebestyen, "The Workers' Councils in Hungary," a paper presented to the Sept. 1958 Vienna Conference on Workers' Participation in Management, sponsored by the Congress for Cultural Freedom.

¹⁰ Carola Stern, *Porträt einer bolschewistischen Partei* (Cologne: Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1957) and Arnulf Baring, *Der 17. Juni 1953* (Bonn: Bundes-

ministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen, 1957).

¹¹ Paris: Horay, 1956, tr. into English as *Behind the Rape of Hungary* (N. Y.: McKay, 1957).

¹² "La révolte de la Hongrie," *Les Temps Modernes*, Nos 129-130-131, Nov.-Dec. 1956-Jan. 1957.

¹³ Vd. most recently his "The Hungarian Intelligentsia," *Soviet Survey*, No. 31 (Jan.-Mar. 1960), pp. 88-94.

¹⁴ H. A. Clegg, *A New Approach to Industrial Democracy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960), pp. 6-7. This work is based on the 1958 Congress for Cultural Freedom Conference in Vienna on the subject of workers' self-management. Vd. also Peter Wiles in *Po Prostu*, Apr. 21, 1957.

¹⁵ Heltai was arrested in the aftermath of the Rajk trial and released after Stalin's death.

¹⁶ Vd. the author's "What Happened to Revisionism?", *Problems of Communism*, IX, 2 (Mar.-Apr. 1960), pp. 1-9; *Soviet Survey*, No. 32 (Apr.-June 1960), which is entirely devoted to revisionism; Bernard Cazes, "Situation du Marxisme dans les démocraties populaires," *Cahiers Reconstruction*, No. 36 (July 1959); Donald F. Zagoria, "The Spectre of Revisionism," *Problems of Communism*, VII, 4 (July-Aug. 1958), pp. 15-21.

¹⁷ I am grateful to Professor Henry Roberts, director of the project, for allowing me to use this material.

¹⁸ Paul E. Zinner, "Revolution in Hungary: Reflections on the Vicissitudes of



Margit Boulevard in Budapest. Written on the first railroad car: "Now is the time or never," a quotation from Petöfi alluding to 1848. On the second car: "Continue the strike!"

EAST EUROPE photo

thy, and such Prime Ministers as Teleki and Kallai were not Fascists but, as Hugh Seton-Watson puts it, Whiggish liberals.²¹ Hungarian Fascism, like German Nazism, had far more lower-middle class than aristocratic or industrialist roots.

Western readers are fortunate in that the general course of pre-1945 Hungarian history has been so exhaustively outlined by Professor Macartney,²² but neither he nor other historians of Hungary have treated, with the detail needed fully to understand them, the non-Marxist leftist oppositional trends in Horthyist Hun-

gary, specifically the activities of the populist and "village explorer" movements. These did present a genuine "third road" alternative²³ for Hungary's primarily agrarian and semi-feudal society to the semi-feudal paternalism of the Horthyist regime, whose complacent failure to tackle the problem of the millions of landless, economically depressed agricultural laborers was matched only by the chauvinism which delivered it into the hands of the Nazis, and then of the Bolsheviks. The "third road," which, far more than revisionism, reflected Hungarian public opinion, was

brilliantly analyzed after 1945²⁴ and again after the Revolt²⁵ by the populist leader Istvan Bibó.

Nor do any of the volumes under review adequately treat the history of the Hungarian Communist Party; and no satisfactory history of it exists.²⁶ Post-1953 Hungarian Party factionalism had roots going farther back in Party history than has been thought or than the books reviewed would indicate. Nagy in 1930 and 1949 had expounded and then retracted almost the same "deviations" for which in 1955 he and his 1953-1954 New Course policy were denounced by Rakosi and the Russians. The "native" Communist faction (Rajk, Kadar, Munnich, and the Debrecen group of young Communists—Losonczi, Kallai, Donath, etc.), both because its members had not been in Moscow and because they were not Jewish, differed from the "Muscovites" in policy and factional allegiance, before and after 1953.

The Jewish question is far more important in Hungarian Communism and in Hungarian history generally than the books reviewed indicate. The Hungarian thaw was largely a struggle between the Jewish Stalinists (Rakosi, Gero, Farkas, Revai) and the Jewish ex-Stalinist writers (Dery, Hay, Aczel, Meray, etc.), with the final victory (quite naturally, considering Khrushchev's generally anti-Semitic attitude) going to the non-Jewish "native" faction.²⁷ The overwhelmingly Jewish character of the Hungarian Party leadership and the Communist literati in large part contributed, more than in most other

a Totalitarian System," *Journal of Politics*, XXI, 1 (Feb. 1959), pp. 3-36. Vd. also the excellent briefer study by Paul Kecskemeti, "Limits and Problems of Decompression: The Case of Hungary," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCCXVII (May 1958), pp. 97-106. For analysis of CURPH material on agriculture, vd. Harris L. Coulter, "The Hungarian Peasantry: 1948-1956," *American Slavic and Eastern European Review*, XVIII, 4 (Dec. 1959), pp. 539-554.

¹⁹ Excluding the documentary *The Truth About the Nagy Affair*.

²⁰ The locus classicus of this latter view is in Franz Neumann's *Behemoth* (2nd ed., N. Y.: Oxford, 1944); for the most

detailed refutation, in a work on the anti-Nazi resistance (itself in large part aristocratic in origin), vd. Gerhard Ritter, *Karl Friedrich Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1954). The English translation of the latter, *Carl Goerdeler's Struggle Against Tyranny* (N. Y.: Praeger, 1958) is considerably abridged.

²¹ In his introduction to Melvin J. Lasky, ed., *The Hungarian Revolution* (N. Y.: Praeger, 1957), p. 14.

²² C. A. Macartney, *Hungary* (London: Benn, 1934), *Hungary and her Successors* (London: Oxford, 1937) and *A History of Hungary, 1929-1945*, 2 vols. (N. Y.: Praeger, 1957).

²³ Vd. David Mitrany, *Marx Against the*

Peasant (Chapel Hill: North Carolina, 1951), pp. 132-133, 243; Zoltan Szabo, "Populismo ungherese," *Passato e Presente*, No. 8 (Mar.-Apr. 1959), pp. 1014-1020; Hugh Seton-Watson, "East European Intellectuals and the Populist Spirit," *The New Leader*, XLI, 1 (Jan. 6, 1958), pp. 6-8; "Hungary's Populist Writers," *East Europe*, Feb. 1959, pp. 32-41; and an unpublished MS. on the populist movement by Imre Kovacs.

²⁴ "The Crisis of Hungarian Democracy," *Valóság*, 1945 and a series of articles in *Valóság*: "The Balance of the Coalition and the Municipal Elections," Nov. 1946; "Coalition at the Crossroads," Jan. 1947; "Conspiracy and the Anniversary of the Republic," Feb. 1947; "The Ten Years of the March Front," Mar. 1947; "Hun-

Eastern European countries, to their almost total alienation from the population, and it was largely Nagy's non-Jewishness which led the Russians in 1953 to choose him to inaugurate the New Course.²⁸

Monolithic Myth

The myth of the "monolithic unity" of Communist Parties serves to conceal the directly opposite reality. Hungarian Party factionalism was complex and constantly in flux. The books under review give extensive and essential details concerning it but do not, with the partial exception of Fejtő's, analyze it with sufficient thoroughness or detail. In this connection, one of Hugh Seton-Watson's most perceptive insights into Eastern European affairs is his thesis that the fundamental difference of personalities between Poland and Hungary was not between Gomulka and Nagy, but between Ochab and Gero.²⁹ Once the Hungarian security police, presumably with Gero's authorization, fired on the demonstrators on the night of October 23, 1956, and Soviet troops intervened, the Hungarian Party, including Imre Nagy, had irretrievably lost control of the situation.

One of the most interesting points raised, but far from definitely answered, in the books under review, concerns the motivation of Nagy and his associates in their last desperate attempt to consolidate the situation during the Revolt: their withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and their declaration of Hungary's neutrality. Both Molnar³¹ and Meray³² maintain that

Nagy took this decision in the hopes of halting the renewed movement of Soviet troops into Hungary beginning on October 31.³³ When one reads Meray's description of how Nagy had become practically isolated even from his closest supporters,³⁴ and studies the extent to which he was under pressure from the provinces (where the radio stations were completely in the hands of the insurgents and the relatively restraining influence of Nagy and the Budapest revisionist intellectuals was almost entirely absent), one wonders how much this decision was a calculated one on Nagy's part to make another Soviet intervention more difficult, and how much here, as only too frequently, he was mainly responding to irresistible mass pressure whose extent and direction he had realized too late to either prevent or control.³⁵

One may view the course of the Hungarian thaw and Revolt as an inevitable historical process. It does seem difficult, at least in retrospect, to imagine how Moscow could have allowed Hungary to leave the Warsaw Pact and to abandon the Communist Party's monopoly of power. (Even so, the Soviet declaration of October 30³⁶ and the reports in these books and elsewhere of the willingness of Mikoyan and Suslov during those revolutionary days in Budapest to permit drastic changes in Hungary show just how close the Soviets came to accepting many, if not all, of the gains of the Revolt.) Furthermore, Khrushchev was clearly under increasing pressure from such relatively conservative opponents as Molotov and Kaganovich, and the Chinese were at least as hor-

rified as he by Hungary's threatened exit from the Bloc. Nevertheless, even placing (as I do) much more stress than do most of the authors under review on the amazing weakness and collapse of the Hungarian Party and upon the Hungarian people's determination to regain national independence and democracy, things did happen otherwise in Poland.

Personalities alone do not explain the difference. Unity in Hungary could only be obtained against the Russians; but the Poles were united also against the Germans and in their determination to maintain a boundary with Germany (the Oder-Neisse line) which only the Russians, they thought, could effectively guarantee. Furthermore, the Polish Party, although anything but a mass movement, did have, particularly in its Central Active and in the latter's connection with workers' leaders in such key factories as the Warsaw Zeran automobile works and with student leaders in the Warsaw universities, a potential for directed mass action, both to mobilize and to restrain it,³⁷ which was almost entirely lacking in Budapest. In addition, the Polish Church was willing to play a restraining role, which in a religiously divided Hungary Cardinal Mindszenty (while entirely innocent of Communist charges that he was propagandizing for Horthyist reaction)³⁸ did not undertake to exercise.

But why did the Polish Party, under the leadership of Gomulka, the liberal elements in the leadership and the Central Active, with cooperation from the non-Communist forces and particularly from the Church, retain

garian Social Development and the Meaning of the Change in 1945," June 1947; and "After the Crisis—Before the Elections," Aug. 1947. Translations of these important articles, edited and with an introduction by Zoltan Szabo, await publication.

²⁸ Text: *The Truth About the Nagy Affair*, pp. 139-146.

²⁹ Mr. Charles Stastny of the University of New Hampshire is writing one; I am grateful to him for allowing me to read his manuscript.

²⁷ Vd. Paul Ignatus, "The Revolution of the Word," *Encounter*, VIII, 4 (Apr. 1957), pp. 6-16, at p. 10.

²⁸ CURPH; Meray, *Thirteen Days That*

Shook the Kremlin, pp. 7-9.

²⁹ Vd., e.g., his *Neither Peace Nor War* (N. Y.: Praeger, 1960), p. 342.

³⁰ Meray, *Thirteen Days that Shook the Kremlin*, pp. 86-90; Fejtő, *Ungheria*, pp. 256-264; for contemporary Hungarian and Western journalists' accounts, Lasky, *The Hungarian*.

³¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 210.

³² *Thirteen Days That Shook the Kremlin*, p. 192.

³³ Radio Miskolc, Oct. 31, 1956, quoted in *The Hungarian Revolution*, pp. 154, 166.

³⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 103, 114, 131-135.

³⁵ Cf. Fejtő, *Ungheria*, p. 310.

³⁶ *Pravda*, Oct. 21, 1956; Paul E. Zinner, ed., *National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe* (N. Y.: Columbia, 1957), pp. 485-489.

³⁷ I am indebted to Seweryn Bialer for illuminating discussion on these points.

³⁸ Fejtő, *Ungheria*, p. 308; Seton-Watson, in *The Hungarian Revolution*, p. 23.

³⁹ Philippe Ben in *Le Monde*, Aug. 7, 1956.

⁴⁰ *Op. cit.*, pp. 132-153, 166-170.

⁴¹ *Ungheria*, pp. 219-222.

⁴² *On Communism*, p. 33.

⁴³ Fejtő, *Ungheria*, pp. 222-228.

control of the situation, while Nagy and his supporters lost it? First of all, of course, because in Budapest blood was shed because Gero authorized it and obtained the Soviet intervention which followed upon it. Gero was a fanatical international Comintern apparatchik, to whom Hungary was primarily his current assigned sphere of action. The Polish Party leader Ochab, in spite of his Stalinist past, had experienced the dissolution of the Polish Party in 1938 and the subsequent liquidation or imprisonment of most of its top leadership. When in 1939, subsequent to the Nazi invasion of Poland he fled to Soviet-occupied Lwow, he suffered economically because of Soviet discrimination against him as a former leader of the dissolved Polish Party, and after the 1941 German invasion of the USSR he was incorporated, along with other "unworthy elements," in a front-line construction battalion.³⁹ Gomulka had survived the Party liquidation only because he was in a Polish jail, and in 1948-1949 he had been purged and imprisoned at Stalin's orders. Nagy, although he lost power and position after 1949, did not lose his faith in the Soviet leadership; this faith was renewed during his 1953-54 New Course policy, and even by 1956 he had not lost all his illusions about Moscow. Nagy was humane, lovable, personally honest and deeply sensitive; one wonders how he could possibly have survived the purges of the thirties in the USSR and the factional struggles in post-war Hungary. Until 1953 he did so not like Gomulka in spite of defiance and imprisonment, but by conformity and pliant withdrawal, and thereafter, until the Revolt, by avoiding overt defiance of the Party leadership.

Nagy was never, as the books under review make clear, the leader of an effective Party faction. During the 1953-54 New Course, when he was

Premier and Rakosi was constantly trying to sabotage and unseat him, his associates repeatedly tried to get him to lead them in all-out, factional opposition to Rakosi; as Molnar and L. Nagy's biography describes in detail,⁴⁰ and Fejtő makes even clearer,⁴¹ he consistently refused. After his removal as Premier and subsequent expulsion in 1955, he maintained this refusal. Then, while refusing to undertake the organizational activity that would have protected him against the consequences, he distributed to the Hungarian Party and the Russians his "political theses," published later in the West as *On Communism* (N. Y.: Praeger, 1957). In it, in respect to domestic affairs, where the revisionists were the most extreme and the Soviets the most willing to make concessions, he was relatively orthodox. In international affairs, however, where the Soviets were the most unyielding, he accepted ideologically (rather than, as the Russians did, merely propagandistically) such highly unorthodox pronouncements as the Bandung Declaration of the five principles of co-existence, applied it to the Bloc (which neither Khrushchev nor Mao certainly ever intended) and used it to support the:

"... sovereign right of the Hungarian people to decide in which form they believe the most advantageous international status will be assured, and in which form they think that national independence, sovereignty, equality, and peaceful development will be attained. . . ."⁴²

Still, Nagy retained so long and so fully his faith in the ultimate wisdom of the Hungarian Central Committee and of Moscow, and his belief in the mono-party system, that he became, without either side quite realizing it, increasingly alienated not only from Rakosi and Gero but from his revisionist supporters.

Alternatives

By the middle of the Revolt Nagy was politically isolated and his popularity in the country, particularly outside of Budapest, was declining. He lost any serious possibility of using the Party (as Gomulka did in Poland) to control, direct and restrain the masses because of (1) the relatively effective continued control of Rakosi and then of Gero over the Party apparatus, (2) his failure to come to terms with Kadar and Kadar's failure to come to terms with him,⁴³ thus ensuring the continued separation of Nagy's popularity from Kadar's organizational assets and effectiveness, and (3) his inability and unwillingness to create a faction in the party apparatus for himself.⁴⁴ None of the above can or should diminish Nagy's human qualities, the bravery of his final stand during the Revolution, once he finally abandoned the mono-party system and the Warsaw Pact, nor his heroic death.⁴⁵

Nor, if Nagy had been different, or the revisionists different, or if the Suez crisis had not happened when it did, would the Hungarian Revolt necessarily have ended otherwise. The Soviet Union would not let Hungary go, and the West's refusal to intervene was only the formalization of its non-intervention posture; ever since the 1944-1947 period it had not seriously attempted to prevent Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.⁴⁶ The balance of thermonuclear terror (the greatly increased reluctance of either of the two major power blocs to intervene in the other's sphere of influence lest they stumble into a thermonuclear holocaust)⁴⁷ made more certain the West's lack of intervention in Hungary. But there is more to it than that. Similarities to 1848 existed not only in Budapest and Moscow, but also in the West. Kossuth's 1848 revolt did not bring about British,

³⁹ Among the most interesting, and tantalizing, materials now available (vd. Molnar and Nagy, *op. cit.*, p. 163; *The Truth About the Nagy Affair*, p. 47; Meray, *Thirteen Days That Shook the Kremlin*, pp. 153-154) are the references to support of Nagy by Imre Mezo, Budapest deputy Party Secretary, and Kalman Pongratz, Mayor of Budapest. It would appear that

at least a potential equivalent did exist in the Budapest city Party organization, one of the key power factors in the equation, to the key role played by Staszewski, the Warsaw City Secretary, in support of Gomulka. In any case, there is no evidence that Nagy utilized such assets as he potentially had in this respect. One of the tragic ironies of the Revolution is

that Mező was killed by revolutionaries during the Revolution who were apparently unaware of his pro-Nagy sympathies and is now canonized by the Kadar regime as one of their martyrs.

⁴⁵ Cf., for characterization of Nagy, C. M. Woodhouse, "The Lost Revolution," *Encounter*, XIV, 2 (Feb. 1960), pp. 79-

French (or American) intervention, for their vital interests were not involved to the point where the inherent risks justified the probable cost. 'It did bring about intervention by Nicholas I, whose vital interests (the threat of spread of revolution to his territories) were. *Plus ça change...*

Nevertheless, although the Revolt, once it had escaped from control, could hardly have ended other than it did, the West and the Hungarian leadership did play significant roles in what happened. Nagy was weak, indecisive, unrealistic, and organizationally incompetent; the revisionists, still alienated from the Hungarian masses by their Stalinist past, largely the prisoners of their ideological dreams of a revitalized Leninism, and also organizationally far from competent, could not fill the vacuum; and the leaders of the mass forces in the country—the peasants, the churches, the Social Democrats, the non-Communist writers, the youth leaders—had neither the time nor the cohesion, once the fighting began, to take the place of the shattered remnants of the old, Communist order. As to the West, the Suez crisis prevented coordination on any subject between the United States and the British and French. Otherwise, some steps might have been taken, and might have had some effect. Nagy and his supporters could have been aided to restrain the speed of the revolutionary process; the Soviets might have been more effectively reassured that the West did not intend to intervene.

But the West from the beginning seriously misunderstood both the Hungarian thaw and the Revolt, in particular the rapid rise and even more rapid decline of revisionism. Although not as seriously as most Hungarian emigres and anti-Communist Hungarians at home, most Western observers underestimated the extent and



A streetcar in Calvin Square in Budapest during the Revolt bore the sign, "Mindszenty comes back." Written on the wall in the background, in Russian and Hungarian: "Russians go home."

EAST EUROPE photo

depth of factionalism within the Hungarian Party and among the intellectuals. Too often personal and ideological dislike of revisionists (and, even more, of their Stalinist pasts) interfered with objective Western analysis of their potential and of their successes, and, once the Revolt began, of their rapid engulfment by nationalistic, democratic forces. Not that all the information now known was then available; when one compares the material in the books here reviewed with what was known in the West at the time, one realizes that most of the Hungarian iceberg was for the West in 1953-1956 still under the surface. Furthermore, during some of the most crucial days of the Revolt Budapest was encircled by Soviet tanks and largely cut off from the Western world.

Past mistakes cannot be repaired, but lessons can be drawn from them

for the future (they seldom are). The Hungarian and Polish thaws have for the first time given us some actual evidence of why and how liberalization occurs in a Communist society: its origins in the defection of Party activists and intellectuals (made possible by a divided and no longer feared Party leadership at home and at the Moscow Center), coupled with its increasing invasion of and control over media of elite and mass communication, its gradual spread to student and youth groups (whose leadership becomes increasingly anti-Communist), and, finally, its linking up with (and often being engulfed by) the wave of nationalistically and economically induced mass discontent.

Western Illusions

These events have also, one may hope, dispelled some Western illusions about Communism in Eastern Europe.

82; Paul Zinner, "Hungary's Imre Nagy: Revolutionist at the End," *Columbia University Forum*, II, 1 (Fall 1958), pp. 6-10; Fejtő, *Ungheria*, pp. 215-222 and "Un communisme qui a choisi le peuple: portrait d'Imre Nagy," introduction (pp. 3-46) to the French edition of Nagy's "political theses": Imre Nagy, *Un Communisme qui n'oublie pas l'homme* (Paris: Plon, Tri-

bune Libre, No. 9, 1957); Tibor Meray, "Imre Nagy, Communist," *The New Reasoner*, No. 9 (Summer 1959), pp. 68-73; *The Times Literary Supplement*, Sept. 18, 1959, p. 534; Gerhard Lehmbuch in *Osteuropa*, IX, 9 (Sept. 1959), pp. 589-590.

⁴⁶ W. W. Rostow, *The United States in*

the World Arena (N. Y.: Harper, 1960), pp. 177-188.

⁴⁷ W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (London & N. Y.: Cambridge, 1960), pp. 123-126.

⁴⁸ Vd., for perhaps its most complete Hungarian expression, Otto Major, "Unity of the Party and Morals of the Writers,"

Communism there did not capture the minds and hearts of the youth; it did not abolish, but rather intensified the deep current of nationalism which there (as in Africa and Asia) is the most striking feature of our times; nor did it even capture the lasting allegiance of those few Communist intellectuals who, out of a combination of enthusiasm and opportunism, seemed before 1953 so fanatically to have embraced it. 1956 was not 1984, and Milosz's "Kerzman" was in Hungary a rare and at best temporary phenomenon. Fear, not conviction, was the primary cause of the intellectuals' conformity during the Stalinist period. Once their fear was gone, Hungarian Communist writers (like their Polish colleagues) finally and totally rebelled, not primarily against the intellectual framework or the economic theory of Stalinism and of its Marxist-Leninist forebears, but against its inhumanity, its lust for power, and its cynical justification of lies, torture, and murder.⁴⁸ Marx and Lenin proclaimed that morality and truth are relative and a function of the class conflict; Freud relegated them to the relatively peripheral role of the super-ego; Warsaw and Budapest in 1956 showed that, for intellectuals at least, bread alone was not enough, the Party's cynically tactical version of "two mor-

alities" was not enough, and that, once their fear was gone, they would rebel against a continued, but concealed, policy of immorality and lies.

So much for Hungary's past; what of its present and future? None of the books reviewed here cover more than the beginning of the Kadar regime, and few serious studies of it have appeared.⁴⁹ One may, however, suggest some of the forces seemingly at work. In the first place, Kadar's Hungary is not purely a Soviet-run terror-dominated State, any more than Rakosi and Nagy were both united and pliable tools of Soviet power. Kadar did, and does, represent a definite "native," "centrist" group of Hungarian Communists, few in number and only maintained in power by Soviet support; most Hungarian Communist activists would probably still prefer Rakosi or Gero. As I observed during a visit to Budapest last summer, the economic situation of the country has considerably improved, while oppression of the intellectuals remains strong. As to popular attitudes, Paul Ignatus has accurately characterized them as

"... one of contempt and hatred for the regime; but also one of an apathy mitigated, as far as possible, by a happy-go-lucky spirit. . . ."⁵⁰

After the Russian obliteration of the

1848-49 rising and Kossuth's flight into exile, some Hungarian leaders, notably Count Istvan Szechenyi and Ferenc Deak, gradually came to the conclusion that a *modus vivendi* with Vienna should be achieved, without in any way giving up their desire for the end of Austrian domination. After the failure of the Polish rising of 1863, a similar and even more pronounced attitude developed among some conservative circles in Poland, one of economic cooperation with, but continued national hostility to, the occupying powers. This policy was called "organic work" (*praca organiczna*). After Gomulka's accession to power in 1956, Polish Catholic leaders revived the same policy, under the same name.⁵¹ It seems likely, as some evidence indicates, that similar thoughts are growing in Hungary. The recent debate between the Communist and populist writers⁵² shows that the latter maintain unchanged their ideological hostility to Communism, while lying low until a better day comes. Hungary after 1960, as after 1849, will probably continue to drift, the Party weak and staffed primarily by corrupt opportunists, the people hostile but politically apathetic, until changes in Moscow (as, in 1867, changes in Vienna) once again lead to changes in Budapest.

Irodalmi Ujsag, Sept. 21, 1956; tr. excerpts: *Les Temps Modernes*, Nov.-Dec. 1956-Jan. 1957, pp. 889-895.

⁴⁸ The best and most recent survey is Paul Ignatus, "Hungary's Craving for Normality," *Problems of Communism*, IX, 2 (Mar.-Apr. 1960), pp. 24-30.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

⁵¹ Vd., e.g., Stanislaw Stomma, "The Shade of Winkelried," *Tygodnik Powszechny*, June 21, 1959; Jerzy Turowicz, "Tygodnik Powszechny after Fifteen Years," *Tygodnik Powszechny*, Mar. 27, 1960.

⁵² "Hungary's Populist Writers," *loc. cit.*, at pp. 37-41; and, for developments

thereafter, an unsigned article in *Kortars*, Apr. 1959; Laszlo Nemeth in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Sept. 29, 1959 (reprinted in *Elet es Irodalom*, Oct. 9, 1959); criticism of Peter Veres in *Valosag*, Dec. 1959; Peter Veres in *Elet es Irodalom*, Jan. 1, 1960; *Magyar Nemzet*; Feb. 14, 1960, re Aron Tamasi's new novel.



Photo from Poland (Warsaw), No. 1, 1959

Winter Journal

by

MARIA DABROWSKA

The author of this journal is generally considered the most important living Polish writer; she will very likely be a candidate for the Nobel Prize in Literature this year. "Winter Journal" was published in ZYCIE LITERACKIE, April 17, 1960.

"Memories of a Vacation," a journal of summer, to which reference is made below, also appeared in EAST EUROPE, March 1960.

NOVEMBER 25, 1959.—I was to leave for Warsaw at nine in the morning, but suddenly I felt so weak that after I'd put my coat on I took it off and stayed in bed, amidst nightmares, until noon. I left at 12:30. In the evening I went to the Kameralny Theatre to see Capek's play "R.U.R." Someone said that the play bored him as nothing had for a long time, but not me. It follows along the lines of my own reasoning concerning an answer to *Zycie Literackie's* poll "Technology and Humanism," and has something in common with a certain fantasy I have dreamed up on the subject. It cannot be said that the play is fascinating from the artistic point of view, but it is im-

portant. And the amazing part is how long this problem has been growing and the growth intensifying. How long is it since the publication of Gina Lombroso's "La rançon de la civilisation" ("The Price of Civilization"—still not translated into Polish)? We don't even realize that everything we experience as "new" is actually rooted in the latter part of the past century or in the initial stages of the present one.

XI. 26.—By train to Komorow [Warsaw suburb] in the morning. I keep moving around like that and it tires me. But is there still anything in existence that would not be tiring? I spent the afternoon, until ten in the evening, writing (with pen) the first draft of a piece about Kalisz* for the publication *Poznaj swój świat* [know your world]. I don't know how to do anything superficially and that'll be the death of me yet.

XI. 27.—All day, until eleven at night, I've been writing and rewriting my piece for the Kalisz issue of *Poznaj swój świat*. Once again an extracurricular task, as it were, while that which is most important—waits. I managed to

* An historic old city in Central Poland.

rewrite that Kalisz thing three times, but, around midnight—mortuus. And again a night of dreams in chopped-up pieces. Like a Braque picture.

XI. 28.—To the post office in the morning with the Kalisz piece. Four in the afternoon brought Marysia and her dog. At five I wrote the first draft of my answer to *Zycie Literackie's* poll, but nothing sensible has emerged. Dyl [a dog] disappeared during his walk and so after dinner we go out into the night to lure him back from the woods. He came, as he always does, but while snapping on his leash I lost the gate key and it irritated me, because it's the second gate key that I've lost. The weather is silent, warm and, unfortunately, still dry.

XI. 30.—I spend as much time as my strength permits over that "Technology and Humanism" piece, poring over it until midnight. Instead of over a book! And yet all this will pass, while a book might have remained.

XII. 1.—Theoretically, I finished "Technology and Humanism" (how those words bore me now) yesterday, but actually I still worked over the last page till noon this morning. Finally I sent it off by special delivery. In 13 days I wrote 10 pages of my "Vacation Journal," 4 pages for the Kalisz publication and the 5-page article for the Cracow poll. A total of 19 pages, and counting the drafts about four times as much. That comes to a little less than two printworthy pages a day. Damnably little, frighteningly little. And not even a slit left open to squeeze in some really creative work.

I started reading Gide's "Journal 1939-49 et souvenirs." Somehow, all my life, I have never been sufficiently convinced of Gide's greatness, which fact I ascribe to some mental deficiency on my part. To me, actually, he is chiefly the creator of Lafcadio, the prototype of all today's angry young men. The "Journal" is already somewhat ancient and slightly boring, although it does contain excellent flashes of genius. A great number of literary references, which is again becoming fashionable (I, myself, succumb to it at times), but which always leaves the aftertaste of having evaded one's own creativeness. Amazing conformity in the face of Hitler's occupation, bordering, almost, on approval, as something that France deserved. A tremendous measure of distance with regard to the downfall of both nation and State. Surprising, under the circumstances, delight in almost exclusively German literature. And, for example, the following passage: "Anyone who kicks against fatality falls into a trap. Why dash yourself against the cage bars? In order to suffer less from prison confinement, there's nothing better than to remain in the middle. I feel within me boundless possibilities for acceptance, however, they do not in any way involve my being. It is much more dangerous for the mind to be overpowered by hate. Insofar as limitation of creature comforts and pleasures is concerned, I stand ready to accept it. The fact of the matter is that my aging body is not concerned with these things anymore. It would be different if I were twenty and I believe that today young people deserve to be pitied more than the old. In order not to falsify one's thoughts it will undoubtedly be necessary to keep them to oneself; the ones

to suffer most will be those who have not yet spoken." This was written September 5, 1940.

To be honest, much of what he said has crossed our minds also. Especially about the privileges of older writers during defeat, austerity and occupation—in comparison with the young who did not have a chance to speak during the always short periods of freedom. But also the words about certain aspects of happiness during defeat. After all, the most propitious circumstances contain within them as many possibilities of tragedy—as tragedy contains the possibilities for happiness. This is the unconventional, shamefaced and even slightly obscene side of life's truth and no one is ever in any hurry to divulge it. So far as my literary memory can recall, there is only one such sentence each in Emerson and Pepys. Samuel Pepys, who, during the 1665 plague, had the courage daily to visit the infected city of London and rub elbows with rampaging death, also at the same time led an eventful personal life conditioned by the menace of extraordinary circumstances. And toward the end of that terrible year, he wrote: "As regards myself, I never lived as gaily as during the plague."

The occupation of France cannot, by any means whatever, be compared to the hell suffered by Poland. And yet, even here, this horrible period provided many people with the chance to live through tremendous, unbelievable experiences, unleashing a surge of their own particular brand of happiness; to some, it was their only chance for adventure, to be delivered from the monotony of a banal life; how many lived through their greatest or strangest love affair amidst this nightmarish scenery: how many discovered within themselves unsuspected talents brought to the fore by the pressure of conditions. And with the complete isolation of the people from the occupier (I do not take into account criminal alliances), there bloomed at that time a kind of life that was not in the least "make believe," but savagely real, recklessly uncontrolled, self-possessed and perhaps even exuberant to the point of wickedness. That is why it should be revealed in literature, even at the cost of widespread disapproval. (Prominski* tried it.) Sometimes it's frightening even to think about it. But then again you realize that no one could have survived the occupation solely on the plane of enlightened suffering. Except that here, in Poland, the basis of all experiences was a refusal to accept the invasion (and even the defeat)—and that was also a source of happiness and strength.

XIII. 2.—Undoubtedly the most important book I have read this year is John Gunther's "Inside Africa." And in connection with it, once again reflections on the subject of Conrad. When I finished my small book about him I thought I had finished with him forever, but he keeps returning like a ghost. Maybe I'll write something about it. What's more important, there seem to be signs of something like a Conrad renaissance in the West. No wonder, he was against the indecency of the world. This guy with the treason complex was perhaps the only literary authority of our times. Not to the writers, but to the common people struggling between pride and despair.

(Continued on page 24)

* Contemporary Polish novelist.

"Technology and Humanism"

In her "Winter Journal" Maria Dabrowska mentions an article she wrote in answer to a poll by the Cracow literary magazine, Zycie Literackie, on the effect of technological progress on human affairs. Below are excerpts from the article.

"QUITE SOME time before the *Zycie Literackie* poll, about a year ago, after a talk with Professor Steinhaus (one of those people with whom a talk is no less than an enchanted intellectual adventure) on the subject of cybernetics, one certain sleepless night, while in a state of half reality and half slumber—so well known to people of sleepless nights—I had the following 'vision of the future': Electronic brains, robots and cybernetic machines have been perfected to a much greater degree than that known today. They can now not only solve the most complicated mathematical equations, but also make new discoveries in physics, as well as mathematics. Not only translate adequately from all languages, but also formulate their own opinions in any language chosen. They have been equipped with mechanism that functions along the lines of human memory. Not only do they react to all kinds of stimuli, but are fully aware of their reactions and are capable of controlling them, in other words, they are possessed of something akin to self-awareness. They are becoming new figures of organized existence which function like a living organism, despite the fact that they have nothing in common with organic matter. The world of machines knows how to turn itself into scrap, i.e., die, and how to manufacture itself, i.e., to multiply.

"In this state of affairs, the role of man is reduced more and more, he is not even needed to service the machines; they service themselves. The existence of man assumes the characteristics of absurdity, despite the fact that scientific progress simultaneously provides humanity with prosperity, health and greatly prolonged life expectancy. But having lost his feeling of indispensability, man is slowly becoming extinct—somewhat like the vermiform appendix. The remnants of wasting humanity are being destroyed by the machines which are already capable of creating tools needed to remove everything that is unnecessary, just as man destroys nature's weeds and pests. However, in the mechanical memory of the technological world there continues and is handed down to succeeding generations of intelligent machines the legend that they are the creations of beings other than themselves. Gradually, the legend of man who has created them becomes transformed into a legend of the Creator of everything, even of the perfect world of machines. Some of the machines 'do not believe' this legend and begin a search to find out how the first machines were created in the hope of finally discovering the secret of mechanical existence. . . .

"I wrote down this fantasy of mine which seemed to me at once idiotic and—is there anyone completely devoid of conceit?—so absolutely mine and so original that it could not be communicated to anyone. And so it was never to see the light of day in the form of print and even the *Zycie Literackie* poll would never have recalled it from memory, had I not been emboldened by the fact that my fancy did not prove to be original at all. . . .

"In other words, if I had not attended, on November 25, the Kameralny Theatre premiere of Karol Capek's play 'R. U. R.' (Rossum's Universal Robots).

"In my literary ignorance, I had not only never read the play, but was even unaware of its existence. I realized with amazement that as long as 40 years ago the dangers concealed in limitless technological progress were recognizable to people whose outlook on matters concerning civilization's development was much more sober and critical than mine. . . .

"The chances of saving humanity from the ominous consequences of the overwhelming progress of technological discoveries are rather small, because evil is much more aggressive, absolute and active than good. However, these chances exist and make themselves known all over the world. I want to believe that this little bit is an embryo which will not become lost in the moral drought of our times, so chock-full of 'moralizing' theories. That it will develop into some aspect of the future, a future if not altogether happy, then at least capable of appreciating, protecting and saving humanist values. . . .

"However, in order to prevent the evil consequences of technological progress, there is need for a great, romantic effort to rebuild atomized human individuality, to create a new being—let there at last be heard the words now held in such contempt—love of life and man. Without this humanism cannot even exist, much less conquer. I say this to the younger generation. To all those disenchanting, angry, furious, beaten, untouchable, or whatever; because in their desperate pessimism I also see a two-edged force capable of creation, as well as destruction. The present condition of threatened humanity irrevocably confronts them with a desperate task; overcome internal decomposition and build within themselves and within others a new, contemporary, humanist personality—composite—even if all the satans in charge of exploiting the 'science of mathematics and technology' for the cause of man's undoing conspire against it."

December 12, 1959

XII. 6.—It rained day before yesterday, on St. Barbara's Day, it was still very wet yesterday and when we left Union House [Union of Polish Writers] after the Congress (three days of suffering), frost had set in and heavy snow fell. Today it's 3 degrees [F.] above zero and snow is still coming down. Spent the afternoon with R. at the films, seeing Steinbeck's "East of Eden" starring the famous late James Dean. A good, color film reduced to a drama about two brothers (Cain and Abel) and devoid of most of the nightmares and complications contained in the novel which, by the way, is extremely uneven, actually several novels in one. I much prefer Steinbeck's shorter novels. Afterwards, using the picture and novel as background, we talk about R.'s tragic love affair. His "fiancée" (consummated immediately after the first meeting) called off all marriage plans, because she wants to be bad like Kate in "East of Eden." The lights and shadows of today's youth, which fears kindness and happiness like mortal sin. A girl simulating demonism, when in reality she's barely trivial.

XII. 9.—I've been in Komorow since yesterday with a cold and 230 blood pressure, I'm feeling poorly and working on nothing but the backlog of correspondence. I simply don't feel up to doing the work I came here to do. I feel sorry for R., and his defeat makes me feel discouraged with life. He's very much like me (except that he's nice looking); but in "my time" all the chances were on the side of people like us; and triumphant love was on our side.

XII. 10.—News from Warsaw. The Hemingway Award jury met yesterday. From among the many almost equally deserving candidates it was divided between Anna Kowalska, for her "Greek Stories," and J. J. Szczepanski (the author of "Shoes") for his "Polish Autumn." There was not even one mention of this event in the press, thus, by the same token, depriving the winning authors of publicity which in turn is followed by reader interest, reprints, translation, etc. Not to mention the disrespect shown Hemingway who is a world-famous personality and an award established by him cannot be disparaging to any country whatever. Anyone (and especially a great writer) who has the means certainly has the right to establish a literary award fund and Hemingway did it not because he hates, but because he feels sympathy for today's Peoples' Poland. It doesn't matter who has been awarded the prize; in any event, it was a chance to interest foreigners in Polish literary art. And it was lost for incomprehensible reasons, or for lack of common sense. No one can convince me that this will serve the cause of disseminating Polish culture here and abroad.

The unexpected (it's always unexpected) frost was enough partially to paralyze the country. Ice floe barricades caused the water level in the Vistula to decline to 76 cm. There was no water in the filters, which were not built for such a level. There is danger the city will have no heat—no water in the tanks. All neon lights are out and they are saying all electricity will be shut off. Candle supplies in stores are exhausted, not only in Warsaw, but in Komorow as well. Bus service is erratic (snow drifts) and trains are running hours behind schedule. If the weather doesn't break there's danger schools will have

to be closed due to temporary heating difficulties. In other words, nature has chosen this malicious way to point out to us that it's not enough to conquer space. We still must learn timely prevention of weather caprices.

XII. 11.—At night I heard something falling against the windowpane, sharply and in profusion. I thought, surprised, hail? But in the morning it turned out to be something much more strange. Some sort of glassy rain fell all day with the temperature 20 and later 15 degrees below freezing. This is the first time I've ever seen anything like it. Not snow and not hail, just tinkling transparent tiny pieces of ice. You can't see them in the air, but they roll down the windowpane and you can hear their glassy murmur among the naked tree branches.

The Hemingway Awards were finally mentioned today in *Zycie Warszawy*. The item appeared in the least noticeable corner of the column—a few sentences in small print, so that not even all the winners' friends noticed it.

XII. 12.—Yesterday I wrote the first draft of a piece called "Postscript to Sketches about Conrad" and just that little bit exhausted me completely. The whole day was somehow unpleasant. In the morning they called from *Przegląd Kulturalny*. The editors want to delete from my "Vacation Journal" all points and humor the intention of which was expressly to weaken and make "palatable" the various small critical reflections. Their argument is that they were deleted on the radio. The radio people coaxed an agreement out of me on the strength of the silly argument that a listener may turn on his radio in the middle of the program and hear these sentences without the text preceding them. I agreed also because heretofore even if the radio deleted something the piece appeared untouched in the press. I tried to defend myself, but the whole thing



Illustration from Poland (Warsaw), No. 3, 1959

upset me so much that I couldn't return to my work on Conrad. The writer, for numerous reasons, subjects himself to much censorship as it is, and now, in addition, there's that insistence on inconsequential trivialities. I constantly wage fictitious conversations which are always miraculously effective—dispersing false diagnoses, absurd misunderstandings, spiritless apprehensions and suspicions. The whole thing is just a fruitless effort.

XII. 13.—I am feeling very poorly, but somehow, in the afternoon, I managed to gather enough strength to finish Conrad between five and midnight. But then I couldn't sleep until two in the morning. I keep thinking about those deletions in *Przegląd*. My "Journal" contains several humorously critical notes about our everyday reality. They do not, so help me God, exceed by as much as one iota the often sharper criticism frequently found in the daily press. And it must be admitted that with the exception of a few subjects (a few "tabus") all public affairs have never been under such a fire of public opinion as they are at the present time in Poland. Institutions and offices must often do a lot of explaining to get out from under the accusations leveled against them by readers and journalists. And now, suddenly: "We are not allowed to fire . . ." [line from a well known Mickiewicz poem]. Even though the ammunition is nothing but paper!

How significant it is that there are such proverbs as: "Too good to be true," or "Sad, but true" and none such as: "Good and happy, because it is true."

On the fly-leaves of books read late at night I found the following two, barely discernible notations for abstractionists and, of course, having nothing whatever to do with any specific reality: "The time is past when it was possible to christen people forcefully and en masse. Even the most, let us say, authoritative governments must take into consideration the feelings and beliefs of the masses, even though they may be incorrect, or considered as such. Each and every improperly utilized method of coercion with regard to the 'new' will be revenged by bad blood, very bad blood. And bad blood breeds gangrene which, in turn, brings spiritual death. What is needed is not only a program, but also genius." And another, older one, from several years back: "In times of State omnipotence the knife's edge of both overt and concealed criticism turns solely against this or that rung of the administration ladder. Public criticism then becomes atrophied, and without it there can be no normal life, no progress and no development. And that is damage that is not only irreparable, but also unavoidable under conditions wherein from the point of view of society it is 'permissible' to criticize only the authorities and from the point of view of the authorities—vice versa."

XII. 14.—At the post office I mailed a letter to *Przegląd* (one of those speeches to the wall) and the Conrad article to *Nowa Kultura*. The rest of the day I again spent working on my correspondence. In addition to public grievances there are many small private ones. The worst of it is that everyone has the best of intentions, but the result is always hash.

XII. 15.—The Yugoslav publishers arrived in Komorow

at five in the afternoon. I signed two agreements with them concerning Slovenian and Serbo-Croatian editions of "Noce i Dnie" ["Nights and Days"—Dabrowska's best known novel, written before the war]. A chance for a visit to Yugoslavia. Ah, a few weeks on the southern seashore would restore me to health and efficiency for a good many years, if, indeed, I am fated to live that long. An invitation to the Yugoslav embassy.

XII. 17.—At the invitation of PIW [Polish Publishing Institute] I presided at an evening devoted to my little brochure on Conrad. It was held in the Dom Księgarza in Stare Miasto. The room was unpleasant, long and narrow, poorly lighted. It was terribly crowded and before we began the doors were locked because people were still trying to get in. I always die of shame whenever I see doors being locked in people's faces. I read the Postscript to "Sketches on Conrad." As usual, the audience listened beautifully and in absolute silence. But afterwards, the few and seemingly hard-to-come-by "voices" were rather anti-Conrad. A lady wondered why Conrad's women were "somehow unreal." One of the listeners insisted stubbornly that Conrad favored colonial policies and was against the colored peoples and that Great Britain differs in no way from the other colonial nations. He hadn't noticed that I talked about England's present, and not past, colonial policies. It finally turned out that he had read neither "The Heart of Darkness" nor "Outpost of Progress," nor even my "Sketches on Conrad," or Gunther's "Inside Africa." Even worse than he was another speaker who—without so much as mentioning Conrad—delivered an embarrassing panegyric "in my honor." He, also, had the best of intentions and never even suspected that I was dying of shame once again. Still I had to interrupt him because he spoke of things that had absolutely nothing in common with existing facts. I had to put things right. The circulating versions and rumors on the subject of my person are strange, indeed.

XII. 22.—The Hemingway Award announcements were officially presented to Kowalski and Szczepanska yesterday, at six in the afternoon, in the PEN Club quarters. The speakers were: Parandowski, Zawieyski (the jury chairman) and Iwaszkiewicz—his debut in the role of newly-elected ZLP [Union of Polish Writers] chairman. Zawieyski explained in detail the reasons for the jury's decision, but was unstinting in his praise for the other contenders of whom there were many and all good. Unfortunately, today's press published not a word of this. The publishers of the award-winning books did not attend the PEN Club ceremonies, while the books themselves did not appear in the windows of book stores. Confusing, to say the least.

The Holidays are approaching, drizzly, cloudy and sombre. We are getting ready to go to Komorow and coming with us is our guest, a young Norwegian, Dag Halverssen, extraordinarily interested in Poland, almost in love with it. This is that crazy mystery of ours. Despite all the deficiencies, our history goes on happening and awakening interest and even . . . infatuation.

(Translated by Ewa Markowska)

Men in the News

Hungary's New Envoy in Moscow

by
General Bela Kiraly



General Geza Revesz
NEPSZABADSAG (Budapest), December 5, 1959

The Hungarian Communists have appointed a new ambassador to Moscow. Who is he, and what does this change signify in Hungarian politics? The author of this article was Military Commander of Budapest and Commander-in-Chief of the National Guard of Hungary during the 1956 Revolt. He now lives in the West, and is Executive President of the Hungarian Freedom Fighters' Federation.

ON MAY 18, 1960, Radio Budapest announced that Colonel-General Geza Revesz had been relieved of his post of Minister of Home Defense and that Lajos Czinege, First Secretary of the Party organization of Szolnok County, had been appointed to replace him. The same broadcast also announced that Geza Revesz had been appointed Ambassador of the Hungarian People's Republic in Moscow.* Both the Ministry of Home Defense and the Moscow Embassy are particularly important positions. The Ministry is in a position of power, while the Embassy is in a decisive strategic position because of Soviet-Hungarian relations. If a change is made in either of them it is worthwhile to look for the reasons.

We must therefore ask ourselves the question: why did Revesz give up his post of Defense Minister, why is he going to Moscow and what will be his functions there? Also: why was Lajos Czinege, a relative nonentity, appointed Defense Minister?

At a State reception in 1950 Geza Revesz sat beside me and told me how, as a Comintern agent in the Thirties, he used to come and go across the Belgian and French borders with false documents, and how he organized, directed and controlled the Comintern's activities in those two countries. Thus at the end of the second World War,

* The previous ambassador, who had held the post since August 1956, was Janos Boldoczky. The announcement made no mention of a new job for him, and his dismissal was not accompanied by the customary acknowledgment for good work done.

Revesz' cadre file in the Soviet Union attested to his organizational talent, his fine results in the field of subversion and, most important of all, his loyalty to the Soviets, proved in peril of death. The Kremlin did not want such a remarkable man in the spotlight, in a conspicuous first-line position. Instead, it gave Revesz and others like him the actual direction and control, but excluded them from the accessory circumstances burdening the front rank. It was not until 1957 that Revesz came into the first rank as Minister of Home Defense. The Kremlin took this step out of extreme necessity. At that time the Soviets did not have even two dozen men upon which to base Communist power in Hungary after the brutal crushing of the Revolution. It was no longer possible to keep a man as valuable and as loyal as Revesz in the second rank.

Geza Revesz is a highly trained and highly educated soldier, a Soviet colonel who has graduated from the highest Soviet technical military academy. I observed him closely at high command theoretical exercises in 1949-50 and saw not only that he had far more understanding and knowledge than the other Muscovites, but also that he had really good tactical and strategic ideas. He was at home in every branch of military science. In the critical year of 1957, such a well-prepared man, with such loyalty to the Kremlin, was invaluable.

PROMOTION OR PUNISHMENT?

Let us now go back to the thought that the Defense Ministry is a far higher position than the Moscow Embassy. From this, we might deduce that in the course of the constant struggle among those in power Revesz lost and that his rivals down-graded him from Minister to Ambassador. This possibility must immediately be rejected. Such a purge and "dispatch into emigration" within the Communist camp is possible in the Soviet Union, but not in the captive nations because of their limited terri-

stories. Khrushchev exiled Molotov to Ulan-Bator, sent Malenkov to head a distant electric power station, probably put Zhukov under house arrest in some unknown place, but Kadar could not send Revesz to Moscow to degrade and eliminate him. It is only with honor and a clean cadre file that anybody can go to Moscow. The consul cannot offend Moscow. Consequently, the change has some more important, more fundamental reason. But before going into this, the role of the new Defense Minister must be analyzed in order to better understand the situation.

According to the Radio Budapest announcement, Lajos Czinege served in the army only between 1951 and 1954, completed only the political officers' school, and never received instruction at the Zrinyi Academy—the highest military tactical school—although such instruction is required not only from higher military commanders but also from leading political officers. He had only the rank of lieutenant colonel. Yet today Czinege is the Minister of Defense. This is the more surprising because in countries under Communist rule the post of Defense Minister is a professional military position, the Minister being at the same time the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. With the exception of Stalin, every Soviet Minister of War since Trotsky was a career soldier; after the Communist take-over in Hungary, their Ministers Farkas and Bata had to go through very severe military training under the personal supervision of the main Soviet military adviser in order to become real "commanders-in-chief." Revesz fitted this role very well. But if he had to go, why has a military dilettante been appointed to succeed him?

The question is particularly interesting if we consider the fact that, although the great mass of the army—including the lower officer corps—cooperated or at least sympathized with the 1956 Revolution, the majority of the higher officers did not, or only paid it lip-service. A great many general and higher officers looked for the return of the Soviet colonizers, from whom they had received their power. After the November 4 Soviet aggression these people again collaborated with the Soviet colonizers. There were also many Communists loyal to the Kremlin in the generals' corps who had attended the Frunze or Voroshilov Academies in Moscow.

If Lajos Czinege became Minister of Defense instead of a military professional trained in the Soviet Union, this is because from 1954 until the Revolution he was the man in charge of military cadre questions in the Secretariat of the Party's Central Committee. Thus his real "military career" started just where Revesz began his after he returned to Hungary in 1945.

But while between 1945 and 1948, Revesz as the Party's military cadre officer had been responsible for the elimination of the members of the old army and police, Lajos Czinege handled the cadre questions of the armed forces at a time when the Kremlin had built up a very large army in Hungary.

He therefore knows every important officer, his past, origin and loyalty to the Party. This is Czinege's only strong side. In addition, he took such a zealous part in the Russian crushing of the Revolution that he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

The fact is, therefore, that a cadre expert decorated for faithful collaboration with the Soviet aggressors against his country has become Minister of Defense in Hungary, jumping over the heads of a series of well-trained, faithful Communist generals. This indicates the degree to which three and a half years after the Revolt, the main question of the leadership of the Hungarian armed forces is not a military but a political question.

The reconstruction of an army after the 1956 events is still giving headaches to the Kadar regime. What was needed, therefore, was a Defense Minister who, although inexperienced in military matters, is an expert in judging which officers are the most reliable from the viewpoint of the Soviets and which officers can be put into key positions without much regard to their knowledge but with a great deal to their loyalty to the Party.

Revesz could have handled this question even better than Czinege. The fact that he has nevertheless been sent to Moscow proves not that he has become superfluous as the head of the army, but indispensable in the Soviet capital. Why is Revesz indispensable in Moscow? The reasons for this make the Revesz case a tiny—but, for Hungary, characteristic—part of the general Soviet evolution.

A NEW ERA

In the Soviet Union the formula of power until Stalin's death was: Stalin plus the secret police. Khrushchev has been unable to establish this simple equation. It is becoming more and more evident, and the summit fiasco is eloquent proof of this, that the formula is much more complicated today. At the time of Stalin, there were no internal Soviet politics, but today there are. The formula now looks something like this: Khrushchev's personality plus the Communist Party (in which the Khrushchev and Stalin factions are two separate elements) plus the armed forces plus the intelligentsia (particularly the technical intelligentsia) plus the administrative hierarchy, plus, to a certain extent, public opinion. This complicated formula produces the play of forces that is internal politics.

Such internal politics make the relations between the captive nations and the Soviet Union more complicated than the old unambiguous straightforward subordination. Various Communist cliques and factions in the Satellite countries can hope for advantage as a result of shifts in the internal power balance of the USSR. Kadar, for example, has until now enjoyed Khrushchev's absolute confidence and his position in Hungary has been as a consequence unassailable. Today, however, when we can see as one of the factors in the summit failure the revived Stalinist line led by Suslov in cooperation with the Chinese, Kadar must balance the possibility that under Suslov's increasing influence the power of Hungarian Stalinists like Rakosi and Gero will wax again. One of the ominous signs of this was that in the April 4 amnesty Kadar released not only the notorious Stalinist Mihaly Farkas but also his son Vladimir Farkas, the man who had tortured Kadar.

The internal Soviet power struggle may be expected to exercise an increasingly strong effect on the captive nations. In this situation, Kadar's group and the other Communist



General Geza Revesz (left) with Party boss Janos Kadar, President Istvan Dobi and Premier Ferenc Munnich at the airport in Budapest. *ERDEKES UJSAG (Budapest), April 6, 1957*

factions are groping in the dark unless they have a suitable representative where the decisions are made, in Moscow. Thus Geza Revesz did not go there as a puppet, but as the first and only Ambassador with real power and influence since the Communists took power in Hungary. He is going to Moscow as a Soviet citizen and will move there on a terrain he knows well. Soviet citizenship—I stress this—must be taken literally and seriously. During the Revolution I took into protective custody Revesz' cultural counterpart, Erzsebet Andics. When the freedom fighters arrested her she produced a Soviet identity card valid for the current year, 1956, and a Soviet passport, and this "Hungarian Deputy Minister of Culture" protested against her arrest as a Soviet citizen. The analogy between the two situations allows us to deduce that among Revesz' permanent documents there always figured and still figures his Soviet

identity card. With his Soviet wife, Revesz is thus going home. As a former Comintern agent of long standing, the back door of the secret police will be open to him. As a former Soviet colonel he will have free entry into the Ministry of War. In recognition of his work in France and Belgium as an international agitator, his personal friends in the second and third ranks of the Soviet Communist Party will keep him well informed.

Geza Revesz will be a real Ambassador who will be able to send thorough reports back to Hungary—if he wants to. Whether he will want to or not remains an open question, because basically Revesz does not belong to any faction in Hungary. He is not a Kadarist, and did not belong to Farkas or Rakosi either. More than anybody else in Hungary, Revesz was simply a Soviet agent. The fact that he is now returning to his superiors indicates the beginning of a new period. It is possible that he is going to re-orient himself or to get first-hand information on coming changes. It is also possible that Revesz is going to Moscow as a compromise between the Kadar and Rakosi viewpoints, in order to discuss and direct, as a neutral and disinterested Soviet agent, the establishment of an eventual Kadar-Rakosi coalition. There are many alternative possibilities as to the meaning of Revesz's appointment. One basic fact, however, is certain. Revesz had to return to Moscow because a new and more complex reality has replaced the unequivocal Stalinist direction of the captive nations. More flexible methods are being used in the relation between Moscow and Budapest, and the Embassy in Moscow will play an effective and important role in them. Affairs of vital importance will be settled there. This is the reason for selecting a reliable Soviet citizen, who stands above the struggle of the Communist cliques in Hungary and enjoys the best of connections in Soviet society.

THE PEOPLE, NO

"In front of the school building the citizens were gathering for the pre-election meeting.

"The evening bell was chiming.

"Old men took off their sheepskin caps and began to pray. I was quite shaken by the sudden change in their manner. The sound of the bell cut off the talk of wit and healthy energy. They were all suddenly subdued and somewhat small.

"It flashed through my mind that I should perhaps take off my hat, but it was too late and so I only bent my head and waited till the bell stopped. . . .

"The meeting started as usual, and a good hour after the time for which it was called. On the narrow school benches a few citizens were huddled together. As soon as the future Secretary of the local national committee . . . took the floor the room filled. The chairman of the election commission gave the name of the first candidate.


"At first there was silence, then one could hear whispers. I was sitting behind pious old men. I gathered from their conversation, conducted in the local dialect, that to them all elections were the same old nonsense; whom the Communists wanted to have elected they would elect, and in any case the truth would never be spoken in public.

"The hour was quite late when the last name on the list of future deputies was read.

"The citizens of Lendak went home.

"They did not propose other candidates—but neither would they give their vote of confidence to those that had been proposed. When they were asked to vote, not a single arm went up. The chairman of the election committee read the names, they took notice of them—and went home."

Pravda (Bratislava), May 21, 1960



The sabers are marked, "quotation."

SZPILKI (Warsaw), June 5, 1960

Philosophy in Poland II

The Stalinist Period

THE VICTORY OF "THEOLOGICAL" Marxism-Leninism in Polish philosophy was part of the general social and political transformation that occurred after 1948 throughout Eastern Europe (mass purges in the Communist Parties, disappearance of the notion of distinctive national "ways to Socialism," concerted efforts to regiment the entire intellectual and cultural life in accordance with the Soviet model, changes in economic policies, etc.). The

The previous article appeared in the June issue. The author, J. H., is a student of Polish philosophy.

general features of this transition from the first "mild" postwar period to the unbridled rule of Stalinist orthodoxy are well known. The official view of the inadequacies, deviations and sins of the first period was expressed in Poland by Hilary Minc—then the strong man of the Polish Politburo—in two points: (1) lack of faith in the Soviet Union, and (2) lack of faith in the teachings of Stalin. These deficiencies were to be remedied by appropriate ad-

ministrative measures and a properly organized offensive "on the ideological front."

Philosophy was one of the most important salients on this "ideological front." No deviation from "correct" philosophy was now to be tolerated. This was justified on the ground that the very foundation for the successful building of "Socialism" was the teaching, popularization and—if necessary—the forcible imposition of correct philosophical views. This emphasis on the importance of purity in philosophical matters did not follow from a concern with philosophical truth; it was, rather, a device for the regimentation of intellectual life. Philosophy ruled the arts and sciences, and hence the Party must rule philosophy.

The measures applied to assure the required "correctness" in philosophy were many and varied. A reliance on rational argument was not one of them. On the contrary, the measures employed show that the Party realized that without administrative help the "correct philosophy" would not fare too well on the free market of ideas.

Well-known philosophical reviews disappeared; many older philosophers were forbidden to teach (although they retained their salaries) or were allowed to teach formal logic only. Special chairs of Marxism-Leninism were created at all institutions of higher learning, and the Party set up its own educational institutions having as their chief aim the philosophical preparation of scholars in various fields. A new periodical, *Mysl Filozoficzna* (*Philosophical Thought*) was created, its announced purpose being "to saturate the whole body of Polish science with Marxism-Leninism, to develop creatively Marxism-Leninism, and to fight against bourgeois philosophy." This, in translation, meant that Polish intellectual life was to be modelled on that of the Soviet Union; that "creative" developments in philosophy were to be the monopoly of those who had political power; and that all non-theological philosophizing was to be eliminated (including non-theological Marxism). Articles in *Philosophical Thought* covered a great variety of subjects, very often extending to fields not usually classified as philosophy.

Regimentation

The teaching of philosophy became standardized, and the subject was reduced to the interminable repetition of Stalin's essay on dialectical and historical materialism, in a variety of equally boring forms, studded with quotations from Engels' *Anti-Duehring* and Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*. A typical reading list for a course in philosophy at the academic level contained in 1952, in addition to the above mentioned books, Engels' *Ludwig Feuerbach*, Lenin's *State and Revolution*, and the works of Zhdanov, Plekhanov, Lysenko and Michurin.

Translations from Western philosophy were limited strictly to authors who were approved followers of the Party line. On the whole, they tended to give a distorted picture of contemporary Western philosophy. Men like Cornforth in England, or Desanti in France, were presented as the most important Western philosophers. Bertrand Russell, John Dewey, the existentialists, the logical empiri-

cists, etc., were summarily condemned as "idealists" and as willing tools of Western imperialism, regardless of the content of their works and the differences separating them.

"Truth" had been established once and for all. The only task which remained was exegesis, the re-education of recalcitrant "idealists," the popularization of the gospels, and the excommunication of heretics. The application of "philosophical" principles was vastly extended, on the premise that philosophy controls everything (and is itself, naturally, controlled by the Party). Everything became either "materialistic" or "idealistic." "Materialistic" meant "approved by the Party," and "idealistic" meant everything else. Perhaps the apex of irrelevance was reached when, during the preparations for the so-called Congress of Polish Science which took place in 1951, the "section of forestry" passed a formal motion stating that "until now, forestry has developed on the basis of the idealistic worldview, up to its neck in the mire of metaphysics . . ." and that this state of affairs must be changed forthwith.

This was the time when—as a Soviet joke has it—"thought" meant "the shortest distance between two quotations." It was said of one opportunistic pseudo-scholar: "Marx read the entire Library of the British Museum in 25 years and wrote *Das Kapital*. Professor X read *Das Kapital* in 25 days and wrote a whole library." Of the many publications which are usually classified as philosophical, most represented no more than the attempt to restate, for the thousandth time, the received body of doctrine.

Despite all this, Polish philosophy never completely achieved the dreary level of Soviet philosophy. *Philosophical Thought*, even in the worst period, remained more interesting than most Soviet publications. The editors of *Philosophical Thought* were commended for their worthy efforts in an article in the Soviet journal *Voprosy Filosofii* (1953, #1), but with several important reservations. The best works representing the official point of view were A. Schaff's *On Some Problems of the Marxist Theory of Truth*, and *The Objective Character of Historical Laws*. They were—with all their dogmatism—much superior to the usual products of this sort. Schaff is perhaps the most erudite and able representative of orthodoxy in the entire Soviet bloc.

One of the features of this period was a concerted attack—led by A. Schaff—against thinkers connected with the tradition of the Lwow-Warsaw school. They were misrepresented as forming a "school" in the strict sense of the term, as committed to a certain number of definite tenets, which were of course declared to be idealistic or at least crypto-idealistic. The attacks did not go unanswered, in spite of difficulties, terror and danger. In the pages of *Philosophical Thought*, Kotarbinski and Ajdukiewicz fearlessly defended their views against Schaff. It was obvious, to any unprejudiced observer, which side had the stronger arguments in this debate. Nevertheless, *Philosophical Thought* announced that the arguments of Kotarbinski and Ajdukiewicz had been decisively refuted. Both of these great Polish scholars were given up as hopeless cases, as men who were not open-minded enough to learn and apply themselves to the process of re-education. Who should edu-

cate whom was, in fact, more than obvious. After this debate, the rule of orthodoxy was no longer opposed in print.

In two fields, however, the work of Polish philosophers was not interrupted. One of them was logic, which, since Stalin's change of mind on the subject, had been recognized even in the Soviet Union as respectable and politically safe. It would be impossible to summarize the work done in logic and the philosophy of mathematics within the framework of this article. Many technical papers of great importance appeared in such periodicals as *Fundamenta Mathematica*, *Colloquium Mathematicum*, and even *Philosophical Thought*. In 1953, *Studia Logica*, a new review devoted entirely to logic, was established. It published articles in French, English, German and Polish, and is now considered one of the most important periodicals of this sort in world literature.

Another field in which interesting contributions were made was the history of Polish social thought. Many neglected Polish thinkers of past centuries were brought to light again. This was often done for ulterior motives, and their significance was often distorted. Nevertheless, the works of many of them reached a wide audience for the first time (e.g. Dembowski, Kamiński). A monumental project for the translation of the works of classical philosophers was also begun. This is still being continued, and represents an achievement of great importance.

The "Thaw" and Its Aftermath

THE THIRD PERIOD in the postwar history of Polish philosophy began with the "thaw" following Stalin's death. The situation changed even more radically after October 1956. The "thaw" affected all of Polish life, and the changes in the field of philosophy should be seen against this background. The genesis and development of the "thaw" and the intellectual background of the events of October 1956, need not be described here. It will be enough to observe that from the very beginning of the intellectual ferment (in the first months of 1954), Polish philosophers of both the older and younger generations took an active part in the debate, and very early started to question both the pseudo-theological method imposed on philosophy and the totalitarian political motivation behind the method. A vigorous critique of Stalinism in philosophy emanated not only from men of such assured intellectual stature as Kotarbinski or Ajdukiewicz, but also from large groups of young thinkers, both Marxist and non-Marxist. In 1957, *Philosophical Thought* published answers to a questionnaire on "Tasks and Perspectives in the Development of Philosophy." Some of the answers were simply catalogues of the abuses of the "past period," but some were interesting contributions to the problem of the social functions of philosophy. Among the most noteworthy were the statements of Professor Kotarbinski and of two young logicians, M. Przelecki and A. Grzegorzcyk.

What Is Marxism?

The young Marxists reacted no less strongly, and the debate led to a fundamental discussion of Marxism, Socialism, Lenin's principle of partisanship in philosophy, etc. Representatives of orthodoxy joined in the general condemnation of the "cult of personality" in philosophy, and the tone and content of philosophical writing changed greatly. The great debate, in which the "faithful" were now forced to rely on argument alone, had been opened.

The discussion that began with the question "What is Stalinism?" became in time one of the most searching examinations of Marxism ever undertaken by thinkers calling themselves Marxists. Compared to the depth and extent of this discussion, the attempts made during the last few years by some Western Marxists, or by disillusioned Communists like Djilas, look very pale indeed. Only recently—and to some extent under the influence of the Polish discussions—has a similar debate developed in certain intellectual circles in the West (e.g., Goldman, Morin, and P. Fougeyrollas in France, Taylor in England, the French review *Arguments*, and the British *New Left Review*).

It is true that the themes of these debates were not entirely new. As Daniel Bell recently remarked in *The End of Ideology*, similar debates on the scientific status of dialectical materialism, on the class determination of ideas, on ethics and Socialism, etc., filled the pages of *Partisan Review*, *The New Internationalist* and *The New Leader* in the early thirties, and the issues were greatly clarified by such writers as Sidney Hook, Ernest Nagel, Lewis Corey, Ed-



"Hello. Are you halfway up or halfway down?"

POLITYKA (Warsaw), February 20, 1960

mund Wilson and John Dewey. To this it might be added that debates on the same and related themes occurred at the time of Bernstein and Kautsky, and that—in fact—they have never ceased. It is enough to mention Lefebvre in France or the strange history of Georgy Lukacs. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the debate in Poland had—and still has, although it is now confined to more esoteric and scholarly journals—an urgency and an immediate political relevance that were not known to the Western searchers for Marxist humanism. Perhaps as a result of this, and because of the unique interpenetration between differing philosophical traditions, and also because orthodoxy had better defenders in Poland than elsewhere, the Polish debate produced several contributions which are undoubtedly of lasting importance.

The new situation after October 1956 radically changed all of Polish intellectual life, and these changes were naturally reflected in the field of philosophy. Old teachers of philosophy resumed their teaching again; *Philosophical Thought*—the symbol of the policies of the “past period”—was liquidated and replaced by a new periodical *Studia Filozoficzne* (*Philosophical Studies*); philosophical publications once more became interesting, varied and often of great scholarly significance. It appeared that, even during the worst time of Stalinist terror, independent thought and research had never stopped; many works originally written without any hope of publication could now appear in print. Also, contacts with the West were reestablished. In July 1957, the *Institut International de Philosophie* organized an international philosophical conference in Warsaw, attended by a large number of scholars from Europe and America. In 1949, at the 10th International Congress of Philosophy in Amsterdam, there had been no scholars from Poland; in 1959, at the 12th Congress in Venice, the Polish delegation was large, composed of many scholars of international standing, and it attracted general attention. In fact, it was the only delegation from the Soviet bloc taken seriously by Western scholars. Articles by Polish philosophers started to appear again in Western professional periodicals, and Polish students began to visit Western Europe and the US.

Recently, after a few years of official tolerance, there has been a reaction against too much “liberalism.” Some apprehensions have been raised by a few vague and menacing pronouncements of Schaff. Representing as usual the official view, he seems to take the position that free debate is desirable provided it leads to the victory of the “truth.” If it does not, the “truth” will have to be helped along in the struggle by proper measures. (See *East Europe*, January 1960, p. 31.) What these measures may be is not clear, but it is easy to imagine. So far, however, the possibilities for creative and independent work in philosophy have not been seriously impaired. Robert Peel said once that William Godwin’s works were not dangerous because a book which cost five guineas could not be widely read. The Polish regime seems to follow the same principle. Although discussions of controversial philosophical issues seem to have become less frequent in the popular press and literary weeklies than they were in 1956 and 1957, a wide variety of opinions is

still to be found in professional journals and scholarly publications.

Two recent developments in Polish philosophy deserve special comment: (1) the return of the old, non-dogmatic way of philosophizing, and (2) the appearance of Polish “revisionism.”

Recent Writings

At the time of the founding of the unlamented *Philosophical Thought*, the goals to be achieved on the “philosophical front” were stated unambiguously: the complete elimination of all independent, “idealist,” “bourgeois” types of philosophy (including non-theological Marxism), and the preparation of “cadres” of professional philosophical employees of the Party ready to accept the verdicts of political authorities as the highest criterion of truth in philosophy. On the gravestone of *Philosophical Thought* it can be written that none of these goals were achieved. The “victory” of the Party-line philosophy proved to be a Pyrrhic one. Old philosophical traditions, based on the commitment to the ethos of free inquiry, were not destroyed, although its representatives had some hard times. In contrast to some confused *litterateurs*, no significant Polish philosopher became a Marxist-Leninist in the required sense of submission to the intellectual verdicts of the Party. Most of them showed fearless resistance to the attempts to make philosophy a propaganda weapon of the government. And, perhaps most important, they were able to educate a large group of younger scholars who look at philosophy and its tasks in exactly the same way as Western philosophers do, regardless of doctrinal differences between them.

The many important works published in Poland since 1956 are the best monuments to these efforts, which did not cease even during the worst days of Stalinist terror. T. Kotarbinski, now the President of the Polish Academy of Science, published two volumes of his *Selected Works*, an excellent *History of Logic*, and an important and original work, the *Treatise on Efficient Action*. This last book is the first systematic presentation of a new field of research with which Kotarbinski has been concerned for a great many years. He calls it praxeology, or the theory of efficient action. The task of praxeology, as understood by Kotarbinski, is to clarify the fundamental concepts relating to human action, to analyze the domain of practical or technical values, such as efficiency, economy, and consistency of action, and to compare successful methods in a variety of domains of human action. Tatarkiewicz’s *History of Philosophy* (this time including the famous third volume) appeared in a new edition and is widely influential; R. Ingarden’s collected works are starting to appear, and the first two volumes of this series contain most of his writings on aesthetics. A monumental history of aesthetics by Tatarkiewicz will appear shortly; S. Ossowski’s *Foundations of Aesthetics*, widely attacked earlier, has reappeared in a new, augmented edition; T. Czezowski has published an interesting collection of philosophical papers; C. Znamierowski, a history of ethics and a longer work on value theory; M. Ossowska has written a new work called

Bourgeois Morality, and republished her *Introduction to the Science of Ethics and Motives of Human Behavior*; K. Ajdukiewicz, who edits *Studia Logica*, is continuing his important contributions to logic, philosophy of language and philosophy of science; and J. Kotarbinska has published several important articles on logic and philosophy of science.

These names and titles are examples only, and they do not exhaust the work of contemporary Polish philosophers. Perhaps it should be added that in addition to the above-mentioned works of older, mature scholars, many younger men have made important contributions in the field of philosophy and methodology of science, continuing one of the most important traditions of Polish philosophy (e.g. M. Przelecki, T. Pawlowski, A. Gedymin, A. Malewski, K. Szaniawski, and many others).

In formal logic, where work was never interrupted during the Stalinist period, Poland continues to be one of the most important world centers of research. H. Greniewski has published two highly original works (*Elements of Deductive Logic* and *Elements of Inductive Logic*), and the young logician, A. Grzegorzczak, with two books and a great number of technical papers, has already achieved international fame. Many Polish technical contributions to logic and the philosophy of mathematics cannot be even enumerated here. They are very well known to competent logicians and mathematicians throughout the world.


One of the byproducts of the attainments of Polish philosophers in the field of logic has been a searching examination of the traditional Marxist problem concerning the relation of dialectics to logic. In the end even Schaff changed his position on the problem of the "principle of non-contradiction."

On the whole, then, it can be said that although the natural development of Polish philosophy was seriously hindered by the Stalinist period, it never stopped. The first of the avowed aims of the defunct *Philosophical Thought* was not achieved: Polish philosophy was not "saturated" with the theological brand of Marxism-Leninism.

Revisionism

AND WHAT ABOUT Marxism-Leninism itself? Here also the results were unexpected. The planned production of "philosophical cadres" largely failed. There are, of course, Marxists and Marxist-Leninists in the new generation of philosophers in Poland. But most of them are not "good Marxists" by Soviet criteria. The "Marxist camp" in Poland does not speak with one voice, but—as already indicated—has become a chorus of discordant voices, disconcerting not only to Moscow but to other regimes in the Soviet bloc. Poland has become a hotbed of philosophical "revisionism."

The problem of "revisionism" is a complicated one and extends beyond the field of philosophy. This is not the place to discuss it in all its ramifications. It will be enough to say that "revisionism"—"the chief danger in the contemporary international Communist movement," according to Moscow—is a natural product of the attempt to



"The various positions are: attention, super-attention, extra-attention, hyper-attention and absolute attention."

POLITYKA (Warsaw), May 7, 1960

make a single system of doctrines function both as a scientific theory and as an ideology. A scientific theory requires continuous revision and change, while an ideology succeeds only if it is presented as immutable truth. Whatever Marxism may have meant to the founding fathers, or to Kautsky, Plekhanov, Lenin and Bernstein, in the course of its development in the Soviet Union the ideological function of the theory became overwhelmingly predominant. This has led to what can only be described as "theological Marxism-Leninism." If the political, "religious," ideological function of the doctrine is the only really significant one, this development is quite understandable.

Since the writings of the founding fathers can be interpreted (and always have been) in a variety of ways, one has either to recognize many "religions" based on the same sacred text, or to establish a single authoritarian church with a monopoly on interpretation. If this last strategy is adopted, the problem is "solved": the correct, orthodox theory is then defined by the Party, which is the only "repository of historical experiences of the proletariat," and the only source of "creative development" of the original theory. The problem is not whether the theory changes, but *who* changes it. The changes introduced by the legitimate authorities are "creative developments"; the obstinate retention of older positions is the heresy of "dogmatism"; the illegitimate innovations are the opposite heresy of "revisionism." The narrow path between the Scylla of dogmatism and the Charybdis of revisionism leads through obedience to the verdicts of the Party in intellectual matters. This, however, whenever the terror is relaxed, produces an understandable reaction. In Whitehead's words: "wherever there is a creed, there is a heretic around the corner or in his grave."

If contemporary "revisionism" is understood in this way, it follows that: (1) It cannot be defined in terms of its doctrinal contents. The "truth" is one, error has many

faces, and the number of possible heresies is countless. The common characteristic of all the heresies was aptly summarized in an attack on Polish revisionists in the Soviet journal *Voprosy Filosofii* (1957, #4): "the petty bourgeois anarchical idea of freedom from Party guidance in all intellectual and cultural fields." (2) Revisionism today is not identical with the old revisionism of Bernstein, even though some of the revisionist themes—dealing with standard inadequacies of Marxism—are often similar to the themes of the old discussions. (3) From the official point of view, revisionism is not only an intellectual mistake but the "sin of pride" and disobedience. (4) What was revisionism or orthodoxy yesterday may be something else today or tomorrow.

Revisionism in this sense may appear on different intellectual levels. One of the characteristic aspects of Polish revisionism is the fact that it was not satisfied with criticizing and examining the purely political and economic parts of the official theory, but went straight to the central, officially sponsored philosophical doctrines in epistemology, theory of history, and ethics. And this philosophical revisionism, developed by young thinkers who were brought up to be the new generation of priests, became one of the most significant aspects of Polish philosophy.

Kolakowski


It would be impossible to present here all the various aspects of this Polish philosophical revisionism. Perhaps the best example is provided by the career of the young Polish

philosopher Leszek Kolakowski, now teaching at the University of Warsaw. In his early days he accepted Stalinist orthodoxy, but slowly developed into the most able and influential representative of "revisionism." Someone said of the French existentialists: it is true that they left the Church, but they have stopped on the Church steps and continue their debate there. Polish revisionists are often in a similar situation. Nevertheless, as the example of Kolakowski shows, some of them have moved quite a few steps down from the Church entrance and have been able to make significant contributions to philosophy.

Kolakowski's articles on a variety of subjects, ranging from the concept and social function of philosophy, the meaning of Marxism, fundamental problems of ethics, the inadequacies of historicism in ethics, and a critique of the orthodox Stalinist myth of "two camps" in philosophy, to recent papers, such as "The Priest and the Jester" (see *East Europe*, February 1960), and "Karl Marx and the Classical Definition of Truth" (*Philosophical Studies*, 1959, #2), are interesting not only as symptoms of the stages of his own evolution from dogmatism to independent thinking, and not only as showing ferment among Communist intellectuals, but also for their genuine philosophical merits. His publications usually draw polemical attacks from the "orthodox" group (e.g., C. Nowinski in *Polityka*, No. 19, 1958; Schaff on Kolakowski's interpretation of young Marx in *Nowe Drogi*, 1959, #13; H. Eilstein on the same subject in *Philosophical Studies*, 1959, #6; J. J. Wiatr on "The Priest and the Jester" in *Polityka*, December 12, 1959; and also A. Schaff's *The Controversy about the Problem of Ethics*, 1958).

Kolakowski's most ambitious scholarly work is his book on Spinoza (*The Individual and Infinity; Freedom and Antinomies of Freedom in Spinoza's Philosophy*, 1958). The primary purpose of the book is to provide a new analysis and interpretation of Spinoza's philosophy. However, it is not simply an exercise in logical and historical analysis along traditional lines. The search for a deeper meaning in Spinoza's philosophy is based on an incomparable knowledge of intellectual currents in the seventeenth century (to which Kolakowski has devoted another book) and is controlled by certain fundamental—and original—assumptions as to the nature and function of philosophy in general, and the proper method of inquiry in the field of history of ideas. Kolakowski's views on these subjects are derived from his own interpretation of Marx. Perhaps it will not be out of place to remark that in certain respects Kolakowski has reached a position reminiscent of John Dewey (e.g. with respect to the nature and task of philosophy, the real functions of classical systems of philosophy, and the means-ends problem).

Although Kolakowski is undoubtedly the most interesting and—despite the obscurity of his language—the most influential Polish revisionist in philosophy, he is not, of course, alone. Several other young thinkers have made noteworthy contributions to subjects ranging from the history of Marxism to the problem of "Marxist aesthetics" (e.g. P. Beylin, "On Some Problems in the Theory of Art," *Twórczość*, 1958, #1).



"Something isn't right . . ."

POLITYKA (Warsaw), January 2, 1960

No "Captive Minds" in Poland

These cursory remarks cannot do justice to the variety and richness of contemporary Polish philosophy. In spite of some recent difficulties, philosophical life in Poland continues to be interesting and vigorous. Older philosophical traditions, logic and the philosophy of science, non-theological Marxism, echoes of such "novelties" as existentialism, both in Catholic and in Marxist circles, or the Oxford analytic philosophy, contribute to an atmosphere of intense preoccupation with philosophical problems, and there is much interpenetration between Marxism and other philosophical views. The political significance attributed by Communist orthodoxy to most technical philosophical questions has helped to create a widespread interest in philosophy. After all, if the officials of the ruling party attach so much importance to the insidious influence of Kant on this

or that Polish philosopher, many people grow curious about Kant. In consequence, an astonishing number of copies of a new translation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* were sold to readers presumably innocent of all philosophy.

The fact that several years of concerted effort by the ruling Party achieved no converts to the Soviet version of Marxism-Leninism among serious philosophers, and that among some who had once accepted it the phenomenon of revisionism appeared, suggests that the ideological appeal of the "new faith" sponsored by a totalitarian State has been greatly exaggerated. The theory—popularized by Czeslaw Milosz—of "captive minds" fascinated by the pseudo-religion and its pseudo-theology, is evidently wrong. There were confused minds, frightened minds, opportunistic minds and uneducated minds, but the genuinely captive mind is not to be found in Poland.

ANOTHER ROCKET? GIVE ME 300 RUBLES!

A Soviet factory worker complains about the cost of living:

"So our scientists have sent a rocket to the moon. . . . So what? What have those sputniks and rockets done for poor mortals like myself? For example, on the eve of the launching of the rocket I owed 300 rubles. I am still in debt regardless of the successful launching. We lack housing and children's homes. Goods are expensive. I don't doubt that this rocket burns up so much money that people would gasp if they knew its cost.

"If you were to tell the workers, 'Well, Ivan, if we don't bother launching this rocket, a yard of cloth will cost half as much, your little boy can go to the children's home, and you can buy yourself an electric iron,' I'm convinced that he would reply: 'For goodness sake, do not launch those rockets! Who needs rockets today? Let the moon go to hell. I would rather have more food on my table. After that, we can play around a little with the moon.'"

From a letter to *Komsomolskaya Pravda*
(Moscow), June 11, 1960

Current Developments

INTERNATIONAL:

Soviet Premier Khrushchev struggles to defend his international policies against opposition in the Communist bloc (p. 36).

POLITICAL:

Yugoslav Communists come under renewed attack from Moscow (p. 38).

Czechoslovakia's "National Front" candidates elected with a 99 percent majority of the organized vote (p. 44).

Hungary's "People's Front" meets, endorses Kadar's policies (p. 45).

Poles riot again over a Church-State conflict in Zielona Gora (p. 41).

ECONOMIC:

Romania's Third Party Congress considers a new economic plan (p. 47).

Hungarian regime strives to create a "new peasant class" (p. 46).

AREAWIDE

After the Summit Collapse

Thrown off balance when the Soviet Premier torpedoed the summit conference scheduled to begin in Paris, May 16, the East European press and radio spent the next few weeks trying to follow and then mimic the shifts of Khrushchev's foreign policy pronouncements. Initially, the Soviet bloc took a hard line toward American President Eisenhower and his refusal to apologize for the US reconnaissance flights over the USSR. Radio Sofia, May 18, characterized Eisenhower's attitude as "pharisaic," the President himself as a man who talked incoherently, and US policy as "unbalanced." Later that same day, Radio Sofia branded "ruling US circles" as "reactionaries, sworn enemies of peace, cold warriors, aggressors, bandits, warmongers, Nazi-allies, spies and provocateurs."

The Prague daily *Rude Pravo*, May 22, was equally vehement in its declarations:

"It has become apparent that Eisenhower has openly gone over to the positions of the militaristic and monopolistic circles in the United States. He lends equally unconcealed support to the aims of the German militarists and revengemongers and to one of the hardest adherents of negotiating policy 'from positions of strength' and the 'cold war'—Chancellor Adenauer."

In Romania, the Party organ *Scinteia*, May 20, called the flight of the American reconnaissance plane an "inadmissible act" ordered by "the ruling circles of the United States which have made the cynical statement that they intend to go even further to aggravate tension" as proved by their refusal to fulfill the Soviet Premier's "minimal and just conditions for the holding of the summit conference."

Poland and Hungary were somewhat more restrained in tone. The correspondent in Paris for *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), May 19, wrote that "it was more sensible and honest to postpone to a later date a summit conference doomed to failure in advance owing to the dispute between the two principal great powers . . . resulting from the US failure to insure conditions necessary for making the conference even a modestly successful one." Questioning "how great in fact is President Eisenhower's effective authority?" the reporter concluded that "this air incident" proved that the "US President is far from wielding sufficient authority to make his personal convictions prevail."

Poland reacted to the Paris failure more in sorrow than in anger. Warsaw radio, May 20, noted with "deep regret" the breaking-up of the conference and *Sztandar Młodych* (Warsaw), May 19, felt "deep sorrow as a result of the obstacles placed by some Western powers on the way to a real and effective agreement." (For Albanian and Yugoslav reactions, see below.)

Throughout Eastern Europe, rallies were held to explain

why the USSR had taken the stand it had in Paris. Many people, however, seem to have reacted to the breakdown of the summit conference with fears of an armed conflict between East and West, and the regimes were soon forced to issue statements soothing the anxious populace. The Czechoslovak foreign minister Vaclav David, speaking at a pre-election meeting in Trebic, stated:

"Some people have begun to draw unsubstantiated conclusions about the summit failure, as if the situation had now become very serious and even as if some conflict were now threatening in the near future. I want to assure you, comrades, with full responsibility, that no such panic is in any way justified. The USSR, by downing the American espionage plane, has shown to the hoththeaded generals in the Pentagon . . . that they must now be very careful as to where the Soviet frontiers are. The fact that the USA did not have enough decency to apologize to the USSR for the plane flights, thus making it impossible to hold the conference, cannot be interpreted or described as being the eve of war. This would be a profound error. The USSR and the countries of the Socialist camp devote all their energies to the preservation of peace." (Radio Prague, May 23.)

Khrushchev Changes Tactics

In his speech in East Berlin, May 19, when he stated that he would not "aggravate the international situation" and in Moscow, May 28, when he said that he "still believed that the President himself now, too, wants peace," Khrushchev tried to ease the tension he had created in Paris. Such remarks aided the Soviet bloc propagandists engaged in calming the worried population. In Bulgaria, for example, Radio Sofia's chief political commentator, May 31, repeated Khrushchev's conviction that the danger of war had not increased, since the immense Soviet economic and military power had a restraining influence on the "aggressive circles" in various countries, and in particular the USA.

Peiping's Peregrinations

After chafing for so long under the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence," Communist China found in the summit breakdown justification for renewed virulent expression of its hard line. On May 20, the official Communist Chinese news agency announced that over 3 million residents of Peiping had rallied to hear their leaders denounce President Eisenhower as a "bloodstained butcher and bandit ringleader" and call upon the peoples of the world to unite to defeat the "US imperialist war forces." The rally's main speaker, Party Central Committee Secretary-General Teng Hsiao-ping, spoke of the "unalterably aggressive nature" of US imperialism and stressed the "power of the awakened masses" who will "certainly be able by their own strength to defeat thoroughly the imperialist forces of war." Soviet Premier Khrushchev was praised for his "just stand against US imperialist provocations." By May 23 nearly 45 million people had participated in anti-US demonstrations throughout Communist China.

The verbal bellicosity emanating from Peiping abated as it became evident that Moscow intended to continue its policy of "peaceful coexistence." The Peiping daily



"You won't believe it, but I'm here on a meteorological research expedition."

Dikobraz (Prague), May 26, 1960

Jenmin Jihpao, June 7, noted that "the possibility of preventing a world war does exist at present, as a result of the change in the balance of world forces," but covered its retreat with the phrase, "we cannot say at this time that war can be eliminated forever, and to spread any impractical illusions about peace will only be favorable to the imperialists."

At a meeting of the General Council of the Communist-backed World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), June 7, China's trade union leader Liu Ning-yi was even more forthright in his acceptance of the Soviet line. He said: "In order to avert the danger of war and safeguard world peace, we favor the holding of talks between the Socialist and imperialist countries and, through such talks, the settling of international disputes; the reaching of agreement on general disarmament and prohibition of nuclear weapons; and even the concluding of pacts of mutual nonaggression." (*New China News Agency*, June 7.) In the final resolution, the WFTU declared that "thanks to the USSR, it has become really possible to avoid the menace of an atomic war that would prove devastating, to impose on the imperialists disarmament and the use of the enormous resources that are at present being wasted on the arms race



A Bulgarian comment on the summit conference in Paris.

Sturshel (Sofia), May 20, 1960

for the economic, social and cultural progress of all the people." (NCNA, June 9.)

Khrushchev's Policies Upheld

In a lengthy article in the Soviet Party organ *Pravda* (Moscow), June 12, under the guise of a review commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the publication of Lenin's "Left-Wing" Communism: an Infantile Disorder," the current Moscow Party line attacking "dogmatism and sectarianism" was defended. The article reminded readers that the Moscow Declaration of the Communist Parties in November 1957 still contained the "major principles" to guide all countries that "are advancing on the road to Socialism." Although this statement was an obvious rebuke to the Yugoslav thesis of separate paths to "Socialism," Communist China was also criticized (though not by name) for its program of agricultural and industrial communization, or, in *Pravda's* words, "for wanting to skip through all the intermediate stages directly to Communism." Unreconstructed Stalinists who disapprove of Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful coexistence," a policy which will continue even after the summit failure, were assailed:

"The left-sectarian sentiments and tendencies against which Lenin's book was directed find their expression in some places even in our time. Some persons mistakenly consider the course of the achievement of peaceful coexistence among countries with different political systems, the struggle to halt the arms race, to strengthen peace and friendship among peoples, and the talks between leaders of Socialist and capitalist countries as some kind of deviation from the positions of Marxism-Leninism." (*The New York Times*, June 13.)

In the Soviet bloc, in the days immediately following the publication of the *Pravda* article, only the East German Party organ *Neues Deutschland* reprinted it.

Tito and the Summit

It is uncertain whether Yugoslavia's mixed reaction to the breakdown of the Paris summit conference will mean resumption of full-scale hostilities between Belgrade and the Soviet bloc. Initially, Marshal Tito modified his almost unreserved support for Khrushchev's foreign policy when on May 17, although he condemned the flight of the American reconnaissance plane over the USSR, he declared that the plane incident "should not and must not" be used as a reason to revive the atmosphere of the cold war. (*Tanjug*, May 17.) When Soviet Premier Khrushchev used the U-2 flight and the subsequent American refusal to apologize for it to justify his own refusal to meet with the Western Big Three, Tito's stand immediately came under fire, first from Peiping and then from Moscow.

The Belgrade journal *Politika*, May 21, accused the Communist Chinese of "perverting" Tito's statement on the Paris conference in order to launch a new attack on "the completely consistent Yugoslav foreign policy." Quoting the official Chinese news agency as saying, "President Tito tried in every possible way to justify the American crime of aggression," *Politika* concluded that Peiping had "forged" Tito's words, thus "continuing their harmful anti-Yugoslav campaign."

Two weeks later, Belgrade renewed its counterattacks against Peiping, asserting that China's attitude toward Yugoslavia's "constructive international endeavors" showed it to be "the reactionary champion of the cold war in the world today." Judging by the anti-Yugoslav articles in the Chinese press, Belgrade could only assume that "China is bothered by the determined, principled, constructive posture of Yugoslavia, and all other countries which have tried not to let international relations become strained and the methods and policy of the cold war be revived." By her actions, "China merely abets the forces of reaction attempting to use to the utmost the Paris failure to undermine international cooperation." (Radio Belgrade, June 3.)

Soviet Denunciation

The real break in the Moscow-Belgrade détente came on May 22 when the Soviet Party ideological organ *Kommunist* seconded Peiping by accusing Tito of "directly or indirectly" supporting the USA and the forces of "imperialism." Belgrade's so-called "nonbloc policy" was termed "not a neutral stand . . . between two blocs, but between two social systems—Socialism and capitalism." In the Soviet view, Yugoslavia blamed "the USSR and other Socialist countries no less than the imperialist powers" for the arms race and for the fact that "no substantial progress has been reached in settling international questions." The outspoken attack continued by citing Tito's May 17th speech as a "rejection of the need for solidarity among the Socialist countries . . . in the struggle against imperialism [and] in this lies the objective essence and harm of their nonbloc position."

Reiterating Khrushchev's thesis that peaceful coexistence does not imply ideological coexistence, *Kommunist* explained that the "Yugoslav revisionists" conceived of peace-

A NEW PEASANT LITANY

A chronic complaint of Polish peasants is that they cannot buy enough of the things they need in order to carry on their farming. A Wroclaw newspaper, *Gazeta Robotnicza*, March 3, admitted that the rural stores are not very efficient in supplying their customers. A reporter who examined the minutes of a meeting of irate peasants in a village near Warsaw wrote the following lines to show the mood of the meeting:

We beg you, O Cooperative, for yeast,
We beg you, O Cooperative, for window panes,
We beg you, O Cooperative, for nails,
Give us, O Cooperative, rock salt,
Give us, O Cooperative, limestone,
Give us, blast you, because there are plenty of
salt and limestone in the land!

ful coexistence as "a renunciation of the struggle against bourgeois ideology." The article contained an ideological assault on "Yugoslav revisionism," concluding that "the Yugoslav revisionists are endeavoring in every way to belittle and play down the conscious principle in Socialist development, and instead, stress its chaotic nature and haphazardness . . . particularly regarding the role of the Communist Party and the Socialist State in the building of Socialism and Communism."

Belgrade Clarifies

In response to the new Soviet tactics, Belgrade concentrated its fire on Peiping, while praising Khrushchev and trying to rebut the Moscow journal's accusations. On May 26, the Belgrade weekly *Kommunist* reiterated the position of nonalignment with either East or West, and in particular disassociated Yugoslavia from those elements on both sides who rejoiced in the breakdown of the Paris meeting: "There is a remarkable similarity in the reaction of an American General who sees in the Paris failure only a motive for increasing military budgets . . . and the Peiping 'fighter against contemporary revisionism' who has made haste to take advantage of this opportunity for an attack on Yugoslavia, India, and on the policy of negotiation and understanding."

The blame for the summit failure was now placed entirely on American President Eisenhower's shoulders while the Soviet Premier was lauded for his May 19 speech in East Berlin, when he said he "would not undertake anything that might aggravate the international situation." In evaluating Eisenhower's behavior, Belgrade took a dim view of "certain statements and messages given or sent by President Eisenhower prior to his departure from Paris [trying] . . . to justify reconnaissance flights over Soviet territory by the demands of the security of the United States."

In the light of all this, the Yugoslav paper professed itself unable to understand the motives for the Soviet attack, terming the Moscow article a "rude distortion of the spirit and the objectives of Yugoslavia's policy." Although Belgrade was not "particularly surprised" by the Chinese attack a few days earlier, the Moscow article seemed to "compromise . . . principles of Soviet foreign policy" as outlined in Khrushchev's East Berlin speech.

Tirana, Peiping Reactions

As the most consistent and outspoken assailant of Yugoslavia, Albania was quick to attack Tito's initial stand on the summit conference failure. The Albanian Party organ *Zeri i Popullit* (Tirana), May 19, accused Tito of "justifying American imperialism and blaming the Soviet Union for the situation [in Paris] which has been created." The "Yugoslav revisionists" were characterized as "dishonest renegades used by American imperialism on the fronts where it needs them most—the Socialist front, the national liberation front of the Afro-Asian countries . . . [proving] once again that the revisionists have been and remain the sworn enemies of the world's progressive forces, the enemies of easing international tension, and the enemies of the cause of peace."

Albanian Party chief Enver Hoxha, in a particularly vicious speech, June 1, in Peshkopi on the Albanian-Yugoslav border, spoke darkly of "thousands of plots" organized by Belgrade against the Tirana regime, alluded to Albanian plans to ask for a revision of the frontier between the two countries, and concluded by repeating the now familiar accusations that Tito was a supporter of American "imperialists":

"As soon as the spy plane violated the airspace of the Soviet Union, an act of banditry which caused indignation among all honest people of the world, Tito had the courage to criticize the firm and courageous stand taken by N. S. Khrushchev by asking why Khrushchev made so much noise about an incident which was not so important. In that way, Tito helped the American imperialists. He also said that the great powers should now step aside because they have failed to settle the international problems; naturally, they must trust Tito with the settlement of international affairs. That does not really astonish us, because it is not the first time that Tito has put the Soviet Union, which works for peace, on the same level with American imperialism which works for war." (Radio Tirana, June 3.)

Soviet Bloc Cautious

Except for Albania, the Satellites treated the Yugoslavs gingerly in the post-summit period. The article in Moscow's *Kommunist* was summarized in Czechoslovak, Bulgarian and Romanian newspapers, but there were few commentaries; in Romania the summary had an introduction stressing ideological rather than foreign policy differences between the bloc and Yugoslavia. (*Scinteia* [Bucharest], June 5.) A brief outburst came from Bratislava, when the Slovak daily, *Pravda*, May 31, after stating that "ruling circles" in the US blamed Khrushchev and Eisenhower

jointly for the collapse of the summit meeting, went on to castigate the "Yugoslav revisionists" who "hastened to endorse this theory in an effort to deceive public opinion."

There was also a minor scuffle between Belgrade and Sofia. *Borba*, May 27, attacked a book, "The Communists," by Bulgarian author Dimitar Gilin, for his "false presentation" of the role of the Yugoslav Party during the Second World War. Belgrade exclaimed incredulously that Gilin was calling them "revisionists during our national liberation struggle" when, of course, "the correctness of a revolutionary policy is judged by its revolutionary results."

Yugoslavia Restates Its Position

An aggrieved tone was evident in another article in the Belgrade weekly, *Komunist*, June 9, answering the Soviet assertions in Moscow's May 22nd *Kommunist*. The rebuttal began with a defense of Yugoslavia's economic development and a demand that Moscow not interfere in Yugoslavia's internal affairs. Regarding foreign policy, the article underlined Belgrade's repeated support of the Soviet Union in this area, even to the extent of urging Communist China's admission to the United Nations, "notwithstanding the savage campaign which China pursues against Yugoslavia." If the Soviet readers were given these facts, "What would remain of the allegation that Yugoslavia is 'supporting imperialism?'" Although the article fully maintained Yugoslavia's ideological position, the language was temper-



Poland's Foreign Minister Rapacki (center) leaving for Denmark to sign the first cultural exchange agreement between the two countries.

TRYBUNA LUDU (Warsaw), June 8, 1960

SOCIALISM IN THE PROVINCES

One of the chronic difficulties in Communist economic planning is a failure to put the right things in the right place at the right time. The Polish trade union newspaper *Glos Pracy* (Warsaw), March 26, published the following description of the malaise:

"What is provincial industry actually? It is industry under the direction of local government. This definition raises some doubts. Can one say that local governments direct a factory if they act only as a mailbox for supplies, and if supply quotas are imposed from above? And those quotas are often not very reasonable.

"For instance: Gdansk and Gdynia need large amounts of wrapping paper, corrugated and reinforced cardboard. They are produced by the Gdansk Paper Enterprises, a provincial factory. Local production is not sufficient to satisfy even local needs. But since the distribution of it is centrally arranged, products of the Gdansk factory are sent all over the country, to Cracow for example, where a similar factory is also producing paper. At the same time, Gdansk receives paper and cardboard from other factories—sometimes even from places to which it is sending its own wares. There is no sense in this, no reason, no accounting, but the local government can do nothing about it. . . ."

ate in an apparent attempt to placate Soviet ire and keep the shaky truce.

Numerous economic and cultural exchanges continued between Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe in the weeks following the Paris blowup. Yugoslav and Polish trade unionists concluded an agreement on further cooperation on May 25, according to the official Yugoslav news agency. An accord for scientific cooperation between Poland and Yugoslavia was signed, May 30, according to the Polish news bureau; and the first Yugoslav exhibition of consumer goods opened in Moscow, May 26. (*Tass* [Moscow], May 14.)

Comecon Trade Agreements

A complex web of long-term bilateral trade agreements is now being woven by the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Negotiated under the auspices of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance—the economic organization charged with integrating the bloc—these pacts serve to dovetail the long-range economic plans of the member countries. The objective is to gain the advantages of large-scale production through specialization. Each agreement stipulates the kinds and quantities of goods to be traded during the five-year period between 1961 and 1965.

Hungary and the USSR

A five-year Soviet-Hungarian trade accord, signed on May 6, calls for a 60 percent expansion of trade during the period, with the volume in 1965 slated at twice the

1958 figure. The continued expansion of heavy industry in Hungary—70 to 75 percent by 1965 over the 1958 level—despite a seriously unfavorable natural endowment, makes it a prime example of Eastern Europe's dependence on Soviet raw materials. The list of Soviet exports in the agreement includes the following (figures in parentheses represent percentages of total Hungarian imports of these commodities): iron ore, 9 million tons (90); oil, 6.6 million tons (96); timber, 5.7 million cu.m. (62); cotton, 188,000 tons (77); metallurgical coke, 2.8 million tons; ferroalloys, (98). Hungary's exports to the Soviet Union will emphasize telecommunication equipment, precision instruments and tools, as well as a number of specialized products of heavy industry: 122 sea-going and river-going ships, 360 cranes, 5,500 metal-cutting machines and 193 diesel trains. The effort to create a division of labor in the machinery industries is underlined by the expansion of trade in their products; the USSR will increase its exports of machinery by 170 percent while Hungary's will rise 80 percent over the five-year period. The USSR's share in total Hungarian foreign trade is to rise from 30 percent in 1960 to about 34 percent during the Second Five Year Plan. (*Nepszabadsag* and *Magyar Nemzet* [Budapest], May 7.)

Czechoslovakia and East Germany

The June 1 agreement between Czechoslovakia and East Germany, the two most highly industrialized countries of

Eastern Europe, shows even more clearly the extent and type of specialization which Comecon is fostering. The volume of trade between the two countries is to increase 122 percent by 1965, and will be double the amount traded during the whole 10-year period from 1951 to 1960. The items include an array of similar but specialized goods, mainly from the highly developed machinery and chemical industries of each country: East Germany will export construction and road-building machines, trucks, electrical machines, precision equipment and optical equipment in exchange for Czechoslovak machine tools, hydro-power stations, textile and light industrial machinery, motor vehicles and equipment for the food processing and chemical industries. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], June 2.)

Poland and Romania

A long-term trade pact between Poland and Romania signed on May 28 in Bucharest provides for trade in old specialties such as Romanian oil products and equipment for Polish coke and metallurgical products, but new items such as machine tools and chemical products also appeared on the export list of both countries. (Radio Bucharest, May 28.)

Each agreement sets prices on an annual basis and provides for the usual year-by-year bilateral clearing of accounts.

THE DEATH OF PASTERNAK

When Boris Pasternak died on May 31, only two Soviet literary gazettes carried short notices of his passing. The rest of the Soviet press ignored him in death as it had in life. The Hungarian literary weekly *Elet és Irodalom*, June 3, in announcing his death made no mention of his famous novel *Dr. Zhivago* for which he received the Nobel Prize in 1959. The full text:

"Boris Pasternak, the well-known Soviet author and literary translator, died on May 31 after a long illness at the age of 70. Pasternak started his literary activity in 1912, under the influence of symbolism. He turned his back on the pressing questions of the era and escaped 'to the pure activity of the spirit.' Later, in the poems 'Lieutenant Schmidt' (1926) and '905' (1927), Pasternak tried to size up the historical events of the era. His poetry as a whole is characterized by micro-realism, by a poetic analysis of subtle, transient perceptions. His poems almost entirely lack the human being and history, but he often immortalized natural phenomena with a startling beauty. Pasternak wrote several short stories and narratives. He was also an important literary translator; he interpreted—among others—the works of Shakespeare and Petöfi [Hungarian national poet]. In 1959 the West tried to make anti-Soviet political capital out of the circumstances under which the Nobel prize was awarded to him."


POLAND

Riot in Zielona Gora

In the wake of the Nowa Huta and Olsztyn religious riots (see *East Europe*, June, pp. 30-31), another demonstration was reported in the town of Zielona Gora in the Western Territories in May. The clash apparently occurred when municipal authorities tried to take over a building housing several Catholic organizations in order to turn it into a concert hall. A crowd estimated at 5,000 forced the city officials to retreat; the demonstrations lasted all day and were finally quelled with the aid of militia reinforcements from Poznan, 60 miles distant. Initially, reports of the disturbances came from Western sources; on June 14, these stories were confirmed by the local newspaper, *Gazeta Zielonogorska*.

Witaszewski Redivivus

The appointment of General Kazimierz Witaszewski to a high post in Party officialdom was finally confirmed, when *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), May 17, reported that he had been named chief of the Party Central Committee Administration Department. Witaszewski, a well-known Stalinist before 1956 and nicknamed "General Gaspipe" after he threatened to use physical force against the workers in the 1956 Poznan "bread riots," had been sent as military attache to Prague after Gomulka's return to power. As head of administration, Witaszewski will now be charged



A Yugoslav cartoonist's view of the anti-Tito propaganda which emanates from Peiping. The editor of *Jenmin Jihpao* (Peiping) is shown announcing a competition for his editorial staff: "I will give chocolate to the man who invents a new curseword for our editorials."

BORBA (Belgrade), June 13, 1960

with Party personnel—i.e. nominations and dismissals of officials in the State and Party posts, the national councils, health service, and military and security forces. The department had been liquidated in the 1956 "thaw" and its reactivation is further confirmation of Gomulka's retreat from the liberal gains of the "Polish October."

More Violence in Poznan

On June 5 in Poznan, scene of the 1956 "bread and freedom" riots, soccer fans battled with the police in protest against the referees at a soccer game between the Warsaw and Poznan teams. The official Polish news agency labelled the fans "hooligans" and "young brawlers" and stated that the rioting was "quickly subdued." (*The New York Times*, June 6.)

Gomulka in Nowa Huta

On May 14, the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the Lenin Plant, one of the largest industrial complexes in Poland, Party boss Wladyslaw Gomulka arrived in the "Socialist city" of Nowa Huta to deliver an address to the steel workers. A few weeks earlier, the city had witnessed a religious demonstration which developed into a battle between police and population (see *East Europe*, June, pp. 30-31), and Gomulka now referred to the demonstrators as "the remnants of anti-social scum." He went on to praise the workers for "condemning the shameful deeds of hooligans egged on by clerics and [for] defending public order in their town," concluding this part of his speech with a threat to deport "adventurers and parasites" who live in Nowa Huta. Otherwise, his address was characterized by a plea for "more and more steel" coupled with praise for the USSR

"without whose help . . . it would have been impossible to construct a metallurgical combine of such great power . . . in such a comparatively short time." (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], May 15.)

New Army Political Head

Thirty-seven-year-old Wojciech Jaruzelski, Brigadier-General in the Polish Army, has been named Army Political Chief. He was previously a commander of an armored division stationed in Szczecin. His assistant will be General Jozef Urbanowicz, a Soviet Army officer attached to the Polish Army, who had served as chief of political education in the Polish Navy prior to 1956. (Radio Warsaw, June 1.)

Envoy to Britain Named

Witold Rodzinski, associate professor at Warsaw University, was appointed Polish Ambassador to the United Kingdom, replacing E. Milnikiel who was recalled to Warsaw. The new Ambassador's most recent post was director of the Afro-Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Radio Warsaw, May 31.)

Bogdan Lewandowski replaced Jerzy Michalowski as Polish Ambassador and representative to the United Nations. (Radio Warsaw, June 7.)

Polish-Communist Chinese Exchanges

Headed by Politburo member Po I-po, a Chinese Communist delegation left Poland, May 26, after a two-week visit. Scant information was forthcoming about the purpose of the trip, although the final communique stated that Polish and Chinese government officials "traveled throughout the country studying the methods of Party work on the provincial level." (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], May 27.)

The new Polish Ambassador to Peiping, Jerzy Knothe, presented his credentials to the Communist Chinese government, May 15. On this occasion Knothe declared that "the Polish nation views with sincere admiration the successes achieved in Socialist construction under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party led by Mao Tse-tung." (*Trybuna Ludu*, May 16.)

PAX Leader Reinstated

Zygmunt Przetakiewicz, generally considered an anti-Semite, has returned to duty as assistant to the director of the Communist-backed pseudo-Catholic PAX organization. Western correspondents reported that he had been dismissed from this post last spring as a result of drunken, anti-Semitic remarks directed against Politburo-member Roman Zambrowski.

Kaczmarek Back

Bishop Czeslaw Kaczmarek, the cleric most frequently attacked by the Polish regime, has returned to his diocese in Kielce after spending several weeks in the mountains on "sick leave," according to Western reports. The Bishop had been arrested in 1951, accused of "collaboration with

the Germans"; at that time he was given 12 years imprisonment, but released after 4 years, following the accession to power of Wladyslaw Gomułka. Recently, the government has refused to recognize him as head of his diocese.

British Trade Back to Normal

A new three-year trade pact was signed on May 20 with Great Britain, Poland's largest trading partner in the West and best customer in its drive to recapture lost export markets for agricultural produce. Anglo-Polish trade talks were deadlocked last December when the British refused to renew the 48,500 ton annual bacon quota which had been granted to Poland in 1959, and which accounted for over a third of Poland's sterling earnings. A provisional accord, accepted at that time, allowed an import of 20,000 tons of bacon during the first six months of 1960. The new agreement restores the 1959 quota, and trade between the two countries is slated to grow by 10 to 15 percent during the first year as compared with the 1959 level, according to the official Polish news service.

The London *Economist*, May 21, by way of explaining the British concession, said: "Poles found it impossible to view the hitch over the British import quotas for bacon as



Left, "State interests." Right, "Local interests."

KOOPERATIVNO SELO (Sofia), May 14, 1960

A MADE-UP MAN

The young Polish poet Tymoteusz Karpowicz is earning an increasing reputation as a leader in the newest generation of writers. Below is a poem from his volume *Kammienna Muzyka* ("Stony Music"), Warsaw: 1958.

Do not stare at my face —
it is a made face
I have saved one dead feature after another
erected this sarcophagus above my corpse
lost half of my life but at last done the impossible:
the most crooked mirror
could not have imagined this face

Do not listen to my speech —
it is made up also
I have done the impossible:
ignored my native sounds
in the tower of Babel
exchanged its sound
for a synthetic speech
It has been harder than wingless flying
Thus I have lost the second half of life

Do not stare at my hands
do not stare at my feet
do not stare at my shadow —
I have made myself up
I am a made-up man —
fruit of a non-existent tree

a mere aspect of a routine trade negotiation. To them the issues involved transcend official bargaining; they affect a long-term pattern of commercial and industrial relationships, and are likely to have a decisive political and emotional influence on Poland's attitude to Britain." Between 1957 and 1959, Poland's imports from Britain, consisting primarily of machinery, increased by 70 percent, and in 1959 by nearly a half. In spite of rapid industrialization and a shortage of meat supplies at home, 75 percent of Poland's exports to Great Britain are made up of agricultural produce, over half of which is bacon and other meat products.

Censor Displeased

"Revisionist tendencies . . . anti-Socialist ideology . . . and barren negative attitudes" were reflected in Polish radio and TV programs last year, according to regime censor Artur Starewicz. Most deserving of criticism, he said, "are the revues and satirical programs which were swamped with the greatest amount of trash, anti-Socialist allusions, shallow humor and poor quality songs with frequently vulgar and artless texts." Starewicz also assailed student satirical theaters and cabarets as well as contemporary music and especially jazz. (*Nowe Drogi* [Warsaw], May.)

Gomułka Speaks

Party leaders, headed by First Secretary Wladyslaw Gomułka and Premier Jozef Cyrankiewicz, met with the members of the presidium of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw, May 27. In a lengthy address, Gomułka stressed



No citizen can evade his "responsibilities." A patient in a Prague hospital casts his affirmative ballot.

Rude Prava (Prague), June 14, 1960

the need for a detailed program of scientific studies leading to an improvement in the use of Poland's natural resources such as coal, sulphur, iron ore and natural gas. He also called for less wastage of fodder to reduce costly grain imports.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The Election Campaign

Although only a single slate of candidates for the National Assembly, Slovak National Council and National Committees appeared on the ballots on June 12, Party propagandists repeatedly bludgeoned the Czechoslovak people with the "importance" of their vote. Dr. Anna Pospisilova, a leading member of the puppet Czechoslovak Socialist Party, produced the following piece of casuistry for *Svobodne Slovo* (Prague), May 24:

"What is the task of the citizens to whom only a single candidate is presented for the elections? It is a very important task: to ponder whether the proposed candidate is indeed capable of fulfilling the requirements needed to build a mature, Socialist society. If the citizens are in doubt about this, they have the right to say so during the campaign. . . . In the past a candidate has been proposed who was known at his job for his good morale but in his daily life has other serious shortcomings. The citizens therefore raised objections to him at a pre-election meeting and his candidacy was dropped. A new candidate was proposed, one who better fulfilled the demands of the



Citizens of the Bohemian town of Kladno being marched to the polls for the election of June 12.

RUDE PRAVO (Prague), June 13, 1960

voter. . . . Therefore, before the ballots are dropped into the ballot boxes, observe the proverb—Measure twice and cut once!"

Who Selects the Candidates?

Candidates for the national committees are proposed by the Communist-controlled National Front. In answer to the question why the voters themselves should not "assemble and select the candidate . . . from among the ranks," the following explanation was forthcoming: "In practice, voters would probably propose a number of different persons, which would stem from their personal opinions and relations. On the other hand, the National Front Commission can select the very best of the very best . . . and then have such proposals evaluated by all voters." (*Prace* [Prague], May 13.)

Finally elected to the National Assembly were 300 candidates, of whom 67 were women. Only 79 were workers; 45 were members of collectives, 59 representatives of the intelligentsia, 10 representatives of the army and security forces, 107 Party and public officials. Of the minorities, only 6 Hungarians, 1 Pole, 3 Ukrainians and 2 Germans were elected. Of the 87 members elected to the Slovak National Council, 73 were Slovaks, 10 Hungarians, 2 Ukrainians and 2 Czechs. Over 99 percent of the valid ballots were reported cast for the National Front candidates. (*Ceteka* [Prague], June 13.)

Ostrava Mine Disaster

On May 22, a gas explosion occurred in a coal mine in the Ostrava region killing 54 miners. The Party Central Committee, after eulogizing the "fallen labor heroes,"

HUNGARY

went on to exhort the workers to show "even greater enthusiasm" for the completion of the "victory of Socialism." Moreover, the sorrow caused by the deaths of the miners "will strengthen the will of the working collectives . . . to achieve permanent peace in the world." (Radio Prague, May 23.)

Cuban Trade Agreement

A nine-man trade mission headed by Minister of Foreign Trade Frantisek Krajcir concluded a series of economic pacts with the Cuban government on June 11 in Havana. Cuba will get "up to \$20 million" worth of machinery and equipment, to be paid for within 10 years at 2.5 percent interest. Czechoslovakia will also send technical experts to assist in Cuba's development. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], June 12.) A *New York Times* correspondent reported on June 12 that a conference between Foreign Trade Minister Krajcir and the Cuban Minister of Armed Forces had set off speculation in Havana that the pact might include the sale of military planes and weapons. No mention was made of such items in the Czechoslovak press. Earlier this month, diplomatic missions in Cuba and Czechoslovakia were promoted from legation to embassy level.

DON'T CONFUSE US, PLEASE

That well-known scholar Wladyslaw Gomulka, the Communist leader of Poland, recently addressed the Polish Academy of Science on the problems of Polish science. Following are some of his remarks on the tasks of the social scientists, as reported by Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), May 29.

"The scientists should help the Party as much as possible in the sphere of the social sciences; they should enrich its theory and its perception of social reality, and cooperate in the shaping of its policy. They will succeed in this only if they are guided in their work by the theory and method of Marxism-Leninism, and draw their inspiration from the attitude and the activity of the Party.

"We have every chance today of avoiding any basic contradiction between the attitude of the Party and the results achieved by scientists engaged in social research, provided that this research is based on scientific Marxist theoretical foundations.

"The reason why such contradictions still exist, and why they were so sharp in the recent past, lies mainly in the fact that, under the slogan of 'anti-dogmatism,' false bourgeois and revisionist theories were brought to play in the social sciences.

"The overcoming and total elimination of the influences of these theories is today the basic requirement for a successful development of the social sciences and humanities in Poland."

Front Organization Convenes

The Second Congress of the Communist-backed People's Front (PPF) met in Budapest, May 27-29. Formed during the Stalinist era, its first congress was held in 1954 when the then Premier Imre Nagy outlined a broader role for the PPF than its status as a catch-all for fellow travelers. Soon after, these plans were torpedoed; now, Party chief Janos Kadar is trying once again to inject some life into the dormant organization. Speaking before the delegates, PPF chairman and Deputy Premier Gyula Kallai referred to the "emerging revisionist group who assumed a leading role in the Party" after 1954; however, "the PPF has overcome these mistaken ideas" and is ready "to exert efforts to realize the objectives fixed by the [Communist] Party for the people as a whole."

Kallai went on to outline Kadar's "middle way" regarding the changing methods of the class struggle: "Now that we have liquidated the bourgeoisie and the class of large landowners, we are not trying to sharpen the class struggle against members of classes which no longer exist. If they integrate themselves honestly into our social system and work appropriately, they become equal citizens of the country." He also predicted that in the next few years agriculture would be entirely "Socialized"; on these economic foundations "Socialist culture" would greatly expand: "After the political and economic fronts, the Socialist revolution will be triumphant on the ideological and cultural fronts." Kallai also urged all social strata to volunteer their time for unpaid "social work"—i.e. aiding the police forces, participating in local councils and collectives, etc. (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], May 28.)

In the final resolution, the Congress voted to support the program of the Communist Party and commended the USSR for its struggle "to assure peaceful coexistence between States with different social systems." (*Magyar Nemzet* [Budapest], May 30.)

New Defense Minister

Lajos Czinege, first Party secretary of Szolnok County, has been appointed Minister of Defense, replacing Geza Revesz who was named Ambassador to the USSR. (See page 26.) No announcement was made about a new post for the former envoy to Moscow, Janos Boldoczky, and his dismissal was not accompanied by the usual customary acknowledgment for work "well done." (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], May 18.)

Recalcitrant Protestants

Lutheran pastors have apparently been lagging behind in their support of the regime, according to an article by Bishop Zoltan Kaldy, installed by the Party after the 1956 Revolt. After scrutinizing 20 sermons, Kaldy was shocked to read only a few sermons "which explained to the congregation the rôle of the church in Socialism." Worse yet,

he discovered "statements reflecting the way of thinking of the 1940s" as well as evidence of efforts to remain apolitical:

"Most of the pastors take pains not to utter words like peace, war, disarmament, racial questions, atomic danger, peaceful coexistence, progress, welfare, etc. from the pulpit . . . thus turning God's church into a museum." (*Lelkipasztor* [Budapest], April.)

Agriculture: Difficulties and Decrees

The struggle to turn the countryside's new collective farms into going concerns has produced a growing stream of discussion and decrees. The issues surrounding the collectives have sharpened since the campaign to increase their numbers ended in February. President Istvan Dobi, speaking at a Budapest session of the National Council of Agricultural Collectives, classified the difficulties into three types: lags in production due largely to a lack of interest on the part of the new members; a flight of youth from the rural areas into urban centers; and problems involved in turning one-time "kulaks" into a "new peasant class." (*Radio Budapest*, June 2.)

The authorities have shown concern over this summer's harvest. They have tried to provide the new collective members with incentives by setting up a more individualistic system of income distribution and work organization (see *East Europe*, May, p. 44.) But to insure that the crops will be brought in, the Party's Youth League is recruiting 30,000 "volunteer harvesting pairs" to aid in the work. These are teams of young people who are expected to harvest some 71,000 acres of grain with hand-scythes and twine, because only enough machinery is available to do roughly 40 percent of the job. (*Magyar Nemzet* [Budapest], May 22.)

President Dobi admitted to his audience that "for years animal breeding has been the most under-developed area of collective farming," and that it declined significantly last year. The answer, he said, is more support to the private plots of the collective farmers, so they can supplement the production of the collectives.

MEANWHILE, BACK AT THE FACTORY . . .

A Hungarian critic of popular culture recently made a tour of the second-hand bookstores in a Budapest working district. To his horror he found a farrago of "chauvinist and irredentist books," military memoirs and even books praising Mussolini.

"After such experiences, no wonder that our eyes were caught by a book with a title in Cyrillic: 'Russkaya Literatura.' We opened it and discovered that the jacket hid the masterpiece, 'The Texas Horseman.' These booksellers learn easily. In the years of the workers' movement [when Communism was outlawed], it was customary to bind Soviet novels and Marxist classics in the jackets of dime novels."

Nepmuveles (Budapest), May 1960

The Old and the Halt

The efflux of young people from the countryside has grown so large that the collectives are becoming "senile," Dobi said, and there are only a few members left under the age of thirty. Since the beginning of the collectivization campaign in early 1958, government ministries have instructed their enterprises not to hire young "runaway" peasants. Now, an open decree by the Ministry of Food forbids its enterprises to employ them unless they have a signed statement by the Chairman of their village council testifying that there is an excess of manpower. Even the Communist press has found this action distasteful. *Nepszava* (Budapest), May 10, stated: "These measures have a bad effect, because they are discussed in the villages and the peasants draw far-reaching and false conclusions from them."

Despite the regime's long propaganda warfare against "kulaks," it now favors their entry into the collectives. *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest) argued on May 10 that this did not mean an abandonment of the class struggle in the villages. "The kulak, by joining the collective and performing good work in it . . . , promotes Socialist farming. Experience gained so far proves that the majority of former kulaks now in the collectives work diligently and are trying to adapt themselves. . . ." However, the Party daily felt that the development of a "new and uniform peasant class" would require a lengthy process of reeducation.

Paintings Termed Weak

While perforce advocating "Socialist realism" in the fine arts, Hungarian critics have not been able to ignore the obvious shortcomings which such an ideological strait-jacket imposes on the artist. Caught on the horns of this dilemma, the critics often acknowledge the poor results but dare not point out the true causes. The following example of this kind of thinking occurred in a review of the Eighth Exhibition of Hungarian Fine Arts, held recently in Budapest:

"The problem was expressed most simply by the viewer who said when he left, 'There isn't one picture I'd like to see again.' This opinion does not only contain the fact that there is a lack of outstanding creativity—this could be excused in any one year—but formulates much more generally the deficiency of the exhibit—it does not arouse deep emotions. . . . As to content . . . there are relatively many pictures of workers, and also themes which, in one form or another, reflect our daily life. But it is precisely the necessity for these themes which leads one to the source of the paintings' grayness and lack of character: the poverty of thought and feeling, the lack of true knowledge of life." (*Elet és Irodalom* [Budapest], May 6.)

Novel Under Fire

Fresh evidence that "Socialist realism" continues to dominate Hungarian critical thinking was forthcoming when Peter Veres' novel, "Reluctant Girl," was reviewed in *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), May 4. Veres, president of

the Writers' Union at the time of the 1956 Revolt, has apparently written a book, set in the period before World War II, which ignores the "social environment": "It is as if the village were a self-contained unit. . . . The misery, struggles and parochial attitudes are not determined by the surrounding social order, and the few parts which relate to a larger social framework . . . are not organically adjusted to the narrative."

ROMANIA

Third Party Congress Program

The long-delayed Third Congress of the Romanian Worker's (Communist) Party—which, according to Party statutes, should have taken place by the end of 1959—convened June 20 in Bucharest. In preparation for the Congress an "enlarged" plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee was held May 17-18 to review the draft economic plan for the six-year period 1960 to 1965 and the long-term "perspective" economic program to 1975, which composed the agenda of the Congress.

The program outlined by First Party Secretary Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej is ambitious but not dramatic. It aims to continue with the development of industry and with the collectivization of agriculture (to be completed by 1965). Heavy stress is placed on modernizing, reequipping and developing existing enterprises rather than pumping more and more funds into large new projects.

Industrial production is to increase over the period to 1965 at an annual rate of roughly 13 percent; national income is to grow by 70-80 percent, labor productivity by 60-65 percent and real wages by 40-45 percent; production costs are to be lowered by 15-16 percent. In the countryside, although agriculture's share of total investment is to be reduced to 13 percent as compared with 19.5 percent in 1959, large-scale improvements in mechanization, irrigation and the use of fertilizers are called for.

AS THE TWIG IS BENT . . .

"The son of the Communist council president is also among the children who take part in religious teaching, and what is more, he comes with the approval and knowledge of his Party-member father. The children must not make an outcast of you, so go to the lesson, my son!—those were his words when he gave his consent. And the child took advantage of it. So much so that he became one of the best altar boys. It is understandable that this was to the liking of the priest, but it is more difficult to see why the Party-member council president agreed to all this."

Zalai Hirlap (Zala County, Hungary), May 3, 1960

BULGARIA

New Soviet Ambassador

Georgi Denisov has been appointed new Soviet Ambassador to Sofia, replacing J. K. Prinkhodov. (Radio Sofia, May 24.) Denisov was chief of the Party Central Committee section for agricultural planning in the Union Republics, and may have been sent to Sofia to coordinate the agricultural policies of COMECON, the Soviet bloc economic group.

Forestry Administration Changed

By governmental decree, the forestry administration of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry has been separated from the ministry and set up as an autonomous organization. The former cabinet office has been renamed the Ministry of Agriculture. No explanation of why this move was made appeared in the regime press. (*Izvestia* [Sofia], May 3.)

"Voluntary Work" In the Forests

"Voluntary manual labor" by white collar employees has not been entirely discontinued. The original decree, issued at the inception of the "big leap forward" in December 1958, which gave "permission" to these employees to do 30 days of work in industry and agriculture, was revoked last March. Now, however, this decision has been amended in deference to the afforestation program for 1960. In an effort to control erosion, 900,000 decares have been set aside for reforestation during the current year. This effort will require "the participation of the population with voluntary labor," said *Kooperativno Delo* (Sofia), April 23. The new decree, moreover, has a novel feature: the land to be reforested will be parcelled out to State offices, enterprises and organizations by contracts stipulating the area for which each is responsible and providing "for the quality and quantity of work" done by their employees. The contracts also provide for "the delivery to the State of good forest cultures in a period of two to three years."

ALBANIA

Prices Reduced

The Albanian regime celebrated May Day by announcing price cuts on 85 consumer items, along with electricity and machinery for collective farms, effective April 29. The retail price concessions covered various kinds of food products, including meats and dairy products, textiles and clothing, and consumer durables such as household utensils, radios, bicycles, cameras and watches. Reductions ranged from 7 percent on meat to 33 percent on saucers. Household electricity rates were cut by 16.7 percent beginning in May. The prices of motor vehicles for collective farms were reduced by 37.5 percent. Minister of Trade Ngjela stated that this was the sixth price reduction in four years and four months. (Radio Tirana, April 28.)

Profile of a Friend

by SLAWOMIR MROZEK

This is a satire on General Kazimierz Witaszewski, widely known in Poland as "General Gaspipe" because he once expressed the view that dissident people should be clubbed. In the Stalinist years he was Deputy Minister of National Defense. After October 1956 he was transferred to the embassy in Prague, but a few weeks ago he was recalled and appointed chief of the important Administration Department of the Party Central Committee, in charge of nominations for political posts.

Satirist Slawomir Mrozek is a very popular Polish writer. This piece appeared in the March 27 issue of Argumenty (Warsaw), the journal of the Association of Atheists and Freethinkers.

I HAD A FRIEND, Johnny D.

Johnny D. had a peculiar characteristic: from his earliest childhood he showed an insurmountable attraction to all kinds of pipes.

As soon as he had learned to walk he ran away from his nurse toward every pipe they encountered, whether it was a drain pipe, a water pipe, a sewer pipe or even a stove-pipe hat on the head of a count who happened to be passing in the street. And at the sight of a gas pipe he clapped his chubby hands and could not contain his joy.

Every so often Johnny disappeared and was found inside the gardener's watering hose, or twisted into an automobile tire, or stuck in a sewer pipe. For that reason the sewage system in our house was usually out of order, since the pipes were stopped up with Johnny.

How can this be explained? Perhaps only by the laws of heredity as taught by Mendel.

Johnny's father was notorious, because even before the birth of his son he never had his pants pressed and the legs looked like pipes. And the poor child suffered for the sins of his father.

Johnny D. also had another characteristic which, together with the first one, was to determine his future. His little head was exceptionally hard. When he was expelled from kindergarten he went to work with a glazier. The glazier used to take him by his little legs and cut glass with his hard little head. The few pennies he made this way he took home where they were needed, since his daddy had long before been killed in an accident. He lost his life when he failed to take the most elementary precautions in servicing a water pipe.

Soon after that I left home to study at Yale and Eton; I lost sight of Johnny D. Many years later I met him again, already a mature artist.

Masterfully combining his two aforementioned characteristics—love of pipes and a hard head—Johnny D. worked in the theatre. While the public watched, he was put in a cannon and shot with real gunpowder right smack into a concrete wall. Johnny was amazingly successful in his acting career.

But the muses fall silent when the god of war speaks. War interrupted Johnny's artistic development.

During the war he served as ammunition for a field battery. Shot from a cannon, he flew with a whistle over the enemy trenches. On hitting the ground he shouted "Bang, bang!" and fell upon the nearest enemy. Then he turned around and ran back to his own lines as fast as his legs would carry him. This meant enormous savings in ammunition, since Johnny could be shot indefinitely, so long as he did not catch a cold.

It took him a long time to get used to the rifled gun barrels that are used in the army. The rifling gave him a fast whirling motion as he flew through the air. His head spun so that when he reached the enemy trenches he was dizzy and exploded only feebly.

When he finally got used to the rifling, Johnny was transferred to the anti-aircraft artillery. Shot in the direction of an enemy plane, Johnny peeked through the pilot's window, cried: "Did you know General Mars?" and fell back to earth. The pilot lost balance and, out of nervousness, was unable to carry out his mission efficiently.

They say that toward the end of the war, when the situation was particularly difficult, Johnny was also used in the anti-tank artillery. To protect him, they gave him a metal helmet.

No wonder, then, that Johnny D. received many medals and citations. But I am telling this story only to show what a bad effect war has upon a man's character. Abilities which in time of peace serve to further the development of the arts, can also be used in wartime; but afterward it is difficult to adjust again to normal conditions.

After the war, when demobilization began, Johnny D. disappeared. All efforts to find him failed. We heard nothing about him until recently, under tragic circumstances.

A band of rural shepherd boys came upon Johnny in a small grove of trees. He had been lying there patiently since the end of hostilities. The children, ignorant of danger, tried to play with him. Then Johnny exploded and tore off the leg of one of the little boys.

But I think we should not judge him too severely. Such is life. . . .

Texts and Documents

MOSCOW ATTACKS YUGOSLAV "REVISIONISM"

The Soviet Communist Party published a strong attack on the Yugoslav Communists in the May issue of Kommunist, the Party's ideological organ. Written by Boris Ponomarev, Fedor Konstantinov and Yuri Adropov, it took issue with the "revisionist" ideas expressed at the April Congress of the Yugoslav Socialist Alliance—a front organization of the League of Yugoslav Communists. While the criticisms expressed in the article are not new, its appearance at this time shows the importance that Moscow attaches to ideological conformity, and indicates the stresses that underlie the superficial unity of the Communist bloc. Extensive excerpts from the lengthy article are given below.

THE FIFTH CONGRESS of the Yugoslav Socialist Alliance, which was set up in 1953 as a result of the transformation of the People's Front, was held in Belgrade Apr. 18-22. The congress discussed reports by the leading organs of the alliance, Comrade Tito's report, "The Building of Socialism and the Role and Tasks of the Yugoslav Socialist Alliance," and other questions.

As is evident from the entire work of the congress, the Yugoslav leaders considered the main task of the congress to be to praise and develop further the revisionist program of the League of Yugoslav Communists. Exposing the aim of the congress, the present Socialist Alliance Secretary General, A. Rankovic, declared: "The Fifth Congress was a further development of the program of the League of Yugoslav Communists. . . ." The speeches of "theoreticians" of E. Kardelj's kind, as well as the speeches of the leading figures of the Socialist Alliance glorified in all possible ways the successes of the Yugoslav system, and the "Yugoslav road to Socialism" was depicted not only as a "peculiar" way for Yugoslavia but also as a model for all countries of the world, a sort of standard applicable to the East as well as to the West. . . .

The congress shows once again that the Yugoslav leaders not only did not draw conclusions from the principled criticism of the program of the League of Yugoslav Communists, criticism voiced by the Marxist-Leninist parties, but that they continue to deepen their revisionist conceptions and remove themselves even farther from the positions of the international Communist movement and from Marxism-Leninism. They strive even more persistently than before to impose their views on the international workers' and democratic movement. . . .

The retreat of the Yugoslav leaders from Marxist-Leninist teaching was ex-

pressed in a most striking manner at this congress: In the basic questions of the theory and practice of building Socialism in Yugoslavia; in the question of the roads of the development of Socialism in the contemporary world; in the explanation of the so-called extra-bloc position; in the question of the methods of insuring the peaceful coexistence of States with different social orders; and in the further revision of Lenin's teaching on the Party and the State and other questions of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

I

The speeches at the Fifth Socialist Alliance Congress dealt at length with praise for the "Yugoslav economic system." An attempt was made to advertise the superiority of the Yugoslav economic system and also deepen its "theoretical" basis. E. Kardelj's speech is characteristic in this connection. Glorifying the Yugoslav methods of developing the economy, he endeavored to attack the principles of Socialist construction in the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries. In his speech E. Kardelj laid the main stress on developing the revisionist tenets on Socialist property, tenets that are contained in the program of the League of Yugoslav Communists. He maintained that with the introduction of "workers' self-administration" in Yugoslavia, not only the form of the State began to change but "also the character of State ownership of the means of production, this being an elementary and principal negation of private ownership." Kardelj continued: "This property becomes more and more public property in the actual meaning of the word, that means joint property of all and of each individual, thus being a negation of any kind of ownership. At the same time it is a collective and also a private property

which belongs to everybody and to nobody, a local property and a universal property."

With the aid of such verbal equilibratics the Yugoslav functionaries try to prove that State property is merely "indirect" public property, "characteristic of the first phases of Socialist development." According to their opinion, for State property to become truly public property it must be transferred from the hands of the "apparatus of public servants" to the people themselves, to the producers. In conformity with this, in Yugoslavia, an alleged transition has been effected from State property to a property which the Yugoslav theoreticians call "all-public" property or "directly public property." It must be noted that the Yugoslav revisionists' negative and hostile attitude toward State property springs from their incorrect, historically invalid understanding of the law governing the emergence and development of Socialist society. From their point of view, Socialism emerges and grows in the folds of capitalism, just as the capitalist system was born in the folds of feudalism. There is no need to prove how untenable it is to identify the laws governing the emergence of Communist forms of which Socialism is the first phase with those governing the emergence of capitalist forms.

The capitalist system can emerge and grow spontaneously in the folds of feudalism because capitalism and feudalism belong to the same general type, both being based on private ownership of the means of production and on the exploitation of man by man. The transition to Socialism, however, means a fundamental upheaval in the development of society. Only the material prerequisites for Socialism are born under capitalism; however, the emergence of Socialism is a revolutionary transformation of all aspects of the old society, of its political structure, economy, law, culture, morality, and the views of people, all of which have emerged on the basis of private ownership of the means of production and the exploitation of man by man. This transformation takes place in a conscious manner under the guiding and organizing influence of the Socialist State and the Party of the workers' class.

"A Negative Attitude . . ."

The negative attitude of the Yugoslav revisionists toward State ownership springs also from the fact that they in effect do not draw a fundamental borderline between the nature and the functions of the bourgeois and the Socialist State, con-

sidering not only the first but also the second to be forces that stand above the people. The bourgeois State is in effect hostile to the people, but how is it possible to place the Socialist State on an equal footing with it, since the Socialist State is a weapon in the hands of the people, serving their interests?

History shows that the forms of ownership change not arbitrarily but depending on the character and level of the development of production forces. Under the conditions of Socialism, public ownership exists in two forms: in the form of State property which belongs to all the people and in the form of cooperative property which belongs to individual groups of working people. In the process of the development of the Socialist society, the level of the socialization of kolkhoz and cooperative production is raised and ultimately the two forms of Socialist property will merge into one single Communist property.

It is known by all that the economic development of society changed from dispersal to a condition of concentration and centralization of production. In the transition period from capitalism to Socialism, the cooperativization of small-type production, including agriculture, is a tremendous step ahead. On the other hand, the transfer of large industrial enterprises to management by the "collective of producers" whereby the State is deprived of the possibility of exerting decisive influence on production, is nothing but a step backward. . . .

" . . . Toward State Ownership "

Turning to Yugoslav practice, it becomes obvious that the factories, plants, transportation, communications, trade enterprises, and agricultural estates that were turned over to the management of the "producers' collectives" have not become another form of property. Actually, is an enterprise the property of a collective of working people who "manage" it? No, it is not. As early as 1956 none other than Kardelj himself wrote in an article, "Evolution in Yugoslavia," published in the American journal FOREIGN AFFAIRS: "The workers' councils do not own the enterprises but only manage them on behalf of the entire society. . . . They cannot act as they see fit because they have no rights of ownership." This is putting it quite clearly. This, however, contradicts the assertions of this same Kardelj to the effect that the transfer of the enterprises to the management of producers' collectives in Yugoslavia has wrought changes in the nature of the

"State ownership of the means of production" and that a transition had been effected from State ownership to some sort of new and higher form of ownership.

Kardelj also asserted that "the production of a given enterprise, which is public property under the conditions of Socialism, cannot be considered State property, which is property that is managed by organs that are not subject to the direct influence of the worker and producer who has participated in the manufacture of this production." Thus it turns out that without being the owner of the means of production one can be the owner of the production and, conversely, being the owner of the means of production, it is possible that one is not the owner of the products manufactured. Thus the very concept of ownership disappears and what is left is something indefinite. Even the most experienced bourgeois economists could envy such refined sophistry. . . .

Everything said above on the groundlessness of the theoretical constructions of Yugoslav revisionists is not new. The practice of the USSR and the People's Democracies proved long ago the truthfulness of the Marxist-Leninist tenets on the nature and the forms of Socialist ownership and the role of the Socialist State in developing the economy. Why did Kardelj have to touch again on these questions at the Fifth Congress of the Socialist Alliance? He did so to prove that, allegedly, only in Yugoslavia have conditions been set up under which the working people are truly free and under which the working people's decisive influence over the process of production and distribution is insured and that therefore, if you please, the Yugoslav experience is of universal significance for all countries of the world.

"2 Billion Dollars in Free Aid"

At the Fifth Socialist Alliance Congress it was asserted that the Yugoslav economic system is exceptionally efficient. Is this so? In this article it is impossible to deal with all aspects of the development of the Yugoslav economy. It will be of interest, however, to quote some characteristic facts. Let us take, for example, such an important index for the efficiency of the economic system as labor productivity. The organ of the Yugoslav trade union, the paper RAD on Jan. 18, 1957, quoted data according to which labor productivity in the national economy, as compared with 1939 (the 1939 level taken to be 100) was as follows: In 1947, 90.3; in 1950, (This was the year the "new system" was introduced in Yugoslavia) 67.7; in 1951, 73.1; in 1953, 79.6; in 1954, 78.5;

in 1955, 78.0; and in 1956 (for nine months) 78.7. If we consider labor productivity only in industry, then, according to Yugoslav data, it grew very slowly up to 1957: In 1954 it did not increase at all, in 1955 it increased only 2.8 percent, in 1956, 3.4 percent. Only in 1957 did it increase 8.7 percent, in 1958, 1.1 percent and in 1959 about five percent. . . .

At the congress J. Tito asserted that Yugoslavia is one of the first countries in the world in the rate of increasing industry and in industrial production. There is no doubt that in recent years there has been a certain increase in Yugoslav industrial production which is principally due to the commissioning of new plants.

The leaders of the League of Yugoslav Communists, however, failed to mention the fact that during the past 10 years the United States and other capitalist countries have invested more than 2 billion dollars in the Yugoslav economy in the form of free aid and various kinds of credits. It is not difficult to imagine what kind of successes the Yugoslav economy would have achieved without the systematic assistance of the American and other monopolies. It turns out that the so-called new economic system of Yugoslavia is marked by the compulsory need to rely upon the permanent assistance of the imperialist governments. What Socialist country, however, and which Marxist party would rely upon regular assistance of imperialist governments in building Socialism? . . .

"Great Disproportions"

The overall development of the Yugoslav economy is characterized by great disproportions, by a serious backwardness in the raw material and power bases of the existing processing plants, by a great shortage of qualified worker cadres and engineering-technical personnel, by a very low level of production mechanization, by a great dependence of the economy upon foreign credits and by a chronic deficit in the domestic trade and payment balance. This system leads in practice to a serious weakening of the principle of planning and unified centralized administration and toward uncontrolled market relations with all the ensuing negative consequences.

Particularistic and parochial trends as well as an unhealthy competition on a republican and regional scale between individual economic organizations and enterprises have become very strong in Yugoslavia. Prices of goods and services are being inflated so that enterprises may receive the greatest profits to the detriment

of the working people's interests and needs. . . .

Facing the growing difficulties and negative trends in the economic field, the Yugoslav leadership has been forced in recent years to implement serious corrective measures in the methods of administration of the national economy and in their economic policy and to consolidate the principle of centralization and of government leadership in the economic field in spite of the principles enunciated by them. The more strange seem the vain attempts of the Yugoslav revisionists to cite as an example worthy of imitation a system into which they are forced to introduce essential corrective measures.

"The Prosperous Farmsteads . . ."

Taking the floor at the Fifth Socialist Alliance Congress, J. Tito declared: "In recent years we have even achieved in agriculture such results as our critics would like very much to see in their own practice." He alleged that the Yugoslav practice refuted the conclusions of the Communist parties on the possible strengthening of capitalist elements in Yugoslav rural areas. It is known that agriculture in the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia had been stagnant for many years and that only within the past two or three years has there been a certain increase in the gross yield of grain crops which was largely due to favorable climatic conditions during these years. This fact, however, does not yet prove the successes of the Socialist reorganization of agriculture.

One of the principal economic tasks of a Socialist government is to assist the basic masses of the peasantry in their transition from small-scale individual agriculture to large-scale collective agriculture which is provided with up-to-date technical equipment and is able to increase production unrelentingly. Marxism-Leninism proceeds from the fact that the only way of creating large Socialist agricultural production is the gradual transformation of small peasant property into cooperative property. . . .

And what is now the Yugoslav road of transferring small peasant farmsteads to a Socialist road? And what must the small producers do who, according to the words of Kardelj, cannot "adapt themselves to such production" and who are threatened with ruin? According to the concept of the Yugoslav revisionists the Socialist transformation of the village must not proceed by way of the transition of small, split-up, individual peasant farmsteads to the road of large-scale collective farms

on the basis of the socialization of the basic means of production, but by way of establishing and developing cooperation of individual peasant farms with State organizations and the so-called agricultural cooperatives of the general type on the basis of mutual material interest. By means of such direct or indirect contacts the private farmsteads will allegedly be enlisted in the general system of Socialist economy and Socialism.

However, first the very cooperatives of the general type in Yugoslavia have a predominantly supply-and-sales character, they cannot conduct their economic activities in line with the market situation on the basis of free market relations while establishing their "cooperation" with the individual peasant farmsteads on a purely commercial basis. Second, the assistance of these cooperatives is used mainly by the kulaks and the prosperous strata of the village with the aim of further intensifying and strengthening their farmsteads. The cooperatives do not help the poor farmsteads which they consider unprofitable.

". . . Grow Rich"

The leadership of the League of Yugoslav Communists is obviously not bothered by the question of changing the very nature of the individual peasant farmsteads based on private ownership. These farmsteads under conditions of the economic policy of the League of Yugoslav Communists are faced with the dilemma of either strengthening and thus, so to speak, "growing" into Socialism or being ruined. It is clear that under such a policy mainly the prosperous farmsteads withstand the test and are strengthened. As far as the small, poor, and medium farmsteads which represent more than 86 percent of all private peasant farmsteads in Yugoslavia, are concerned their prospects are truly not good. If one turns to the contemporary Yugoslav village one notes above all, the intensive process of stratification and polarization of the peasantry—the prosperous farmsteads grow rich and the poor farmsteads are ruined and crowded out.

The large peasant farmsteads representing less than 14 percent of the total number of peasant farmsteads in Yugoslavia have almost 40 percent of all the land of the private sector in their hands. Using such opportunities as the freedom of buying, selling, and leasing land, the exploitation of hired labor, speculation with agricultural produce, and utilizing State loans, the kulaks are consistently strengthening their economic positions. At the same

time, tens of thousands of poor peasants are ruined and are forced to abandon their land and go to work in the towns. . . .

"Living Costs Were Higher"

The most important proof of the correctness of the economic policy of a Marxist party leading a country is a rising living standard of the working people. Facts in this field are not in favor of the so-called new economic system of Yugoslavia. It has contributed very little to improving the material situation of the Yugoslav working people. It is not by accident that the leaders of the League of Yugoslav Communists praised their system to high heaven in their speeches at the Fifth Socialist Alliance Congress, but failed to give data on the living standard of the working people. They tried to avoid this issue.

In recent years Yugoslavia has experienced a consistent increase in the retail prices of industrial and food products. While nominal wages have increased during the past three years an average of 30 to 40 percent, retail prices have increased considerably more. In the period from August to November 1959, prices of agricultural produce increased 12 percent as compared to the same period in 1958 while retail prices in general increased by three percent. On Feb. 9 this year BORBA noted that "since last August a certain gradual increase in prices for agricultural produce is noticed." In this connection BORBA stressed that this trend intensified in January 1960 and that the same development would continue in February. As BORBA proves, expenditures for food increased in this period by 2.4 percent, for tobacco and beverages by 0.4 percent, for apartment rent by 150 percent, and for heating and light by 20 percent. On the whole, "living costs for a worker's family consisting of four persons in January were 6.2 percent higher than in December last year."

If one takes into consideration that in addition to these facts Yugoslavia suffers from chronic unemployment and that the purchasing power of the dinar is continuously decreasing it becomes obvious that Yugoslav reality is far, very far from the picture drawn in the widely publicized declarations of the leaders of the League of Yugoslav Communists. This at a time when the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Socialist camp have achieved remarkable successes in the cause of continuously increasing the material and cultural level of the people, which even Western bourgeois circles are forced to admit.

II

In addition to propagating the "Yugoslav road to Socialism" as the universal road for all countries, an attempt was made at the Fifth Socialist Alliance Congress to interpret important problems of contemporary international developments. All these problems were viewed in the spirit of the revisionist program of the League of Yugoslav Communists. The report of J. Tito as well as the speeches of Kardelj and others devoted much time to international questions. Kardelj tried to draw a picture of the basic trends of international development, in particular of the road of development of Socialism in our time.

The birth of Socialism and its victorious triumph in the world is the logical result of the revolutionary struggle of the workers' class caused by the irreconcilable contradictions of capitalist society. The development of Socialism proceeds from the revolutionary overthrow of bourgeois rule and the desertion of ever more countries from the worldwide capitalist system to their unification in the worldwide system of Socialism. The division of the world into two social systems, the Socialist and the capitalist, is the main feature of our era. To speak in our time of roads of development and strengthening of the worldwide Socialist system where the ideas of scientific Communism have been implemented in practice is axiomatic for every Marxist-Leninist.

"Socialism Is Growing in All Countries"

The theoreticians of the League of Yugoslav Communists adhere to other views. Distorting reality they pose in their revisionist program the thesis that Socialism is allegedly growing in all countries—in Socialist countries, in countries liberated from colonialism, and in capitalist countries. As the Fifth Socialist Alliance Congress showed, the Yugoslav leaders not only failed to abandon their wrong, revisionist views on the road of contemporary social development but even continue to deepen them. It is unbelievable but true: The congress bypassed the main question—the question of the basic force of consolidation of the cause of peace and social progress, of the worldwide Socialist system, its international-historical victories, and the growth of its influence on the whole course of international development. E. Kardelj and other speakers preferred to speak of "Socialist forces" which are progressing in the whole world, thereby treating processes taking place in

Socialist countries on a par with processes evolving in the countries of capitalism. Particularly characteristic are E. Kardelj's discourses on so-called general trends of international development which are uniformly manifest under capitalism as well as under Socialism even though, as is known, these social-economic systems are contradictory. He asserts that contemporary social development "on one hand unites nations and peoples and expands the field of the international division of labor, draws States together and requires the most rapid abolition of State borders and other obstacles of this type, while on the other hand it strengthens the independent, social role of individual persons, requires a simultaneous decentralization of the administration of production and distribution, also the deconcentration of many public functions, direct democracy, and so on."

These words reflect with particular clarity the revisionist approach of Kardelj to contemporary problems. In his view, differences between Socialism and capitalism disappear and in his imagination both social systems are developing in one direction. According to this, the revival "of the independent social role of individual persons" is also taking place in capitalist countries whose rulers stifle freedom and curb the democratic rights of the masses. Thus, if one follows the logic of Kardelj, the struggle of the workers' class and the peoples' masses for the defense of democracy and against the encroachments of the reactionaries on the rights and freedoms of the working people is superfluous. What is the meaning of his statements on "the abolition of State borders" and on "drawing States together" under conditions when the reactionary circles of the imperialist powers are waging licentious attacks against the sovereignty of nations and trying to poison the masses with the ideology of cosmopolitanism?

Furthermore, how is it possible to equate capitalism, where the concentration and centralization of production means the growing omnipotence of and oppression by the monopolies, and Socialism, where these processes lead to a further strengthening of the economic bases of Socialist democracy and the development of public production with the aim of a maximum satisfaction of the requirements of the whole society and of each of its individual members? It is not difficult to look behind the scenes of Kardelj's discourses. He had to talk of decentralization to justify Yugoslav practice once more, this time from the viewpoint of "world trends," and thus to pass

it off as a general example applicable to Socialism as well as capitalism.

"Workers' Self-Administration"

After the Fifth Socialist Alliance Congress, the Yugoslav paper RAD published an article by the director of the Institute of International Politics and Economy, Stanovnik, who also dwells on general trends in the world. He considers the striving for workers' self-administration such a trend. "Demands in the direction of workers' administration in a conscious or spontaneous form," the article says, "represent an outward manifestation of the irrepensible penetration of Socialism through all pores of the old system and on a worldwide scale."

Thus in the Socialist as well as in the capitalist countries the workers' class needs self-administration and, naturally, Yugoslavia is showing them the road. Class struggle and revolutions for overthrowing the old regime—the workers of the capitalist countries need nothing of this sort, all due to the miraculous discovery of the idea of "workers' self-administration" through the leaders of the League of Yugoslav Communists! The realistic processes of social development in the capitalist countries refute these newest discoveries of the revisionists. Therefore J. Tito in his report was forced to speak of the existence of the class struggle under capitalism. Such contradictions are characteristic of the position of the Yugoslav figures at the Fifth Socialist Alliance Congress. All the more astonishing are the attempts to teach others on the basis of Yugoslav experiences. . . .

The direct participation of the masses in the administration of production and their State grows consistently with the degree of success in building Socialism and Communism and this reflects one of the basic directions of the development of Socialist democracy. Obviously the Yugoslav theoreticians confused two processes which are completely contradictory in their class contents and goals and whose differences are understandable to any conscious worker. This is no accident. All the discourses of Kardelj and the other Yugoslav theoreticians on the roads of development of Socialism and on general "world trends" reflect the complete absence of clear class positions in the assessment of this or that fact of social life which is characteristic for the revisionists of all shades.

The absence of a class position is evident with particular clarity in the so-called "outside blocs" policy pursued by

the Yugoslav leaders. This policy must by no means be confused with the peace-loving policy of positive neutrality pursued by many countries of Asia and Africa which do not belong to blocs. The Soviet Union values highly the policy of neutrality of these countries. Statements of Yugoslav leaders at the Fifth Socialist Alliance Congress stressed obtrusively that their foreign policy has the most beneficial influence on the international situation. According to the Yugoslav leaders, their "outside blocs" policy is the only possible policy for a Socialist country.

"The Danger of Two Blocs"

The Yugoslav leaders see the causes of international tensions and of the danger of war in the existence of two blocs, each of which is striving to implement its narrow bloc interests. According to this concept, the USSR and other Socialist countries are no less to blame than the imperialist powers for the fact that the arms race is continuing and that no essential progress has been made in settling disputed international questions. The foreign political actions of the Soviet State are also usually reviewed by the Yugoslav press from such a position which is in contrast to reality, attributing identical goals to all military blocs. The leaders of Yugoslavia thereby justify their refusal to march jointly with the Socialist countries and their opposition to the international solidarity with the Socialist countries.

Now not only the Marxists-Leninists but also the broadest circles of the world public know where the source of international tensions is located. It by no means lies in the existence of two blocs but in the fact that imperialism still exists in the world with its inherent predatory strivings, militarism, attempts to destroy the Socialist countries and suppress by force the worldwide revolutionary movement of the working class and the national-liberation movement.

Did not the postwar period bring much proof of the growing aggressiveness of imperialism, particularly of U.S. imperialism? Who but the imperialists launched the war in Korea, tried to oppress the liberation struggle of the Vietnamese people, organized the predatory attack on Egypt, threatened Syria with war and sent their troops to Lebanon? Who but the imperialists unleashed the arms race, placed the newest discoveries of science and technology at the service of war preparations, and refused to conclude an agreement on a cessation of

nuclear weapons tests and general and full disarmament?

If it is still possible to stamp out the hotbeds of war created by imperialism, to prevent a new worldwide conflagration, and to implement measures which lead to some alleviation of international tensions, mankind has primarily the great comity of Socialist countries to thank for it. Unfortunately, aggressive circles of the United States, by their treacherous, provocative acts, broke this line mapped out for the alleviation of tensions in the world and torpedoed the summit conference.

It is somewhat difficult for people who call themselves Marxists to explain something that is now understood by all peace-loving mankind: that Socialism, in complete contradiction to imperialism, not only has no aggressive strivings but, on the contrary, includes in its program the most devoted, consistent, active struggle for peace and friendship between peoples. If the Socialist States have to strengthen their might, equip their army with the most perfect weapons, and coordinate their efforts in the field of defense, this is done only with one aim—to create a guarantee for the defense of their security, for insuring peaceful conditions for the building of Socialism and Communism, and for interfering with the imperialist forces launching of a world war.

If there were no aggressive imperialist blocs there would be no defensive Warsaw Pact. Only hopeless "objectivists" can put aggressive imperialist blocs like NATO, SEATO, and CENTO and the defensive alliance of the Socialist States on the same level. . . .

Furthermore, can one assert without being at odds with truth that the foreign political actions of the USSR and the other countries of the Socialist camp are dictated by narrow bloc interests, as is asserted by the revisionists of the League of Yugoslav Communists? The whole world admits that Soviet foreign policy fully corresponds to the interests of all nations and is directed toward safeguarding universal peace. The nations of all countries have welcomed the Soviet program of universal and complete disarmament with tremendous enthusiasm.

"Attempts to Sit on Two Chairs"

The worldwide comity of the Socialist States is no military bloc, no matter how often the Yugoslav revisionists call it so. This is a new socio-economic formation which represents a system of countries of the same type, building their relations on the basis of the principles of proletarian

internationalism, fraternal friendship, cooperation, and mutual aid. The formation of the worldwide system of Socialism is the legitimate outcome of the evolution of human society, a great achievement of the working class and of all toilers, the embodiment of the international community of interests of the working class in various countries.

The building of Socialism alone, in self-isolation from the other Socialist countries, contradicts the laws of society's evolution, the nature of Socialism, and the vital interests of the nations which have chosen the Socialist path of evolution. What then can one say about people who pretend to the role of genuine builders of Socialism and yet occupy positions of neutrality in relation to the countries of the world Socialist system? Only one thing: Such people try to occupy neutral positions not between two blocs, but between two social systems—Socialism and capitalism. There is no need even to say that the desire to pursue some sort of neutral line in relation to the forces of reaction and the forces of progress has nothing in common with the ideology of scientific Socialism, with the principles of proletarian internationalism, and with the interests of the international working class movement. The history of the international working class movement teaches that attempts to occupy neutral positions in the class struggle, attempts to sit on two chairs have always ended in failure and often also in the open transition to the side of the enemy on the part of those who made such attempts.

Facts leave no doubt as to Yugoslavia's position of nonalignment not being, in the first place, really such a position of nonalignment, especially if one takes into consideration that Yugoslavia still continues to be a member of the Balkan Pact which also includes Turkey and Greece; and second, their position suits the interests of the imperialist bloc and is, above all, convenient to it. Recently, the ASSOCIATED PRESS reported that Tito "had come into conflict with Stalin and later with Khrushchev because of questions of Lenin's ideology. Afterwards, the Tito regime received colossal economic and military help from the United States." The main thing here has been grasped correctly. Lenin's ideology, under whose banner a billion people are marching and which is conquering the hearts of ever new millions, is the deadly enemy of the imperialists. And they do not grudge money for those who revise Leninism, who try to render it harmless for the exploiters, who engage in subversive actions against the comity of the Socialist

countries, built on Lenin's principles, for those who attempt to undermine the growing authority of these countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and in the international workers' movement.

The imperialists also praise "Yugoslav Socialism" because the Yugoslav leadership directly or indirectly supports the Western States, in the first place the United States, on a number of international issues. It has become customary for the Yugoslav press to pass in silence over many actions by U.S. ruling circles directed against the cause of peace. It is very characteristic that the Yugoslav leaders and the press failed to condemn the U.S. agreement with Iran on the construction of American military bases on its territory, the U.S. agreement with Turkey on the location of American rocket bases on Turkish territory, the signing of a new military treaty by the U.S. and Japanese governments, and the supply by the United States of the West German army with atomic and rocket weapons. What is this? A sign of agreement with these overtly aggressive actions or fear of forfeiting new credits and doles for their criticism? In either case it amounts to a direct encouragement of aggressive imperialist forces.

The position of "nonalignment" of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia finds its logical expression in practical steps in the sphere of foreign policy. As a rule the views of politicians and parties which occupy a nondescript position assert themselves with particular overtness in connection with the biggest and most acute foreign political events. This is how matters were with the conduct of the Yugoslav politicians at the time of the counterrevolutionary rising in Hungary and this is how matters are now in connection with the gangster-like intrusion of an American spy plane into the USSR.

"Shameful Justification of the US"

The whole progressive world public expressed its angry indignation at this aggressive act as well as at the motives and explanations adduced by the U.S. authorities which stated openly that espionage constitutes an integral part of their foreign policy and that they would continue to carry it out, flouting the national sovereignty of independent countries and international laws. Even many bourgeois newspapers, including some in Britain, the United States, France, Japan, and other countries have come out with an indictment of the aggressive actions of the United States against the USSR.

And the Yugoslav press, after having

kept silent for a few days, came out with commentaries in which the entire blame for the provocative actions of U.S. imperialism was laid on the objective state of affairs. "The Powers case" BORBA wrote, "reflects the tremendous mistrust still existing between the big powers. For many years this mistrust has acquired a gigantic force and almost became a material force of its own." The whole world considers the unbridled U.S. militarist forces the culprits of the provocative act, yet BORBA does not find a single word of condemnation and sees the causes of the aggressive U.S. actions in a mythical "material force of its own." In actual fact, such an explanation does not amount to anything but a shameful justification of the U.S. imperialists' aggressive actions.

"A Spirit of Mock Neutrality"

The statement which J. Tito devoted on May 17 to the meeting of the four heads of State in Paris is couched in a similar spirit of mock neutrality toward relations between the imperialist aggressors and the peaceful land of Socialism. Having dropped a passing remark that the intrusion of an American aircraft into the air space of the USSR is an adverse feature which cannot but be condemned, Tito considers that this is not at all the main thing and insists that a conference of the heads of the big powers should take place, despite the refusal of the U.S. Government to condemn the provocative act of aggression and the statement that it will also carry on with such a policy in the future. J. Tito bypasses the real causes of the conference's breakdown as well as the question of the culprits responsible for this breakdown; there is no indication in his statement that this cause lies in the aggressive policy from which certain U.S. circles are unwilling to desist.

J. Tito again equates the United States, which has perpetrated aggressive actions unprecedented in peacetime, directed against the peace-loving Soviet State, and the USSR, which really defends peace and the interests of its nation and which is bound to resist any aggressor. At a time when not only the democratic forces of all countries, but many bourgeois politicians and commentators too, declare that the position occupied by the U.S. government torpedoed the summit conference, J. Tito, glossing over the actual causes of the breakdown, launches a version to the effect that it is all a matter of prestige. Such views sound strange especially when they come from people who are extremely touchy where their own prestige is at stake.

J. Tito speaks of the need for international relations to improve and for peace to be safeguarded, but in so doing bypasses the only correct way to solve this task—the active defense of the cause of peace, an integral part of which is the unmasking of the aggressors' policy, resisting them, and mobilizing the masses in defense of peace. J. Tito rests all hopes for the consolidation of peace and the security of nations not in the comity of the Socialist countries, which plays a decisive role in the prevention of war, but merely in the "countries which have not joined blocs." Tito tries to come out again in the role of an arbiter standing "above the blocs" and thereby denies the correctness of the policy of the States of the worldwide Socialist system on the most important international issue. . . .

And what are the allegations of the Yugoslav leaders that the USSR inclines to settle international issues with the other big powers at the expense of the small countries worth? The Secretary General to the president of Yugoslavia, Mates, recently charged the USSR with no more nor less than having shared in the division of Germany and Korea and later on of Vietnam at the conferences of the big powers which took place during the last years of the war. Similar notes rang in the Fifth Socialist Alliance Congress. One of the leaders of that Alliance, Bakaric, said: The main thing is not whether the United States and the USSR come to terms. Their relation to other countries constitutes the touchstone.

"Sowing Doubts of Soviet Sincerity"

Attempts to frighten the small countries with an absolutely nonexistent, imaginary danger of a conspiracy between the USSR and the Western States constitute an ignominious trick aimed at sowing doubts of the sincerity of the Soviet Union's policy and at arousing these countries against the USSR. But do not let the Yugoslav leaders count on the success of this design! The whole world knows that the USSR is not trading and never has traded with the fate of nations. The small countries remember well who came to Egypt's aid in the days of aggression against it, who raised his voice in defense of the people of Syria when the danger of imperialist aggression hovered above it, who established with all States, big and small, genuinely equal relations for the first time in history. The Yugoslav zealots for the fate of the small countries, by equating the policy of the USSR and of the imperialist countries, are as a matter of fact distracting the attention of the

small countries from the real danger of their absorption by the imperialist States. They are afraid of giving offense to those who stifled progressive democratic Guatemala and are conducting an aggressive gangster-like policy in relation to heroic Cuba. . . .

"They Do Not Think of Unmasking Imperialism"

Peaceful coexistence by no means excludes the class struggle within the capitalist countries nor that on an international scale. The class struggle is engendered by objective conditions, and nobody is able to check it or gloss over it. Yet in the world arena this struggle can and should be waged not in the form of a military conflict, but through peaceful economic competition, the struggle of ideologies and political principles. Peaceful coexistence, interpreted the Lenin way, calls for the incessant unmasking of imperialism and the forces of reaction, it calls for an irreconcilable struggle against bourgeois ideology. It is here that the watershed between the Marxist-Leninist and the revisionist interpretation of the principle of peaceful coexistence lies. In accordance with the concept and the practice of the Yugoslav revisionists peaceful coexistence presupposes a renunciation of the struggle against bourgeois ideology, a renunciation of the unmasking of imperialism and its aggressive plans and schemes. Does not the almost complete absence of criticism of imperialism in the Yugoslav press testify to this? . . .

Active operations by all peace-loving countries and nations are called for to prevent imperialism from unleashing a world war. Peace cannot be begged for from the imperialists, it can only be won in a struggle. To struggle for peace means to augment the strength of the worldwide Socialist system, to develop technology and science, to create all the best conditions for people's lives; it means to mobilize all the forces of the nations, to thwart resolutely all the intrigues of the aggressors, to unmask the schemes of reactionary imperialist circles, to pursue consistently and unswervingly Lenin's policy of peaceful coexistence.

The Yugoslav functionaries see things differently. They do not even think of unmasking imperialism, they do not want to struggle actively against its aggressive aspirations, or to act in a united front with all the forces opposing imperialism. It is not by accident that at the Fifth Socialist Alliance Congress not a single word was said about the role of the in-

ternational Communist movement, no more than the position of the right-wing leaders of the Social Democrats who prevent the rallying of the peoples against the danger of war was criticized. . . .

III

Just as any other revisionism, Yugoslav revisionism is characterized by eclecticism, which to a certain extent facilitates the camouflage by its representatives of its true essence and of its deviation from Marxism-Leninism. The speeches of Yugoslav theoreticians frequently contain contradictory statements—that capitalism is doomed and that it is progressively "transformed," that capitalism allegedly will automatically turn into Socialism, due to the growth of productive force. There is some mention of a revolution, there is recognition of the class character of bourgeois society, and, at the same time, of the "supra-class" character of the present state of capitalist society, etc.

In the speeches at the Fifth Socialist Alliance Congress, there was no shortage of such eclecticism either. At this congress, incorrect opinions were also expressed on such questions as the role of proletarian ideology, of the Marxist Party, the Socialist State, and others. It is also noteworthy that the League's leadership, considering the affinity of its theoretical tenets with the views of social reformists and bourgeois nationalist politicians, obviously decided to pretend that the unprincipled eclectic mixture of various trends concocted by it are views which are acceptable to all. The League's leadership intended to turn its revisionist theory into an ideological flag, into a basis for creation and another variety of a "third power," combining elements which are entirely heterogeneous in both ideological and political respects. The popularization of this eclectic theory as "Yugoslav Marxism" was one of the basic tasks of the fifth congress.

"The Communist Party Is Being Depreciated"

No one who observes ideological life in modern Yugoslavia can fail to be struck by the fact that Yugoslav writers, journalists, and even philosophers, sociologists, economists, and art experts, consider it their paramount task to struggle against the Communist Parties, the Socialist countries, and the Marxist-Leninist ideology reigning in them.

At the same time, they fail entirely, or almost entirely, to conduct a struggle against capitalism and reactionary bourgeois ideology. The entire ideological ac-

tivity of the League's leadership during the last few years is characterized by the lack of struggle against bourgeois ideology. . . .

It seems that what the leaders of the Yugoslav League of Communists picked in their own way out of materialist dialectics—which is the very essence of Marxism—was only the skill of exploiting contradictions, and not those between capitalist countries, as Lenin advised, but between Socialist and capitalist countries. As we see, this is a rather peculiar way to understand and exploit dialectics.

It is characteristic of revisionism in general and of Yugoslav revisionism in particular that Communist consciousness and its loftiest exponent, the Communist Party, are being depreciated by all means. The Socialist revolution and the victory of Socialism over capitalism means a dialectical transition from the spontaneous phase of social development toward a conscious and planned development; it is a great leap from the realm of blind necessity into the realm of Socialist freedom when society for the first time accomplishes mastery over its social relations. This highly important feature of the new laws of social development, a feature which arose from the victory of Socialism, was underscored with particular vigor by Marx, Engels, and Lenin. The Yugoslav revisionists, however, try by every possible means to belittle and depreciate the role of a consciousness in Socialist development, relying particularly upon spontaneity and laissez-faire. This feature also finds its expression in the attitude toward the central problems for Marxism-Leninism: the role of the Communist Party and the Socialist State in the building of Socialism and Communism. . . .

Who profits from all these arguments which aim at belittling the historical role of the Party, contrary to the rules of the establishment and development of a new society? The working class, the people? Of course not. Only the enemies of Communism can be happy about them. The bourgeoisie hates the Communist Parties because they help the working class become a revolutionary power. The bourgeoisie would like to see the working class beheaded, without its Marxist Party. This is its dream. And whoever belittles the role of the Communist Party, willingly or not, helps the bourgeoisie. It is only with the help of its Communist Party that the working class can rise to an understanding of its universal historic mission.

Without its Party, the working class is unable either to win or to maintain the

dictatorship of the proletariat. The negation of the leading role of the Party, said Lenin, is identical with a complete disarmament of the proletariat for the benefit of the bourgeoisie. Lenin revealed this truth when he founded and educated the Bolshevik Party and directed its activities. For Lenin the Communist Party was the leader, the organizer and inspirer of the working class in its struggle for the overthrow of capitalism and the building of Socialism and Communism. . . .

"Negation of the Socialist State"

The trend toward reducing the role of Socialist consciousness in social development finds its expression also in the revisionist interpretation of the role of the Socialist State. It is already a truism for Marxists that the working people need State power both to eliminate the resistance of the defeated exploiters and especially to organize the economic and cultural buildup, to implement the policy of the union between working class and peasantry, and of the leading role of the working class in this union, to implement a Socialist policy in the sphere of national policy, and, finally, to defend Socialist achievements against foreign enemies. . . .

Any conscious and planned social development (including that of economy) under the conditions of Socialism, stipulates the knowledge of the economic and other objective laws of social life and the faculty to exploit them. Who is able to comply with this condition on a nation-wide level and throughout Socialist society? Only a Marxist-Leninist Party and a Socialist State. Individual organizations and the collectives of direct producers are naturally unable to fulfill this task. Yugoslav theoreticians, although realizing the role of the Socialist State,

consider it, contrary to Marxists and also to bourgeois ideologists, primarily as an organization of coercion. Here again revisionism relies upon the wrong principle of spontaneous development of Socialism. The negation of the economic role of the Socialist State is connected with this principle.

As a rule, the basis for revisionist views on this problem is identification of the objectively inevitable character of the development of Socialism with spontaneity. According to this idea, it is enough to create the necessary material prerequisites, and Socialism will, as it were, develop further by *laissez-faire*, without needing the correct and harmonious combination of the growing and conscious initiative of the broad masses with a Socialist and general State leadership and its directed and planned influence.

Proceeding from such a concept, revisionists assert that the role of the Socialist State is limited to the release and protection of spontaneously developing Socialist forces. "The release of these forces," say Kardelj, "the protection of their free development from counter-attack by the forces of reaction—this is, in our opinion, the task of a Socialist State, that is, of a dictatorship of the proletariat within this meaning." . . .

Characteristic of the theory and practice of Yugoslav revisionism is the deviation from principles of proletarian internationalism and their reduction to the level of bourgeois nationalism. This is where the sinful revisionist fall began. The League's leaders considered the interests of their country in a narrow and nationalistic way, and this put their policy in contrast with the policy of the Socialist countries and furthered the leaders' rapprochement with the forces inimical to Communism. . . .

Particularly emphatic now is the warn-

ing of Comrade N. S. Khrushchev from the rostrum of the 21st CPSU Congress on the possible consequences of the so-called Yugoslav way of development:

"The Marxist-Leninist parties are alarmed to see what is going on in Yugoslavia. With great sacrifices and with the assistance of the USSR, the brotherly peoples of Yugoslavia achieved their liberation from the German and Italian occupants, broke the yoke of their own bourgeoisie, and took the road of Socialism. But now the policy of the Yugoslav leaders, aimed at opposing Yugoslavia to the Socialist camp and the international Communist movement, can entail forfeiting the Socialist achievements of the Yugoslav people."

There is no doubt that the working people of Yugoslavia ponder over the fate of Socialism in their country. They cannot be convinced by the fables of the imaginary superiority of the "Yugoslav road," of the "hegemony" of the Soviet Union and the CPSU.

As a result of the Leninist policy of the CPSU, the power of the Soviet Union serves the welfare of the Socialist world system, the welfare of working people of all countries, and of peoples who strive for their national independence or for its strengthening. The power of the Soviet Union is used with enormous success in the struggle against the aggressive policy of imperialism and the danger of new wars.

Under these conditions it is particularly harmful to the Yugoslav people themselves that the revisionists stubbornly strive to oppose Yugoslavia to the Soviet Union, and her policy and views to the Leninist line and views of the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties.

Socialism in Yugoslavia can be victorious only if revisionism is overcome and only in an alliance with the Socialist world system.

Recent and Related

Soviet Conduct in World Affairs, a Selection of Readings, compiled by Alexander Dallin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960, 318 pp., \$4.50). This is a collection of 15 articles by students of Soviet foreign policy and institutions written in the years since Soviet international behavior became a major preoccupation of Western scholars. Professor Dallin has chosen them to show "the various interpretations of Soviet policy that have been advanced." The collection is led off with an irreverent essay by Daniel Bell on the attempts to explain Soviet actions in terms of various social-scientific theories: "Each of the theories . . . seems reasonable, yet not wholly real." There is a three-cornered debate on the relative importance of ideology and power politics in Moscow's dealings with the world, carried on by R. N. Carew Hunt, Samuel L. Sharp, and Richard Lowenthal. The other contributors are Barrington Moore, Jr., Nathan Leites, George A. Morgan, Michael M. Karpovich, Philip E. Mosely, Robert C. Tucker, George F. Kennan, Bertram D. Wolfe, Alex Inkeles, Henry L. Roberts and Marshall D. Shulman.

The Truth about the Nagy Affair, published for the Congress for Cultural Freedom (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959, 215 pp., \$7.50). The editors of this volume—the former friends and colleagues of Imre Nagy living outside Hungary—have compiled a collection of facts, documents and statements in an attempt to throw light on the betrayal and death of Imre Nagy. In the first part of the book they give the facts in chronological order, from the ambush laid for Nagy in front of the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest to the verdict in his trial. The second part is an analysis of the different charges in the indictment. It includes an appendix which contains several documents, either unpublished before or little known, such as the Hungarian writers' memorandum of November 1955, or the revealing proposal submitted by the leaders of the Hungarian resistance to Mr. K. P. S. Menon, the personal representative of Mr. Nehru. The third part of the work is a review of international press writings on the Nagy trial, containing commentaries from both the Eastern and the Western press. The preface is written by Albert Camus.

The Red Executive, by David Granick (New York: Doubleday, 1960, 334 pp., \$4.50). Soviet Russia's new businessman, according to economist David Granick, is not unlike his counterpart in the United States. First Mr. Granick examines the red executive as an individual: his background (often surprisingly white-collar), his education, his way of life, his professional ailments (he earns his ulcer by worry over matters similar to those of a US executive). Then the author analyses the Russian executive's part in the Soviet system and his relation to the Communist Party. The Russian manager, he says, is a man with power, but he is no independent decision-maker. His production goals, his costs, and even his industrial research objectives are set for him, but the achievement of them is his personal responsibility. Mr. Granick goes on to survey the factory set-ups, the production methods, and the economic and organizational pressures in the Soviet enterprise. Finally, he surveys the emergence of Russia as a first-rank economic power on the world scene. Index.

The Triumph of Tyranny, by Stephen Borsody (New York: Macmillan, 1960, 285 pp., \$4.50). Professor Borsody discusses the tragic story of Central Europe (giving particular attention to Czechoslovakia and Hungary) and the final triumph of tyranny in that area, namely the Nazi and Soviet conquests. He emphasizes the disastrous effects of nationalism on the course of Central European history from the Habsburgs to the Soviet Russians. Federalism, he believes, "is the only conceivable foundation upon which peace can be built in regions, such as Central Europe, where the peoples have paid so dearly for the reckless nationalist policies of their governments." The book contains four maps of Central Europe, notes, and an index.

The Hidden Russia, by N. N. Krasnov, Jr. (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1960, 341 pp., \$5.00). The son of Russian emigré parents, Nikolai Krasnov, Jr. was brought up and educated in Yugoslavia, where with the invasion of Hitler he fought against the Nazis and became a prisoner of war in Germany. Later, after peace was declared, Krasnov was one of the thousands of prisoners who were

turned over to the Soviet government under the terms of the Yalta Agreement. Thus began the author's ten-year term as a slave laborer for the MVD, of which this book is a faithful account. His description of the countless horrors of Lubyanka, Lefortovo and Butyrki prisons and the freezing mud huts of the Siberian Correctional Labor Camps are interwoven with poetic passages on the suffering and true character of the Russian people, for whom the author has great love and compassion. He also criticizes what he believes to have been fatal policy mistakes of the West, and emphasizes the futility of compromise with the Communists. Index.

Communist China and Asia, by A. Doak Barnett (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960, 575 pp., \$6.95). This book, published under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations, is a study of Communist China's growing impact on Asia and the problems it poses for the United States. Since 1947 Mr. Barnett has spent over six years in firsthand observation, research and reporting in Asia. He was in Peking when the Communists came to power, and stayed seven months under their rule. Later he lived in Hong Kong, reporting on developments throughout Asia. His chapters on Communist China as a totalitarian state emphasize its challenge to the world on political, ideological, economic and military levels. The book also discusses Peking's relations with Communist parties in other Asian countries, the Sino-Soviet alliance, and the role of the Overseas Chinese. Mr. Barnett concludes with an examination of the present US policy toward Communist China. Bibliographic note, index.

Current Soviet Policies III, edited by Leo Gruliov (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960, 230 pp., \$6.00). The documentary record of the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, from the translations of *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*. Of primary interest are the control figures of the Seven Year Plan and Khrushchev's report on the Plan. The rest of the book is a verbatim transcript of the speeches made by the delegates to the Congress. There is a "Who's Who" of the Central Committee, including candidates as well as full members. Index.

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